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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the extent to which hospital middle managers can exercise autonomy in 
England and Iran. It aims to explain the impact of public management reforms on middle 
managers and their response to these reforms. Data were collected from interviews with 
forty-five middle managers, observational fieldwork and documentary analysis across four 
teaching university hospitals in England and Iran.  
The findings show middle managers’ autonomy is constrained in the two countries in 
different ways. In England, middle managers have financial and human resources, but their 
autonomy is constrained by government policy and targets. In Iran, middle managers are 
less constrained by government policy and targets, but they do not have financial and 
human resources to exercise autonomy.  This study shows that career path, experience and 
skills of middle managers are important factors affecting middle managers’ views on their 
autonomy and the identity they adopt. 
Drawing on the institutional pillars framework of Scott (2000), it is argued that in Iran, 
middle managers face professionalism as the main logic. Managerialism is not as strong as 
middle managers are not in control of the managerial resources (e.g., human and financial 
resources). In England, middle managers face two strong logics of managerialism and 
professionalism. They work in a clinically driven environment while they have the autonomy 
to manage as long as they stay within the predetermined financial and human resources 
framework, follow the standardised policies and procedures and meet the central targets. In 
both countries, the central government control is a major factor affecting the hospital 
middle managers’ autonomy.  
According to the notion of institutional work (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006), it is argued 
that in England, the majority of middle managers aggregate the competing logics. They do 
identity reconciliation and use their practical evaluative agency and act as the change agent. 
In Iran, the autonomy over input, process and outcome is more unbalanced compared to 
England. Therefore, the majority of middle managers internalise the institutional 
contradiction and compartmentalise the competing logics (e.g., autonomy/accountability). 
They develop fragmented identities. They use their practical evaluative agency and similar 
to middle managers in England, mainly play the change agent role.   
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Chapter one: Introduction 
 
This thesis explores the extent to which hospital middle managers can exercise autonomy in 
England and Iran. It seeks to explore the impact of public management reforms (e.g. 
decentralisation and hospital autonomy) on middle managers’ autonomy, and explain 
similarities and differences in middle managers’ responses to the reforms. 
Middle managers embody a significant occupational category in organisations. They 
undertake a vital role as they sit between the operational and strategic groups. In the 
context of healthcare, middle managers, traditionally, acted as administrators whereby their 
role was limited to support doctors (Currie, 2006). They mainly played the role of diplomats, 
serving the interests of the professional operating core (Mintzberg, 1995). However, the 
role of middle managers shifted soon after internal markets were introduced as a result of 
the promulgation of the New Public Management approach (NPM). The adaptation of NPM 
empowered middle managers and elevated their role in healthcare organisations. Power 
(1997) argued that middle managers were made accountable to achieve dictated targets 
and to monitor overall performance (Gatenby et al., 2014, p.9). The drive for efficiency, 
resulting from the mechanisms of the internal market, gave middle managers the power to 
act as ‘change agents’ (Currie, 2006).  
More recently, due to the decentralisation of powers to local organisations, in line with the 
NPM agenda, it is assumed that middle managers act more proactively and innovatively. 
Prior to NPM reforms, it was primarily the doctors who controlled the actual delivery and 
the development of health services. Studies in the UK National Health Service (NHS) show 
that doctors’ power and central control are two main barriers for middle managers to enact 
proactive and strategic roles (Currie and Procter, 2005). 
The health care system across the world has been shaped a great deal under NPM. 
Decentralisation, which is one of the key reforms under the NPM agenda, has helped 
reorganise the structure of health care organisations. However, the approaches taken by 
different governments vary in structural design and extent. Different countries have taken 
steps to accommodate the differences in their domestic politico-administrative regime, 
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structural features, national cultures, and the external influence of dominant administrative 
doctrine (Christenson and Laegread, 2007; Pollitt, 2008).  
In both the English and Iranian health care, the management reforms since 2004 were 
directed at granting more autonomy to public hospitals. In the English NHS, under the NPM, 
there was an increased emphasis on markets. This led to the introduction of reforms in both 
the supply and demand side. On the supply side, it increased the diversity of providers to 
stimulate competition. On the demand side, there was an emphasis on numerous reforms 
focused on facilitating the patient Services. These reforms included Patient Choice, where 
patients had liberty to choose providers of care, and Practice Based Commissioning, where 
general physicians were given budgets to commission care for their patients. In addition, a 
new system of payment was introduced for all NHS Trusts, called Payment by Results (PbR).  
The emphasis on quality promotion and innovation has led to the increased decentralisation 
of powers resulting in localised autonomy. The inception of Foundation Trusts (FT) in 2004 
has been part of the modernisation initiatives of the NHS. The notion of creating FTs is in 
line with the emphasis on decentralising decision-making powers to organisations at the 
local level (Exworthy et al., 2011). Foundation trusts enjoy greater autonomy from central 
control (Allen, 2011), and are free to set up their own management structures (Saltman et 
al., 2012). However, the current literature lacks discussion on whether the formation of FTs 
has mirrored the decentralisation within these organisations. There is also a need to study 
how hospital autonomy has shaped the role of middle managers. 
Similarly, in the Iranian healthcare structures, internal economic situation along with 
external pressures from international agencies were the main drivers of bringing about 
reforms and providing greater autonomy to the health care organisations. Granting greater 
autonomy to public hospitals meant decentralising powers to a local authority.  In 2004, in 
order to ‘increase satisfaction, effectiveness and efficiency of services’, hospital autonomy 
policy was implemented in Iranian hospitals (Doshmangir et al. 2015). This goal was met by 
establishing a Board of Trustees (BT) in hospitals. The change in the organisational structure 
aimed to increase autonomy in administration, financing, and control over human 
resources, and ultimately increase the quality of hospital services within these hospitals 
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(Manavi et al., 2012). A discussion of the development of the BTs is covered in chapter 2 in 
detail. The current literature, however, lacks attention to how middle managers perceived 
their autonomy, and how they responded to changes under the NPM.   
In order to explore the perception of middle managers on hospital management reforms in 
England and Iran, a multi-level analysis has been conducted. The institutional pillars 
framework of Scott (2000) has been applied to address the external forces that affect 
middle manager behaviour within the hospitals of the two countries. The concept of identity 
work has been used to explain the responses of middle managers to the challenges of the 
external forces. Considering the notion of ‘identity work as an institutional work’ (McGivern 
et al., 2015) helps explain differences between managerial behaviours within the same 
organisations, which are located in the same organisational field. 
In most of the previous studies, the impact of management reforms on managers, including 
middle managers, was limited to the organisational field level analysis, or to the individual 
characteristics of managers. This study highlights the importance of multi-level analysis. 
Moreover, in most of the cross-country comparative studies, the focus is on national 
culture, and it is assumed that managers’ practices are most directly linked to the values 
and norms of their countries. However, it is quite difficult to develop a connection between 
the measured values, actor identities, and strategies in practice (Almond and Gonzalez 
Menendez, 2014, p.2599).  
This study tries to bridge this gap by linking middle managers’ perceptions and responses to 
their roles and managerial practices. It contributes to the literature on HRM, which 
emphasises the role of context in managerial practices and behaviour. This study compares 
middle managers’ autonomy in two different country contexts and shows that middle 
managers’ autonomy, in England, is constrained by government policy and targets, while, in 
Iran, it is constrained by central control over financial and human resources. According to 
neo-institutional theory, institutional elements including regulative, normative and cultural–
cognitive pillars (Scott, 2000) affect the subjective sense middle managers have of their 
autonomy and identity (Hales, 1999), and how they behave within organisations.  
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Another contribution is to the literature on HRM, which looks at the role of agency in 
managerial behaviours and practices. The notion of identity work helps explain that 
individual middle managers within the same hospital may have a different perception and 
understanding of institutional and environmental elements on the basis of their habits, 
judgments and imaginations. The differences in their perceptions affect their identity 
construction processes and the type of identity they develop or establish. This study shows 
that career path and experience are important factors affecting the identity construction 
process. This study demonstrates that middle managers do not respond to environmental 
factors identically. Therefore, in the study of middle managers both institutional and 
intentional factors need to be taken into account.  
The thesis proceeds as follows. In Chapter two, the health care policies in the UK and Iran 
are discussed. Chapter three discusses the relevant literature on the healthcare context; the 
role of health care professionals, middle managers in healthcare and generic organisations, 
and key institutional theories. Chapter four discusses in detail the data collection approach 
adopted for this research along with the instruments developed for data collection and 
analysis. Chapter five presents and discusses the findings of the research. Chapter six 
reflects on how the current research adds to the existing literature. Finally, chapter seven 
suggests implications/recommendations for further research and outlines the limitations of 
this study.  
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Chapter two: Health Care Policy in England and Iran 
 
Health care in Iran and England has been through different reforms under different eras of 
governments. After 2004, there has been a wave of changes in both the countries under the 
NPM reforms. The following chapter introduces the scope of public management reforms 
under NPM across the world and particularly in England and Iran. It delves further into 
tracing the details of different reforms introduced in both the countries under NPM and 
how it has affected the state of autonomy within hospitals. 
2.1. Public Management Reforms 
During the 1980s and 1990s, increasing the managerial capacity was one of the main aims of 
public management reforms (Maor, 1999). Devolved managerial responsibilities have been 
one of the central themes of the NPM in different countries. The main elements of the new 
steering model include micro-economic governance instruments, the clear-cut division of 
politics from administration, contract management, output emphasis, result-oriented 
budgeting and decentralised resource responsibility among others (Banner, 2001, 2005, 
cited in Mattei, 2009).  
 
Public managers are let ‘free to manage’ by disengaging the politicians from administrative 
bureaucracies. Reform measures are introduced in many European countries to allow 
greater bureaucratic discretion for public managers and senior civil servants. This is claimed 
to improve the efficient decision-making process and encourage managers to take 
responsibility for output. According to the OECD (1995, 1996), NPM represented a global 
paradigm for the organisation of public services. The emerging theories like principal–agent, 
public choice, and transaction-cost economics led to the changes in the public management. 
Various reforms on the basis of these theories and the inception of NPM support the 
increase of managerial autonomy in decision-making that goes hand in hand with 
decentralisation reforms (Peckham et al., 2005; Saltman et al., 2007). 
 
Powell and DiMaggio (1991) suggest that governments are active in copying organisational 
forms for reasons that escape global pressures or efficiency gains motives. Political rhetoric 
and strategy play an important role in the adoption of NPM, more so in countries where 
they are associated with neoliberal ideologies, such as the United Kingdom (Castles et al., 
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1996; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). However, management reforms and changes are not 
simply empty talk (Christensen and Laegreid, 2001b). It can be argued that decentralisation 
has not been the only approach for all countries to adopt, as centralisation has also been 
present. Decentralising of some government departments has happened concurrently with 
increasing the central monitoring and control. The inception of compulsory national ‘league 
tables’ for hospitals and schools is one of the examples of central government control in the 
UK.  
 
The balance between different forms of decentralisation is varied in different countries 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011, p. 102). For instance, the UK was a centralised country in the 
early 1980s and central government merely decentralise few powers to the lower 
administrative level. The political decentralisation in the UK was attributed to the creation 
of assemblies for Scotland and Wales.  
 
In some low- and middle-income countries, the rise of the ‘development theories’ as well as 
the ‘political motivations’ challenge the centralised financial management and emphasise 
the importance of local participation to improve the ‘sustainability’ (Mitchell and Bossert, 
2010, p. 670 ). For instance, in Iran, international bodies such as World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund emphasise the importance of structural reforms mainly in the 
form of decentralisation to improve the financial and managerial arrangements (Farazmand, 
2001). These external, as well as internal forces on Iran as a middle-income country, have 
led to the implementation of decentralisation policies in various financial, political and 
administrative areas (Ramli, 2009). 
 
The decentralisation model of NPM is characterised by different factors (Ferlie et al. 1996, p. 
13). According to Ferlie et al. (1996), the decentralisation is characterised by the 
‘introduction of quasi-markets’; ‘move from management by hierarchy to management by 
contract’; ‘split between a small strategic core and a large operational periphery’; ‘de-
layering and downsizing’; ‘split between public funding and independent sector provision’; 
‘move from the command and control form of management to new management styles’, 
and ‘attempt to move away from standardised forms of service to a service system 
characterised by more flexibility and variety’ (Ferlie et al. 1996, p. 13). 
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Decentralisation is often argued to be associated with decreasing the rules and regulations, 
for example in the area of HRM, and consequently increasing individual managers’ 
autonomy to make decisions (Meyer and Hammerschmid, 2009). Therefore, public 
management reforms mainly in the form of decentralisation have led to increasing the 
demand for HR professionals. Indeed, decentralisation and the devolution of HRM to line 
managers have been discussed as interrelated activities (OECD, 1996; Lonti, 2005). 
Advocates of decentralised HR management emphasise that decentralising the HR 
responsibilities to managers reduces the long processes of HRM and improve the efficiency 
and effectiveness of HRM. They argue that HRM decisions regarding, for example, selection, 
and recruitment can be taken more rapidly and more suitable according to the needs of the 
local organisations. It is assumed that increasing the managers’ autonomy and their ability 
to recruit, appraise, promote, incentivise, and develop the skills of their employees improve 
the effectiveness because the centralised HRM cannot be responsive, fast, effective and 
flexible. Finally, there is not much empirical evidence to suggest if political pressure and 
politicisation have any effect on decentralised HR (Coggburn, 2005). 
 
However, some argue that in very high decentralised systems the civil service can lose its 
ethos and coherence (Meyer and Hammerschmid, 2010). Furthermore, managers in 
decentralised systems need to be very skilful to perform their roles and responsibilities. 
Therefore, there is a need to highly invest in managerial qualifications to ensure the success 
of the decentralised organisations (Hales, 1999). Other key issues in these systems are 
‘fragmentation of policies’, ‘equity’ and ‘fairness’.  In addition, there is a danger of increased 
centralisation in the case of outsourcing, for example, the HR to a centralised external body. 
It is also questionable whether decentralisation increases the autonomy and reduces the 
bureaucracy or whether the new types of bureaucracy in the form of central targets, 
extensive monitoring, as well as reporting requirements, would increase (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2004, p. 173). 
 
Decentralisation and other related reforms under the rubric of NPM are increasing around 
the globe and supported by international donors such as World Bank.  Therefore, it may be 
assumed that management systems across different countries are adopting institutional 
isomorphism regardless of the national differences (Meyer and Hammerschmid, 2010).  
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Although the appearance of similar public sector reforms across different countries may 
provide a sense of convergence, evidence indicates that substantive content is different, 
and there are elements of path dependency (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Considering the 
different levels of convergence - idea, talk, policy decision and policy practices (Pollitt, 2001) 
- Goldfinch and Wallis (2010) argue that the convergence arguments struggle on a number 
of grounds (Goldfinch and Wallis, 2010). First, the term convergence shows ambiguity. For 
example, it is not clear whether the convergence is on ideas, or decisions or practices 
because the ideas to implement reforms can be brought to a halt by institutional elements 
(e.g., politics, rules) (Goldfinch and Wallis, 2010).  
 
Sometimes, the link between policy ideas and policy practice is weak and even 
contradictory. Similar policy decisions might be greatly divergent in practice. Therefore, the 
implementation of NPM agenda can be different in its idea (theoretical ground), in practice, 
and within the demarcation of its coverage. Implementation of any reforms across different 
countries indicates significant variety, and the institutional elements show considerable 
impact (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000, 2011). 
 
Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000, 2011) identify a number of factors that explain the differences 
of the NPM in practice from NPM as an idea. These factors include:  ‘institutional setting, 
the decision process of elites, socio-economic effects, chance events (e.g., scandals and 
disasters) and differences in politico-administrative systems’ (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000 
and 2011, p. 51). They mainly emphasise on the political and administrative systems, which 
influence the change processes and consequently influence the public management system 
of a country.  
Drawing on the work of De Jong et al. (2002), Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011, p.51) compare 
the politico-administrative systems of countries based on four key features. First, the state 
structure (a structural feature). The structural feature refers to the degree of vertical 
diffusion of authority and how far the authority is shared between different levels of 
government. The differing characteristics of the centralised and decentralised states have 
been summarised in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 
Centralised States Decentralised States 
All important decisions are taken at the centre All important decisions are taken at 
different levels 
Reforms are more general and homogenous Reforms are specific and heterogeneous 
More involved in delivery of services such as 
health care 
Responsibilities are delegated to lower 
levels. 
Centralised states are more likely to control 
expenditures of state services 
Decentralised states are less likely to 
control expenditures of state services. 
Table 2.1. Source: Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011, p.51 
The second feature of the politico-administrative system is the nature of the executive 
government at the central level (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011, p.51).  This is a mixture of 
structural and functional elements. According to Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011), in the 
majoritarian government, the scope and intensity of management reforms are greater. The 
third feature is the relationship between ministers (e.g., political executives) and mandarin 
(i.e., senior public servants). According to Pollitt and Bouckaert, it is ‘a functional element 
but heavily conditioned by cultural values and assumptions’ (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011, 
p.51). He argues that the ministers are politicised and integrated where most of the senior 
civil servant occupants have their inclinations towards a specific political party. 
  
The last factor is the dominant administrative culture. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004, 2011) 
categorise countries on the basis of two main administrative cultures: ‘public interest’ and 
‘Rechtsstaat’. The concept of ‘Rechtsstaat’ refers to the state as the main authority in the 
society that acts within the pre-defined and precise rules, according to which the act of 
citizens and civil servants is determined and monitored. Administration system is based on 
lines of hierarchy and authority which are rooted in the Weber’s rational bureaucracy. 
Conversely, public administration is conducted by ‘public interest’ and there is no clear-cut 
division between society and the state. Implementing the managerial reforms such as 
decentralisation and managerialism are easier in public administration tradition compared 
to the ‘Rechtsstaat’. The normative and cultural-cognitive elements of the societies with 
public administration tradition make the implementation of managerial changes more 
feasible. 
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Table 2.2 
 State 
structure 
Executive 
government 
Minister/mandarin 
relationship 
Administrative 
culture 
England  Centralised Majoritarian Separate 
Not politicised 
Public interest 
Iran Centralised Majoritarian Integrated 
Politicised 
Rechtsstaat 
Table: 2.2 Types of politico-administrative regimes in the United Kingdom and Iran 
 
In summary, table 2.2 shows that the state structure in both England and Iran is centralised, 
and both executive governments are majoritarian, which means they both are in favour of 
the management reforms. On the other hand, the minister and mandarin relationship in 
England is ‘separate and not politicised’, while it is integrated and politicised in Iran. This 
means that changes in the ministers lead to changes in the senior civil servants. This leads to 
the high turnover of senior managers in Iran and the difficulty of implementing the 
managerial changes. In addition, the difference in the administrative culture of the two 
countries indicates that the implementation of managerial changes is more feasible in 
England (i.e., public interest) compared to Iran (i.e., Rechtsstaa). These Politico-
administrative elements are the underlying social factors that affect management practices, 
in particular, HRM practices (e.g., appraisal, recruitment/selection, reward and 
compensation) in each country (Meyer and Hammershmid, 2010).  
 
2.2. Health care reforms in England and Iran under NPM 
 
The health care system in both Iran and England has experienced different changes over 
time. The process of decentralisation and autonomy that health care sector enjoys today in 
both countries has not been in a linear progression as different policies under different 
regimes saw hospital autonomy increased at one time and decreased in another. For 
example, in the UK, there has been a cyclical shift to and from centralisation and 
decentralisation since the formation of NHS (Peckham et al., 2008). According to Exworthy 
et al. (2010, p.17), the 1979 consultation document that led to re-organisation in 1982 
stressed decentralisation. However, according to him (Exworthy et al., 2010, p.17), ‘this 
wave of decentralisation was soon followed by a number of measures including central 
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performance management, planning systems, circulars and contracts that clearly depicted 
the contradiction to the decentralisation that started in 1982’.  
It was only in 2004 that the government’s decision of creating FTs and Monitors showed 
that the policy makers were genuinely interested in devolving responsibilities to the lower 
administration (Exworthy et al, 2010). The creation of Monitor and FTs shifted powers from 
the Secretary of State to the lower administration (Exworthy et al, 2010, P.19). Since 2001, 
there has been a shift in UK government policies when it started advocating for localism. As 
the governance approach tilted towards decentralisation, the government started 
emphasising more on diversity rather that uniformity (Exworthy et al., 2010, p. 19). This tilt 
in policies toward diversity encouraged the local authorities to approach and define the 
standards locally.  
Despite the tilt in policies, the NHS’s one nation service did little to loosen the hierarchical 
control. In addition, in order to address the NHS financial deficit, the government had to 
intervene frequently to cut jobs and centralise the mergers. Therefore, the tension between 
the centre and the locality has remained (Peckham et al., 2008). The government 
interference though had a positive impact on driving down the waiting lists and infection 
rates, bringing equity and fairness through greater accountability. However, it proved 
problematic in empowering localised settings (Farrar, 2012). Therefore, the government has 
introduced Foundation Trusts and the Monitor to sustain the localised settings. 
The changes in the NHS were introduced keeping in view the earlier failures of internal 
market structures (Allen, 2009). The re-emphasis on improving the market structures was 
rooted in ‘four interrelated pillars of reform’ (DH, 2007). The four pillars of reforms can be 
categorised under demand side reforms, transactional reform, system and management 
regulation and supply side reforms (DH, 2007). These market reforms aimed at improving 
patient experience, producing better quality and reducing inequality, diversifying health 
care providers, incentivising and rewarding efficient providers (DH, 2007). Enhanced patient 
choice was one of the key reforms under the demand side reforms. Under the Patient 
choice reform, NHS patients awaiting referral to the hospital have been provided the option 
to choose from four or more options, one of which must be an independent provider (DH, 
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2005). The transactional reforms introduced a national tariff of fixed prices for procedures 
to pay both public and independent health care providers (DH, 2007). This was called 
‘payment by results’. The idea behind this reform was to increase emphasis on quality and 
to sharpen incentives. Practice-based commissioning involved decentralising and delegating 
a large part of the commissioning process to the individual general medical practitioner. 
Thus, the commissioning process became more fragmented and affected the demand 
dynamics of the internal market (Harradine and Prowle, 2012). The supply side reforms, 
under the coalition government (during 2010-2015) emphasise on austerity and efficiency 
savings in the English NHS. There has been a move towards more market oriented NHS by 
utilising the ‘competition and non-NHS providers’ (Hughes, 2016, p.141), while the 
commitment to equity and service quality has remained the same. 
In Iran, health services operate in a somewhat decentralised manner. A substantial decision-
making responsibility and authority has been transferred to peripheral units mainly at the 
provincial level. The authority has been devolved from the Central Ministry of Health and 
Medical Education (MOHME) to the provincial level Medical Universities, which are also 
responsible for the service delivery within their respective provinces (Jafari et al., 2010, p. 
e123).  The impetus for this reform came under the Fourth five-year development plan in 
2005, which transferred budgeting responsibilities to the medical universities. It also put at 
their discretion the power to allocate resources as per their needs (Gressani et al., 2007, 
p.101). The Medical Universities, headed by the Chancellor, acts as ‘Provincial Minister of 
Health’ because of the substantial authority he/she has in directing health affairs in the 
province. The Minister of Health appoints the Chancellor and is represented as the head of 
the University Board. The role of the central MOHME is limited to regulating health policy, 
regulatory guidance, and providing oversight of different functions through keeping proper 
monitoring and evaluation mechanisms (Jafari et al., 2010) (See figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1. Simple view of the structure and organisation of the Iranian health system (Mostafavi et al., 2016)  
 
Although the devolution of power occurred at the national level, at the provincial level, 
authority was not significantly decentralised below the Medical Universities, except at the 
district health centre, which has historically been responsible for primary health care 
programmes. Thus, there was a type of re-centralisation at the provincial level (Gressani et 
al., 2007). This was partly due to the dual roles of medical education and service delivery 
played by the MOHME, which made it more difficult to decentralise powers to any medical 
body below the level of the provincial medical universities (Gressani et al., 2007).  
 
Hence, in 2004, the inception of the Board of Trustees (BTs) was a step towards 
systematically decentralising the service delivery beyond the provincial level. The 
introduction of BTs extenuated the role of medical universities at the provincial level. The 
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aim was to increase the managerial autonomy of hospitals to improve efficiency and 
effectiveness in the field of healthcare. In 2013, a new annual accreditation (grading) system 
was implemented to ensure hospitals improving the quality of patient services. Hospitals 
were also encouraged to voluntarily implement quality management techniques. It seemed 
the Iranian government has implemented both mandatory and voluntary quality assurance 
policies to improve the quality of patient services in hospitals. Another major issue has been 
the financial pressure on public hospitals and patients. To address these problems the 
emphasis was on increasing the tariffs of medical services and reducing the out of pocket 
payment for patients.  The main health policies in the Iranian and English health systems 
during 2011 to 2015 (at the time of the study) are summarised in table 2.3. 
Table 2.3 
England(Monitor, 2015) Iran (Moradi-Lake and Vosoogh-
Moghaddam, 2015) 
Improve access (e.g., reducing the waiting 
time) 
Increase in the population insurance 
coverage 
Improve patient safety (e.g., reducing 
deaths from heart disease and cancer)  
 
Improve quality of care in hospitals 
Increase efficiency Increase the tariffs of medical services  
Improve patient experience Reduce the out of pocket payments 
Increase equity  
Table 2.3 The main health policies in England and Iran 
In summary, both English and Iranian health systems aim to improve the quality of health 
care services and the patient experience. They both are in favour of localism and granting 
more autonomy to the local hospitals. However, they have chosen different paths to reach 
the same goal. In England, the main emphasis of the coalition government is on utilising the 
competition and financial incentives to improve efficiency and quality of care in line with the 
neo-liberal market based approaches. Conversely, the Iranian government has taken a more 
bureaucratic approach and tries to increase the insurance coverage of population and the 
medical tariffs that lead to the flow of funds to public hospitals.  
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2.3. Health care context in England and Iran 
 
This research examines the impact of public management reforms on hospital middle 
managers’ autonomy and the responses of these managers to the changes resulted from 
the reforms. Therefore, it is useful to study the context of the organisations (here hospitals) 
within which middle managers work, in both countries and also the wider environment 
within which hospitals are embedded. To better serve the goals of this study, this research 
provides an overview of the health care systems in both England and Iran. According to the 
neo-institutional theory, it is important to consider that organisations are embedded in a 
wider environment. Therefore, management practices reflect the rules, norms and 
structures prevalent in the societal settings.  This wider environment consists of resource 
environment and institutional environments (Scott, 2001). The resource environment 
consisting of the supply and demand side and the institutional environment including 
factors like actors, provision and governance (Scott, 2001). These contextual elements are 
used to explain the changes under the NPM in both countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Healthcare environment 
 
2.3.1. Resource environment  
Supply side (Healthcare financing)   
 
The English NHS has gone through several waves of major financial reorganisations, starting 
in 2000 when the NHS budget was increased to reach the international level (Ham, 2004). 
Until later, it was described as a highly centrally controlled system (Moran, 1999; Bevan and 
Hood, 2006). Healthcare was publicly funded and provided to the public in a highly 
centralised political system. Throughout the history of the NHS, there have been instances 
External environment (resource environment + institutional 
environment)  
 
 
Hospitals (internal environment) 
 Middle 
Managers 
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of experimentations with the delegation of financial powers to the lower level and then 
moving back to the centralised approach (Exworthy et al., 2010, p.13). This experimentation 
according to Exworthy et al. (2010) was due to the lack of intention of the government to 
decentralise the power. Even though the FTs were created in 2004, the intention behind 
decentralising was to make limited resources go further and focus on increasing micro-
efficiency and competition to provide better health services without spending more money 
(Freeman, 1998, 2000). The FTs were no longer directly accountable to the Secretary of 
State for Health. Moreover, the local people got the right to become members and vote for 
the board of governors. FTs were also granted more freedom to spend their incomes. They 
have been allowed to make independent investments by forming companies or acquiring 
memberships in corporate bodies (Allen, 2009, P. 380). They are also allowed to borrow 
money. However, FTs overall financial affairs have been monitored by the Monitor, which 
intervenes from time to time when the targets of the FT are not met.  
 
In Iran, sources of revenues in health care are complex. Funds are collected through many 
distinct public and private channels. The Ministry of Health and Medical Education 
(MOHME) receives budget funds for a number of targeted programmes including public 
health, health prevention and promotion, medical education, research, training, rural 
primary care programmes, and special programmes of social priority such as organ 
transplant programmes. Curative care is covered through three types of health insurance 
organisations: public, private, and government-based organisations such as the National 
Iranian Oil Company. The public social health insurance organisations constitute around 89 
per cent of insurance resources; the other types roughly split among the remainder (WHO, 
2006). 
The private sector appears to wield considerable influence over the purchase and provision 
of health services in Iran. Public hospital tariffs have been set far below the market price of 
services, which leads to low income for the hospitals with limited financial autonomy 
(Davari et al., 2012). During the last few years, low incomes in these hospitals have led to 
understaffing in the public sector, affecting the quality of the health services provided at 
these hospitals. This also gives an added incentive to the health staff to work in the private 
sector as it is more profitable. 
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It is also reported (Khayatzadeh-Mahani et al., 2013) that the medical association sets 
separate tariffs for private services, and fee differences between the public and private 
sector can be as high as 10 fold. This may account for the differences in revenue streams 
between public and private sector (WHO, 2006). This has led to the increase in provider-
induced demand, where physicians encourage patients to receive their treatment in the 
private sector where they can earn more. The private physicians recommend the utilisation 
of the services that are mostly covered by the private insurance and involved undergoing 
new medical procedures and use of new medicines and expensive diagnostic services such 
as Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) (Khayatzadeh-Mahani et al., 2013, p. 489). This 
behavioural tilt toward the private health care facilities is traced to the lack of funding to the 
public hospitals and lack of government support among others (Gressani et al., 2007). 
 
To address these problems, the Iranian government increased the financial autonomy of 
semi-autonomous hospitals (i.e., BTs) in two ways. Firstly, the role of the medical university 
of the province as an intermediary for distributing the financial resources to the public 
hospitals was diluted. It allowed BTs to receive their budgets directly from the Ministry of 
Health. Secondly, the tariffs of health services for BTs were raised to 3.6 times higher than 
the tariffs of other public hospitals (Davari et al., 2012). This policy aimed to address the 
financial difficulties of public hospitals. It was assumed that higher tariffs would help BTs 
earn more income, by encouraging physicians to treat their patients in the public sector. The 
higher tariffs would also decrease the out-of-pocket payments by patients.  
 
Table 2.4. Healthcare financing  
 English FTs Iranian BTs 
Healthcare financing  Controlled by Monitor  
 FTs enjoy financial autonomy 
to keep surpluses  
 Controlled by 
MOHME 
 BTs enjoy higher 
tariffs and higher 
income but have to 
compete with private 
sector counterparts 
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Demand side  
 
In Iran, the public is free to choose to seek all types of health services such as primary, 
secondary and tertiary from either public or private sector based on their ability and 
willingness to pay (Khayatzadeh-Mahani et al., 2013, p. 489). Currently, as individuals move 
up the income group ladder, they tend to use private sector services instead of publicly-
delivered services. Government and public sector facilities are viewed as residual facilities 
for those who cannot afford non-governmental provision. Patients from the well-off families 
rely mostly on private health care providers (Gressani et al., 2007). This is partially also 
because of the fact that the physicians encourage the patients to have their treatment done 
in the private sector (Khayatzadeh-Mahani et al., 2013).  
 
The health system in Britain adopted a general practitioner model, which offers the lowest 
level of patient choice. Patients have to register with a general practitioner and it is the 
practitioner who refers patients to the specialist out and inpatient services in hospitals 
(Blank and Burau, 2007, p. 81). This offered the practitioner a strong gate-keeping function. 
However, the emphasis of government on individual autonomy has mainly reflected in 
patient choice policy. This policy enables the patients to choose among five care providers, 
one of which could be from the private sector. The patient choice policy had been a central 
element of health care in the UK in the mid-2000. It has focused on patients being able to 
choose the secondary care provider, strengthening the voice of patients (Exworthy et al. 
2010, p. 25). The patient choice policy aimed to improve the quality and efficiency of the 
hospitals and reducing the waiting lists and waiting time of the patients (Fotaki, 2007; Le 
Grand and Dixon, 2006). The effectiveness of the policy, however, remains debatable.  
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Table 2.5 
Demand side  England Iran 
 The health system in Britain adopted 
a general practitioner model. 
Patients have to register with a 
general practitioner and it is the 
practitioner who refers patients to 
specialist out and inpatient services 
in hospitals. 
The public is free to choose to seek all 
types of health services such as 
primary, secondary and tertiary from 
either public or private sector based 
on their ability and willingness to pay. 
Patients from the well-off families rely 
mostly on private health care 
providers. 
 Gate-keeping system Unlimited patient choice. 
Flow of fund to the private sector. 
 
2.3.2 Actors (users, payers, providers, the State) 
In both countries, hospitals are embedded in a pluralistic environment and need to deal 
with a number of stakeholders to achieve their objectives. However, the different actors in 
the health care systems enjoy different degrees of power under the different institutional 
setups (Blank and Burau, 2013). For instance, in the rural areas of Iran, MOHME holds the 
responsibility to provide better health care at the national level. It receives the required 
budget from the government. The rural citizens are provided with two basic facilities that 
include family physician and BEHBAR (rural health insurance for all rural residents) 
(Khayatzadeh-Mahani et al. 2013, p. 488). The Iranian government uses the referral system 
to control the access of rural residents to the secondary and tertiary health care and the 
costs of health services (Khayatzadeh-Mahani et al., 2013) although the referral systems are 
more expensive in rural areas as compared to the urban areas (Black and Burau, 2014). On 
the other hand, in the urban areas, the government has not developed a strong Primary 
Health Care (PHC) network, and the private sector, as a provider, is particularly influential in 
setting the priorities of health service delivery. The residents have a great choice of access 
to different health care opportunities as compared to health facilities available at the rural 
areas, which have been limited by the state policies (Khayatzadeh-Mahani et al., 2013, p. 
488).  
In England, during 1997 – 2010, ‘NPM’ was introduced; whose strategies included improved 
‘efficacy, cost-effectiveness and accountability of public services, and the quality 
improvement movement’. As a result of this, ‘civil servants, management consultants, 
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commercial ICT providers, and regulatory bodies’ all took up the responsibility to deliver the 
NPM ideology (Macfarlane et al. 2013, p. 13). During 2006 – 2011, new localism caused an 
enhanced competition, the result of which was the increase in ‘the use of private-sector 
providers in NHS, semi-autonomous foundation trusts; enhanced patient choice and ‘arms-
length’ approach to regulation’ (Macfarlane et al. 2013, p. 13). The use of competition and 
private sector is more emphasised by the coalition government during 2011 -2015.  
Table 2.6 
 England Iran 
Actors In England, civil servants, 
management consultants, 
commercial ICT providers, and 
regulatory bodies’ all took up 
the responsibility to deliver. 
In rural areas of Iran, MOHME holds the 
responsibility to provide better health care 
at the national level. In the urban areas, 
the private health care providers play a 
major role to deliver healthcare services. 
 
 
2.3.3. Provision: quality, access, efficiency 
The goal of providing access and quality shapes the healthcare priorities of each country. At 
a macro level, the differences among the two countries could be explained by noting the 
emphasis each nation puts on the freedom of choice for consumers, autonomy of the health 
care service providers and insurers (Blank and Burau, 2013). These goals are prioritized by 
both countries based on their national cultures, and political and institutional structures. 
The UK, with its deeply rooted egalitarian traditions, emphatically implemented the 
comprehensive national health care services to deliver on the central goals of universal 
access and free care at the hospitals (Blank and Burau, 2007, p.93). However, despite the 
emphasis of the British NHS on universality, the service funding is often subject to variations 
depending upon the local decision making of health authorities. In addition to this, the 
patient waiting lists limit access to elective surgery. The physical or geographical access to 
healthcare has proven increasingly problematic as it became more specialised and capital 
intensive. Geographical inequities in healthcare, although initially reduced by regional 
reallocation schemes, still remained troublesome. The labour party government emphasised 
a lot on the fair access to the health care services by introducing new central institutions 
such as Commission for Health Improvement (CHI) now called Care Quality Commission. 
Other institutional efforts contained establishment of the National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence (NICE), and the National Service Frameworks (NSFs) (Exworthy et al. 
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2010, p. 19). Similarly in Iran, the government was under extreme international pressure to 
meet the international standards as European Foundation for Quality Management, clinical 
governance, and the self-assessment accreditation system.  
In both England and Iran, like many other countries, ageing population, boundless 
technological expansion, and heightened public expectations reinforced the importance of 
implementing cost containment policies. In the UK, this was encouraged by an overall 
ideological shift towards the neo-liberalism, which placed emphasis on efficient markets 
(Blank and Burau, 2013). The health care in England is financed by the government; 
therefore, the cost containment policies operate mainly on the supply side of the system. 
The supply-side cost-containment approaches have proved to be more effective in the UK 
since the government gets the budget for the health sector (Blank and Burau, 2007). The 
total expenditure of the NHS is set by the Treasury. Once the overall spending is 
determined, a fixed annual budget is allocated to the commissioners (Charlesworth et al., 
2014). While the budget caps work to control the costs of health services in the UK, they can 
be politically risky because they hold the central government responsible for the failure of 
micro-decisions (Blank and Burau, 2007). This financial management system allows the 
hospital managers to blame the government policy makers for the shortfalls in their services 
and attributing it to the lack of adequate funds. On the contrary, in Iran, budget caps are 
less effective as the government grants additional funds to those hospitals that overspend 
and require supplements to their budgets in order to keep operating. 
In Iranian health care system, since health care organisations are autonomous in terms of 
the number of services they deliver and the amount of revenue they generate, there is more 
emphasis on the demand side cost containment strategies. These strategies are mainly in 
the form of out-of-pocket payments to ensure that the patients also share the costs of the 
expenses incurred (Blank and Burau, 2007, p. 66). In Iran out of pocket payments 
contributed for almost 52% of the total expenditure on health in 2012, while it amounted to 
just 9.9% in England in the same year (World Bank, 2015). Despite the shift of high amount 
of contribution towards the service users, there has not been any substantial decrease in 
the demand for the health services in Iran. It is reasoned that the strong role of the medical 
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professionals in increasing provider induced demands has actually behind keeping the 
demand steady (Davari et al., 2012). 
 
 
Table 2.7 
 England Iran 
Provision 
(Budget 
Containment 
Strategies) 
In England, budget containment 
strategies are mostly supply-side 
strategies since the government 
gets the budget for the health 
sector. The total expenditure of 
the NHS is set by the Treasury so 
they allocate the budgets 
accordingly. 
In Iranian health care system, since 
health care organisations are 
autonomous in terms of the amount 
of revenue they generate, there is 
more emphasis on the demand side 
cost containment strategies. These 
are mostly in the form of out of 
pocket payments. 
Healthcare providers get their 
budget from government.  
Healthcare providers get half of their 
budget from out-of-pocket payment. 
So, patients, who are willing to pay, 
prefer to have their treatment in the 
private sector. 
 
The following table provides a comparison between Iran and England of some of the key 
indicators mentioned above: 
 
Table 2.8 
  
     Health expenditure 
 
Health workers 
Total 
% of 
GDP 
Public 
% of 
total 
Out of 
pocket 
% of 
total 
External 
resources 
% of total 
Per 
capita 
$ 
Per 
capita 
PPP $ 
Physicians 
per 1,000 
people 
Nurses 
and 
midwives 
per 1,000 
people 
Year 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2007-12 2007-12 
England 9.4 82.5 9.9 0.0 3,647 3,495 2.7 8.8 
Iran 6.7 40.4 52.5 0.0 490 1,562 0.9 1.4 
 
 Source: http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/2.15 
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2.3.4  Governance  
Governance in health care is different in a way that actors of health care system such as 
state and market forces are interlinked with each other. Generally, governance is conceived 
as government’s authority to influence the actors involved (Blank and Burau, 2007). The 
degree of institutional integration in health systems or the extent of the government 
authority over the private interests of the doctors, hospitals and insurers reflects the overall 
government authority in the health care sector (Blank and Burau, 2007, p.86). 
The differences in the degree of central integration, between the UK and Iran, can also help 
explain the differences in embracing decentralisation. In the UK, decentralisation occurs as 
part of the introduction of a quasi-market in healthcare that was inspired by the NPM 
paradigm. The actors at the local level are commissioners and hospital trusts and, at the 
regional level health authorities, which are not only parties of central government, but they 
also continue to operate within a highly hierarchical system of health governance. Indeed, 
the central government control has increased following the introduction of the internal 
market and most prominently the management of performance has become tighter as part 
of a more explicit ‘quality turn’ (Harrison, 2004). Not surprisingly, the autonomy of trusts 
and health authorities is confined to managerial responsibility. This complex division of 
labour among different levels of governance has also highlighted problems of accountability.  
The inception of FTs (in 2004) along with other market-type initiatives such as ‘performance 
targets’ and ‘payment by results’ has been part of the modernisation initiatives in the NHS 
in 2000. The FTs were given autonomy and it was assumed that managers in those FTs 
would act innovatively. Similarly in Iran, in 2004, the formation of BTs aimed at increasing 
the satisfaction, effectiveness, and efficiency of hospital services (Doshmangir et al., 2015). 
The formation of BTs advocated increasing the managerial autonomy of hospitals (Manavi et 
al., 2012). 
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2.4.  Hospital Autonomy in Iran and England 
 
Under the NPM reforms hospitals have been granted autonomy, assuming that increasing 
the autonomy and reducing the central control would improve the use of the public 
resources and increase the accountability and responsibility of those hospitals (Castano et 
al., 2004). The extent of autonomy hospitals can exercise in the two countries reflects the 
extent of resources (e.g., financial and human resources) available to the managers. It can 
also indicate the scope of decision making for managers in those hospitals.  
 
According to the framework developed by Preker and Harding (2003), autonomy can be 
granted to the hospitals over five key structural elements of decision rights, market 
exposure, residual claimant, accountability mechanism, and hospital social functions (Jafari 
et al., 2010, p. e122). The framework suggests that the hospitals apply one organisational 
modality based on the extent of autonomy granted in one of these structural elements. The 
autonomy of having control over decision rights in the area of financial, human resource, 
and strategic management can be used as an indicator to assess the degree and level of 
managerial autonomy of hospitals in England and Iran.  
 
2.4.1  Financial Management 
 
In England, the Foundation Trusts have considerable autonomy. The FTs can reinvest the 
surpluses, and establish their annual budgets (Saltman et al., 2012). Still, the FTs, like all 
government bodies, are required to comply with the probity and transparency principals in 
using public money (HM Treasury, 2009). The extent to which FTs may borrow money can 
be determined by Monitor’s risk-rating process. FTs have full discretion over their level of 
contingency reserves, procurement decisions, and the target for the risk ratings which are 
assessed by Monitor (Saltman et al., 2012, p. 122). FTs are accountable to the Monitor (the 
economic regulator) which provides guidance and sets schemes over investment, 
acquisition, borrowing, and high-risk transactions. FTs can also enjoy access to low-cost 
finance from internal banking of the Department of Health, but gaining access to this facility 
is difficult (Saltman et al., 2012, p. 122). FTs can co-operate with the private sector and 
enter the private-patient partnership. 
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In Iran, in terms of financial decisions, since the implementation of the self-governing 
reforms in 1995, public hospitals in Iran are expected to generate their own revenue 
budget. The government still overlooks the staff salaries, development budgets of the 
hospitals, and the financial support for the hospital social functions (Jafari et al., 2010, p. 
133). Even though the hospitals have the autonomy to generate revenues, they have less 
authority to decide in terms of spending the generated revenues. The hospitals earn income 
from user payments and insurance payments, which is then transferred to the medical 
university at the end of each month. The medical university of the province has the 
authority to examine the financial performance of the hospitals. Medical universities are 
being held accountable by the ‘Supreme Audit Court’ to ensure that the governmental 
budgets are being allocated and spent as established (Jafari et al., 2010).  
 
2.4.2.  Strategic Management 
 
In terms of strategic decisions, the objectives of the FTs are in line with the wider healthcare 
system within which they operate. Recently, due to the increased diversity in the NHS, there 
is an ongoing emphasis on ‘shared principles’ and ‘values’ to ensure uniformity (Saltman et 
al., 2012, p.122). An NHS constitution was created to communicate the fundamental 
principles of NHS, the service delivery to the patients, and what is offered to the staff 
(Saltman et al., 2012). 
 
The extent to which BTs can exercise autonomy over strategic decisions is restricted. 
Despite several reforms promoting autonomy, Iranian public hospitals are still owned by the 
medical universities. Therefore, the university principal and his/her deputies are held 
accountable for the performance of the hospitals. For this reason, willingness to grant 
autonomy to the hospital level might not be high. The limited decision rights of the hospitals 
effect the long term strategic planning of the hospitals (Jafari et al. 2010). Hospitals are not 
authorised to borrow private funds unless they are granted explicit approval by the 
Provincial Medical University Chancellor. The director cannot make any acquisitions or 
disposal of land and or buildings owned by the hospital (WHO, 2006).  
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2.4.3.  Human Resource Management 
 
Regarding the HR management, the FTs have the freedom to establish the staff required by 
the hospitals and to hire and fire (Saltman et al., 2012; Allen et al., 2011). FTs have to 
comply with the national pay system; however, they have the freedom to pay their own 
rates to their new staff. FTs are also free to create new roles and have their own pay 
structure or organisational bonus scheme (ibid). 
 
In this regard, the hospital management, in Iran, has minimal decision rights over 
recruitment or remuneration of civil servants. These are determined by the Medical 
University (Gressani et al., 2007; Jafari et al., 2010; Jafari Sirizi et al., 2010). The hospital 
director, however, can recruit local employees and the contract staff. The hospitals can 
contract only support staff and that too, for short-term contracts, which can only be 
conducted through corporate organisations and cannot be hired directly. The hospital 
management also needs the university approval to fire permanent staff (Gressani et al., 
2007).  
 
2.5. Summary 
 
Public management reforms implemented under the NPM reforms agenda informs us about 
the overall trend of the health care policies undertaken in Iran and England. While the 
extent of NPM reforms has been different in developed and developing countries, the trend 
of decentralisation of authorities has remained the same. However, both countries have 
taken different paths to accommodate the differences in their domestic politico-
administrative regime, structural features, and external influence of dominant 
administrative doctrine (Christenson and Laegread, 2007; Pollitt, 2008). These factors have 
been influential in determining the impact of these public reforms on middle managers in 
the health care in both countries. The context of hospitals within which the middle 
managers perform in both the countries has been analysed using neo-institutional theory. 
The analysis of resource environments, in the shape of demand and supply side resources, 
against the institutional environment including factors like actors, provisions and 
governance seems useful to explain the different changes under the public management 
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reforms in both countries. Both the environmental and institutional factors impact the way 
middle manager behave within the particular context. Later in the study, it is shown how 
middle managers in Foundation Trusts (in England) and Board of Trustees (in Iran) respond 
to the public management reforms. 
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Chapter three: Literature Review 
 
This thesis describes and interprets the impact of public management reforms on Hospital 
Middle Managers in England and Iran during 2004 to 2015. This chapter critically examines 
the literature that links the existing literature to addressing the central research questions. 
In what follows the literature shows that who middle managers are, what they do, what 
roles they play, what changes have happened to their role, and what the challenges are for 
middle managers in the context of healthcare. Then, the institutional theories are discussed 
to explain the impact of institutional factors on middle managers' behaviour and the 
agential roles of middle managers. After that, the literature discusses the concept of identity 
and identity work that can affect the behaviour and managerial practices of middle 
managers in the health care organisations. The last section reviews the literature on 
autonomy and its importance for middle managers. 
3.1. Middle managers  
 
Middle managers form a significant occupational category in organisations. They perform a 
vital role as they sit between the operational and strategic personnel (Floyd and 
Wooldridge, 1997; Currie and Procter, 2001; Balogun, 2003; Hyde et al., 2011; Currie et al., 
2014). The roles of middle managers vary a lot depending upon the type and the structure 
of the organisation (Dopson and Stewart 1990, Hales 2006, Buchanan 2013). 
Middle managers constitute the middle tier of the organisational hierarchy. Their role is of 
supreme importance as they have the responsibility to oversee and indirectly control the 
work of others (Livian, 1995). According to Hales, ‘the middle managers conventionally have 
been either responsible for the operational effectiveness of the organisation and/or its 
cost/profit performance at a mesolevel' (Hales, 2006, p.33). The middle managers link top 
level management strategies to the lower level operations. In this process of management, 
middle managers implement strategies, policies, rules, and regulations.  They also organise 
several departments or units. The middle managers not only coordinate within the 
organisation, they are also responsible to maintain the external relations, reporting and 
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accounting for smoothness of operations, and level of business performance that ensues 
(Hales 2006, p. 33).  
Hale's (2006, P. 33) listing of middle managers activities provides a well-directed overview of 
the responsibilities of the middle managers in generic organisations. According to him, the 
goal of middle managers is to translate strategies into operations by transmitting and 
implementing the policy regulations, directing their subordinates and finally reporting the 
operational and financial performance. They regularly communicate with other units within 
and outside the organisation in terms of coordinating with the external parties such as 
suppliers, distributers etc. Their responsibilities also include managing human resource, 
budget, and logistics, monitor the progress and report the organisational performance to 
the higher management. 
Middle managers perform a wide variety of tasks, which include both managerial and 
professional duties. They are in the middle stretch of the organisational hierarchy so they 
communicate with the organisation in different directions: upward, downward and lateral. 
They span the boundaries and behave as representatives of their organisations. Hales (2006) 
argues that the middle managers' work is characterised by considerable workload and 
pressure. These characteristics of managerial work were also found in a study of managers 
by O'Gorman et al. (2005). The study contends that the work of managers is ‘indeterminate', 
‘chaotic' and ‘un-planned' because managerial work has indeterminate boundaries and 
managers are willing to decide on the boundaries of their work.   
To investigate changes in the middle managers work, Tengblad (2006) in a comparative 
research on top executives studied the notion of ‘New Managerialism' introduced in the 
1990s. In this study, it was found that middle managers were empowered in organisations 
that underwent downsizing and delayering. However, they were not willing to delegate 
responsibilities to their subordinates as they were still held accountable for the 
accomplishment of the task and the overall performance. These results were also 
substantiated by another study conducted by Thomas and Dunkerly (1999). The study found 
that as a result of downsizing, during the 1990s, the role of the middle managers seemed 
more of a ‘coordinator' rather than a ‘technical expert'. This study found that middle 
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managers had not delegated responsibility to their subordinates as they perceived 
themselves as the subject to extensive performance management that would hold them 
accountable for the failure of ‘empowered subordinates'. 
Although middle managers were to be found defensive about their job, they felt positive 
about ‘surviving' the downsizing and meeting difficult targets. In a study by Ashmos et al. 
(1998), it was found that active participation of middle managers in decision making would 
increase the organisational efficiency. Overall, despite the rhetoric of post-bureaucracy and 
empowerment of employees in 1980s and 1990s (Pollitt, 2009), middle managers remained 
as supervisors and co-ordinators. They remained in the process of dealing with increased 
pressure to meet the performance management targets (Checkland et al., 2011).  
Similarly, Hassard et al. (2009) found that the middle managers were under pressure to 
meet the performance targets and this was not a sign of a post-bureaucratic organisation. 
The study found out that the role of middle management have become more challenging as 
their working hours have increased performance pressures, expectations of rapid results 
and blurring of work boundaries (Hassard et al., 2009, p. 228). However, according to them, 
this can be compensated by providing higher salaries and greater responsibilities. Hassard et 
al. (2009) found that although middle managers work under pressure they still find the 
motivation to perform well. The study concluded that middle managers performance would 
be improved if the workload was relaxed (Hassard et al., 2009, p. 13).  
In summary, middle managers play a key role at both operational and strategic management 
levels; they manage human resources, change, and innovation. They act as mediators 
between senior managers and frontline employees. However, the range of their 
responsibilities and their working hours are continually susceptible to change (Buchannan et 
al, 2013). 
 
3.1.1. Why do middle managers do what they do? 
 
The role of middle managers is influenced largely by the environment they work in. 
Therefore, there are no concrete ways to categorise universalistic managerial 
responsibilities. Hales (1999) provides a pertinent analysis of this phenomenon. He argues 
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that the middle managers work is greatly influenced by their location in ‘different 
institutions' and ‘organisations'. He maintains that the middle managers working in the 
corporate settings are agents who are responsible for accomplishing targets. According to 
him, managers are responsible for the efforts of those who are engaged in that work. 
Building on Gidden's (1984) debate on structure and agency, Hales adds that managers’ 
responsibility has both structural and individualistic aspects. The structural responsibilities 
include following the organisational ‘rules and procedures', ‘hierarchies', ‘behavioural 
pattern', ‘expectations' and ‘relationships' for the work area. At an individual level, the 
managers pursue their own objectives and goals when they take up the responsibility for 
the work (Hales 1999, p.342). 
However, the structural and the individual responsibilities of the manager cannot be seen 
independent of each other. The managers' individual perceptions and purposes do not 
stand alone and are in line with the structural features of the organisation within which 
he/she performs. The managers' individual practices are restrained and facilitated by the 
structural features of the organisation. Using Gidden's (1984) model of resources, cognitive 
and moral rules, Hales develops a link between manager's practices and structural 
properties. He establishes that all work roles having managerial responsibilities are 
influenced by certain facilities and norms of that organisation (Hales 1999, p.343).  
Hales developed (figure 3.1) a model of how the location (including rules and resources) 
within which managers perform their role can influence and be influenced by managers' 
responsibility, which is the ‘defining characteristic of managing'. He argues that managers 
use the rules and resources and at the same time reproduce them in their work practices. 
Therefore, changes in those rules and resources can lead to the changes in the managerial 
responsibility. Thus, the argument here is that, when the rules and resources change, the 
responsibility also changes, and finally the managerial autonomy changes too. Managerial 
autonomy is the outcome of authority over responsibility (Vancil, 1979). The extent and 
level of managerial autonomy can reflect the structure of the work environment as well as 
the individual managers' agency. 
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Figure 3.1. Systems, modalities and managerial agency, Hales (1999, p. 343)  
In figure 3.1, by facilities, Hales means the ‘structured distribution of resources' that the 
managers use and reproduce in their managerial practices. The managers are able to use 
their organisational resources but are limited to only manage with them. Therefore, 
managers work in a certain way that limits as well as enables the future managers to expand 
their managerial responsibility. Similarly, managers use and reproduce the cognitive rules as 
interpretive schemes in their managerial practices. Managers also act by drawing on and 
acting within norms and moral rules (Hales, 1999). These rules provide legitimacy to 
managerial practices. Managers can alter or reproduce these rules, which then constrain or 
facilitate future managerial practices. For instance, budget spending can serve as an 
example for using and reproducing rules and resources. Managers spend the budget on 
activities and budget headings specify what sort of expenditures the budget can or cannot 
be used for. The act of budget spending is prompted by the rules which are indicative of the 
processes that are acceptable within the organisation (Hales 1999, p. 343). 
Hales' (1999) model considers both internal and external environment of the organisations 
within which managers perform as well as the role of managerial agency. In other words, 
this model reflects the impacts of both the structure and individual managers' agency on 
managers' job. However, it does not give a clear picture of the managerial roles. It neither 
distinguishes different types of roles that managers play in different settings. Other scholars 
such as Floyd and Wooldridge (1992), Currie et al. (2008) and Gatenby et al. (2014) have 
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provided a clearer picture of managerial roles. These models are explained in detail in the 
section 3.1.3. 
In line with Hales argument that structure impacts management responsibilities, Vancil 
(1979) argues that responsibility and authority of managers are the reflections of the 
management structure of the context within which managers play their roles. He 
emphasises the role of context on the managers' responsibilities and authorities. Vancil 
(1979) defines the responsibility as corporate activities with which a manager is concerned 
and for which s/he is held accountable (Vancil, 1979, p. 35). Authority, on the other hand, is 
defined as the resources that the manager has at his/her disposal. It is the power to decide 
how the resources can be utilised. This difference between responsibility and authority gets 
complicated when we move down the hierarchy to the lower level management systems. At 
the lower managerial levels, there is no significant difference between the manager's 
concern for an activity and the custody of resources available. Even as we move up the 
hierarchies, for instance in the case of chief executive officers, the responsibility and 
authority become equivalent. However, for the middle managers, there can be an important 
difference between custody and concern, between the power to control physical resources 
and accountability for results that is usually measured in financial terms (Vancil, 1979). 
In summary, this section has emphasised the influence of rules and resources on managerial 
work. Hales' (1999) has developed a comprehensive view of contextual forces affecting 
managers' behaviour within the organisations. The relative importance of resources and 
institutions in constraining and enabling managerial practices is likely to vary depending on 
the context of managerial work (Hales, 1999, p. 344).  
3.1.2. Middle managerial role  
 
The role of middle managers is much debated in the literature. Kats and Kahn (1978) argue 
that the role played by individuals in the organisations is not necessarily the reflection of 
their job title and description. According to their study, the behaviour of certain individuals 
in the managerial role can be linked to a number of factors. These factors include the formal 
requirement for filling that position, organisational culture, personal character of role 
holder and finally the relation between the organisational members and the role holder.  
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The managers' interaction within the organisation and with the environment within which 
the organisation is deeply embedded affects the ‘role performance' of managers (Peters, 
2005, p.31). To explain how a particular role is performed, March and Olson (1989) apply 
the notion of institutions and argue that institutions (established norms and values) affect 
the individuals' conduct in any given situation. In other words, according to them, individual 
behaviour is shaped by the norms of the institution and they term this phenomenon as 
‘logic of appropriateness'.  
It is assumed that managers play a more fluid role when operating in more networked 
organisations compared to the large and bureaucratic ones (e.g., Hales, 2002 and Ferlie et 
al., 2010). Empowered employees in networked organisations can be managed by trust 
instead of rules and procedures, as they internalise the notions of appropriate behaviour. 
However, in networked organisations without any rules and hierarchies, ambiguity and 
uncertainty increases and managers are likely to embrace the expected behaviour and 
perform their managerial role as it is established in their organisations (Hales, 2002).  
The ambiguity in the role of the managers is also studied by Erera (1989) in the context of 
American public welfare. He argues that ambiguity arises when the policy continuously 
changes, new rules and regulations are enforced, and the performance expectations are not 
clear. In another study by Houlihan (2001) the effect of structural constraints on managers 
are evaluated. In this study, which examined a call centre, Houlihan used ethnographic 
methods and found that middle managers experienced a conflict between their perception 
of what their role entails and the senior managers' expectation of their role. Therefore, 
defining the role and clearly communicating it across the organisation to the all the 
members, setting clearer responsibilities of not only the managers but also the rest of the 
members of the organisation helps to meet the expectations of the senior management. 
Mantere (2008) also asserts that the individual middle manager's managerial agency affects 
the way an individual middle manager performs a role in a social context. He called this 
‘enacted role' and argued that senior managers' expectation of middle managers can either 
constrain or enable middle managerial agency in this process. 
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Another issue regarding the middle managerial roles is the concept of ‘role dissonance' 
which is addressed by McConville (2006) in his study of middle managers in a number of 
organisations in the UK. Role dissonance is the difference in what the managers desire to 
perform and what they are able to perform because of their limitations. McConville explains 
that the middle managers are willing to act as empowered employees, however, their 
personal and professional values, time, and work capacity affects the way they perform. 
McConville argues that role dissonance is linked with the notions of ‘role conflict', ‘role 
ambiguity', and ‘cognitive dissonance'.  
Role conflict is related to the conflicting messages that the managers receive about the 
characteristics of their role. Cognitive dissonance, on the other hand, refers to a situation 
when managers are morally confused about reconciling their professional values with their 
professional obligations. In his study, McConville found that middle managers experienced 
role dissonance as they are caught in the middle of the organisations. On one hand, they are 
responsible for the smooth day-to-day running of the organisational functions and on the 
other hand, they have to innovate and meet the performance targets. As the middle 
managers lacked the authority to change the demands on them, they were under severe 
tension and stress.  
The concepts of role conflict and role ambiguity are also found in the studies of middle 
managers in the healthcare organisations in the UK NHS. Currie and Proctor (2005) found 
that middle managers were confused about the nature of their jobs and meeting the central 
targets. As a result of this confusion, the middle managers were experiencing 
disillusionment (Currie and Proctor, 2005, p.1347). In addition, many of middle managers in 
the NHS were nurses and doctors with a high degree of identification with their professions. 
This fact partially impedes the role transition of these managers to a new role. Bolton (2005) 
in her study of nurses introduced the notion of role distance. She argues that nurses, who 
are middle managers, keep themselves emotionally distanced from those aspects of their 
managerial role which are in conflict with their professional values (Bolton, 2005).  
In summary, it can be argued that the role of middle managers entails a complex interaction 
between the social context, institutional norms and the agency of the manager concerned 
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(Checkland, 2011). When middle managers cannot reconcile their individual sense of self 
with their professional identity they face role ambiguity. They are also challenged by the 
role conflict when different aspects of their work are not compatible. Middle managers have 
to face these challenges, especially, because they are placed in the middle of the 
organisations (Checkland 2011, p.27).  
 
3.1.3. The changing role of middle managers 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the number of middle managers was reduced as a result of the 
move from large bureaucratic organisations to more flat and flexible ones (Currie and 
Procter, 2005). The literature identifies several reasons for decreasing the number of middle 
managers under the NPM. First, the increasingly knowledgeable employees needed to have 
more autonomy than command and control and the rise of knowledge management 
enables more control over subordinates and control at a distance. Second, the ever more 
highly developed information technology led to the reduction in the managerial costs. Third, 
performing the managerial role in highly uncertain and unstable environments required 
more responsiveness and dexterity, as well (Livian, 1997; Hales, 2001).  
In some of the management literature, middle managers have been criticised for being a 
block between operational and strategic levels of the organisations. They are seen as being 
costly, unable to act as entrepreneurs, political instead of problem solver and inefficient to 
link the top-level to the front-line managers (Scarborough and Burrell, 1996; Balogun, 2003). 
Middle managers have been the agent as well as the target of the change. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that they sometimes resist the organisational change (Balogun, 2003). Despite 
the environmental pressures in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the middle managers still 
play an important role in organisations (McGurk, 2011, p. 15). Middle managers have to play 
several roles with regard to the varying conditions. These roles, however, have been 
changed recently. Some of the scholars have emphasised the role of the middle managers in 
strategic change (Currie and Procter, 2001, 2005). In some of the studies, the importance of 
the middle managers' position in the middle stretch of the organisations has been 
highlighted. It is argued that their position assists them to process the new ideas and 
information effectively and enable them to innovate and initiate change.  
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In a study on middle managers in a large company, Huy (2002) argues that middle managers 
play an important role to help their employees to adapt to the organisational change. 
Middle managers who paid attention to the emotions of their employees while 
implementing the organisational change, made a great contribution to the organisational 
change as well as its continuity. In similar circumstances, Balogun (2003) studied the role of 
the middle managers during the implementation of change and concluded that they can act 
as the agents of change. Middle managers, in this study, tried to make the changes 
themselves as well as help their teams to make sense of the change implementation. They 
tried to balance the tensions of change implementation and continuity.  
Other than balancing the organisational change and stability, middle managers need to 
balance their managerial and leadership roles. The managerial roles refer to the formal 
control processes that coordinate the activities, while the leadership role is the informal 
process of influencing and inspiring the members of a group to achieve the objectives of 
that group or organisation (Shackleton, 1995). Shackleton (1995) argues that leadership 
entails a process which is people focused, and has change-oriented dimensions, while the 
management is a control process, which has the task-focused compliance and continuity 
dimensions (MacGurk, 2011, p. 16).  
Some scholars argue that managers have given more weight to leadership than 
management in the recent times. They attribute this to the increased number of flat 
organisations as a result of decentralisation and post-bureaucracy. The argument is that 
flatter organisations can be more responsive, flexible and adaptable to the competitive 
environment (Handy, 1990). Hales (2002, p.55) argues that there is more need for 
leadership in flatter organisations that have less standardised processes and hierarchies. 
Such organisations need leadership as consultative coordination, coaching, and inspiration 
rather than formal managerial control and performance monitoring (McGurk, 2011, p. 17). 
However, it is argued that centralised, bureaucratic organisations have not necessarily been 
replaced by flexible and dynamic organisations (Farrell and Morris, 2003; Hales, 2002). 
Rather a simultaneous centralised and decentralised form of bureaucracy called ‘neo-
bureaucracy' is being witnessed (Farrell and Morris, 2003).Therefore, it can be concluded 
that middle managers in organisations play both a formal managerial role, associated with 
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organising and coordinating and an informal leadership role such as inspiring and 
influencing the employees. The extent to which middle managers play ‘managerial' and 
‘leadership' role can be different in different contexts. 
Floyd and Wooldridge (1992) developed a framework of middle managers' influence on the 
strategies. They draw on the work of Mintzberg and Waters (1985) who look at the strategy 
as ‘a set of deliberate and emergent processes' (MacGurk, 2011, p. 17). This framework 
implies two dimensions and four roles for middle managers' contribution to the strategies 
(Table 3.1).  
 
 Upward Downward 
Divergent Championing alternatives Facilitating adaptability 
Integrative Synthesising information Implementing deliberate strategy 
Table 3.1. Typology of middle manager influence (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992) 
 
The first dimension is related to the upward and downward direction of the middle 
managers' influence on strategy. The second dimension considers the middle managers' 
influence on changing the notion of the organisations' strategy. For instance, middle 
managers can organise different activities towards a consistent objective. In that case, their 
influence on strategies is integrative.  Middle managers are likely to contribute to the 
strategies in four ways. First, they perform the upward integrative role to synthesise 
information by translating and interpreting the information for senior managers. They give a 
picture of the situation of the organisation and the information to the senior managers to 
help them make their decisions regarding time and resource allocation. The second upward 
divergent influence of middle managers is championing alternatives. They present and 
advocate the alternatives to the planned strategies of senior managers. The third influence 
of middle managers is downward as to facilitating adaptability. They advocate and 
encourage the changes in their work areas that sit outside of the senior managers designed 
strategies. Fourth, under implementing deliberate strategy they translate the objectives and 
strategies of senior managers into action plans at the operational level.  
Floyd and Wooldridge (1994) and Currie and Procter (2001, p. 57) argue that middle 
managers play the ‘implementing deliberate strategies' role the most among all four roles. 
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However, the two structural elements seem inevitable to enable the middle managers to 
make a greater contribution to the strategies.  Firstly, middle managers need to be granted 
autonomy by their seniors assuming that autonomy is a property given rather than 
contested or negotiated. Secondly, they need to go beyond the boundaries of their work 
areas. Both studies show that different structural elements provide middle managers with 
different situations to get involved in the strategies.  It can be argued that the extent to 
which middle managers are able to contribute to the strategies reflects the structural 
elements and the extent of their autonomy. However, Floyd and Wooldridge's (1992) 
framework has two main limitations; first, it does not consider the role of the external 
environment of the organisations (Gatenby et al. 2014). Second, unlike the Hales' (1999) 
framework, it does not take the role of managerial agency on what they do and how they do 
it into account.  
In terms of the leadership roles, Currie et al. (2008) distinguished three main roles of 
leaderism of managers in the context of healthcare as political, stakeholder and 
entrepreneurial agents (Currie et al. 2008, p. 1005). The political agent ‘identifies market 
opportunities based on the policy directions and optimising the internal resources' (Currie et 
al. 2008, p. 1005). The stakeholder agent ‘navigates the path to market for opportunities 
based on the knowledge of internal organisational structures and external political 
landscape' (Currie et al. 2008, p. 1005). Lastly, the entrepreneurial agent ‘harnesses and 
manipulates resources to translate the opportunities identified by the stakeholder into real 
projects' (Currie et al. 2008, p. 1005). The advantage of this role typology by Currie et al. as 
compared to the roles identified in Floyd and Wooldridge model is that other than the 
upward/downward direction of managers' influence on strategies, their lateral and external 
contributions are also taken into account. In other words, the main focus of Floyd and 
Wooldridge is on the internal environment of the organisations, while Currie et al. consider 
both internal and external environments within which organisations are embedded.  
According to Gatenby et al. (2014), Floyd and Wooldridge's framework does not consider 
the roles that middle managers have to play to respond to the demands of central 
government and external bodies. The study adds that middle managers play three main 
roles as ‘diplomat administrator', ‘government agent' and ‘entrepreneurial leader' (Gatenby 
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et al., 2014, p.4). Performing the role of diplomat administrators, middle managers reconcile 
the managerial boundaries and professional demands of the organisation. On the other 
hand, they implement the government policies and are responsible for monitoring the 
performance and meet the targets while they perform as government agents. According to 
Gatenby et al. (2015), the middle managers also act as entrepreneurial leaders while 
implementing the techniques and practices of the private sector to change the culture and 
facilitate innovation (Gatenby et al., 2014, p.4). The study finds that although the middle 
managers are enacting all three roles, central government control puts a constraint on 
middle managers to perform their roles independently. The unique structure of the 
professional bureaucracies comprising administrative and managerial hierarchies cause 
more ambiguity and conflict for the middle managers as they perform their roles.  
3.2. Middle managers in Healthcare 
3.2.1. Middle managers in the English NHS 
 
Until the mid-1980s, middle managers in the healthcare organisations acted merely as 
administrators. Before that, the healthcare organisations were professional bureaucracies 
which were dominated completely by the doctors. All the important decisions regarding 
service delivery were made by the doctors (Mintzberg, 1995). The doctors had a strong 
influence in designing the service delivery and monitoring its performance. Any reforms that 
challenged the authority of the doctors were rejected by them (Ferlie et al., 1996; Ackroyd, 
1996; Dopson, 1996; Thomas and Hewitt, 2011). During that time, the middle managers only 
acted as administrators negotiating the professional needs and demands of the hospitals 
(Harrison and Pollitt, 1994). 
The middle managers came to prominence as a result of the inception of the internal 
market (1991) and general management (1985) policies introduced under the NPM 
paradigm. The internal market or quasi-market as some call them aimed to split the 
purchasers and providers of the health care, generating competition for service delivery 
within the suppliers (Currie and Procter, 2005, p.1330).The policy documents identify 
middle managers as change agents in the health care organisations (Currie, 2006). The 
introduction of general management in the mid-1980s encouraged private sector managers 
to move into NHS managerial positions, for instance as HR managers. However, the central 
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government control, doctors' power, and the political context of health care organisations 
limited their ability to operate fully as managers. The private sector managers and 
management models seemed inappropriate and unsuccessful in the context of the public 
sector (Hood, 1991; Boyett and Currie, 2001).  
At the same time, the middle management positions in the public health sector 
organisations were increasingly occupied by health care professions who had received the 
management education such as Master's degree in Business administration (MBA). These 
managers were expected to enact strategic roles, but they were the targets of redundancy 
at the same time (Currie, 2006). The labour government reduced the management cost by 
£44 million in 1998/9 and £18 million following the earlier cost cuts that led to £62 million 
savings (Currie, 2006). The coalition government had the plan to reduce the managerial cost 
by 45% which was one the largest reduction in the managerial cost in the history of the NHS 
(Walshe and Smith, 2011). 
The range of activities that the middle managers in healthcare are responsible for is 
discussed much in the literature. One of the ongoing debates about middle managers is 
related to their role in human resource management. The decentralisation under the public 
management reforms has led to increased demand for the HR professionals (Meyer and 
Hammerschmid, 2010). The decentralisation and the devolution of HRM to line managers 
are taken as interrelated activities (OECD, 1996; Lonti, 2005). McConville (2006) states that 
middle managers consider HRM as part of their role, and they are willing to get involved in 
the HRM practices. However, taking this role has put the middle managers in a difficult 
position, as they have to deal with the senior managers' demands to their subordinates and 
the requirements of the customers at the same time (McConville, 2006, p. 646). However, 
burdening the middle managers with multiple roles has been a recurrent theme of the shift 
in the policy under NPM (Conway and Monks, 2010, p. 364). The focus on the roles that 
each of them plays in the delivery of HR activity perhaps draws attention away from the fact 
that middle managers are not only responsible for implementing the HR policies, but they 
can also contribute to the formulation of HR strategies (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1997; Currie 
and Proctor, 2005).  
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To encourage middle managers to contribute to the HR strategies, HR has to ensure that the 
relationship with middle managers is effective (Currie and Procter, 2001). These measures 
of maintaining a healthy relation with middle managers include developing an HR strategy 
on the basis of general principles rather than prescribed agendas. This requires the HR to 
work on projects with middle managers as a group to persuade them to use their knowledge 
that can influence HR strategies, and work closely with middle managers to invest in 
organisational and management development. This approach is likely to realise HR strategy 
through a process as termed by Currie and Procter as ‘negotiated evolution' with middle 
managers (Hutchinson and Wood, 1995, p. 66). 
In terms of the institutional factors affecting middle managers in the context of healthcare, 
Currie (2006) refers to central government control and doctors' power as two main factors 
that influence middle managers' autonomy. The relationship that managers have with the 
external bodies such as Department of Health is very influential on managers' autonomy. 
These vertical or political relationships are important to managers. Central government 
targets and policies serve as the determinants of the managers' agenda in practice while at 
the same time these limit the managers' autonomy (Harrison and Lim, 2003; Gatenby et al., 
2014).  
Exworthy and Frosini (2008) argue that NHS managers are used to centralised decisions in 
their organisation so they might not be able to act as entrepreneurial leaders. On the other 
hand, clinicians who enjoy a high degree of professional autonomy act as street-level 
bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980; Checkland, 2004). They take the decision-making powers in their 
hands and determine the policies of the organisations undermining the managers' 
autonomy to enact their roles as the government agent. Gale et al. (2017) build on Lipsky's 
observations and introduce the concept of ‘street-level diplomacy' instead of ‘bureaucracy'. 
Their argument is that street levels, in the English primary care, use their discretion and 
relative autonomy to tailor the public policies to the local need. According to them (Gale et 
al., 2017), street level diplomats use their communicative skills to make shared decisions 
and what is best for the community they serve. So rather than subverting the policy-as 
suggested by Lipsky- the street level diplomats modify the policies to address the needs of 
their local community through the network mode of governance. 
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In summary, it is argued that middle managers traditionally acted as diplomat 
administrators in the NHS. They came to prominence with the introduction of the internal 
market. They became the general managers in charge of meeting the government targets. 
More recently, in the debates of middle managers, there is an emphasis on 
entrepreneurialism and enacting strategic role. However, central government targets and 
policies, clinicians’ especially doctors’ power, the vertical and political relationship of 
managers with the external bodies put constraints on middle managers in enacting the 
more proactive and innovative roles. 
3.2.2. Middle managers in the Iranian health system   
 
In Iran, during the 1980s and 1990s, the role of middle managers in the health care 
organisations was limited to enact operational roles as the power and authority stayed at 
the top (Amirshahi, 1997). Middle managers were selected and recruited on the basis of 
their loyalty to the Islamic ideology rather than competence and skills. They were not given 
decision-making power from senior managers because they lacked the required skills. 
Furthermore, the decision-making power was not delegated to the middle managers from 
the senior managers as the senior managers themselves lacked legal autonomy. Therefore, 
the middle managers served mostly as administrators (Abeddi et al., 2008).  
Tabibi et al. (2003) show that the persistent central government control has been one of the 
main barriers to middle managers' involvement in strategic management in hospitals. This 
study highlighted the need for less central control, decentralising managerial functions to 
middle managers and providing these managers with required training programmes as the 
key challenges faced by the middle managers in the health care organisations in Iran. This is 
in contrast with the findings of a more recent study by Delgoshayi et al. (2011), who found 
that middle managers with both clinical and non-clinical background have a high degree of 
participation in decision-making processes in hospitals. Furthermore, it is shown that middle 
managers who are recruited and selected in both public and private hospitals have the 
required knowledge and skills about their work and their management practices. This can be 
explained by the development of HRM in Iran during the last decade (Namazie and Frame, 
2007; Yeganeh and Su, 2008; Soltani, 2010).  
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Iran has a 20-year strategic vision to develop and manage the workforce effectively. 
Providing the human resources with various training is one of the main issues. It is argued 
that there is an intention to move from hard HRM to the soft HRM. The former considers 
the human resources as the costs and emphasises managerial control on them. The latter 
introduces the new approaches to give more weight to the human aspects of HRM and 
appreciates the human resources contribution to and their influence on the organisation's 
strategic objectives. However, the extent to which this target is being met is questionable. 
Despite developing HRM, lower-level managers i.e. middle and first-line managers still 
criticise the centralised management and decision-making processes as the main 
impediments to bringing about innovative changes (Khachian et al., 2012). Yet, It is not clear 
whether decentralisation of health services delivery and increased local autonomy of 
hospitals during the last decade have led to increased autonomy of middle managers. 
In summary, similar to the NHS, the Iranian health system has moved towards 
acknowledging the middle managers’ influence on and contribution to the hospital 
strategies. Again, central government control and doctors’ power are significant factors 
affecting the role transition of middle managers. It is also questionable whether the middle 
managers in the Iranian health system have the required skills and ability to bring about the 
innovative changes.  
3.2.3 The role of the professions in healthcare  
 
The relationship between the managers and other staff in the NHS is widely studied by 
different scholars. Some of the prominent authors reviewed for this thesis include Harrison 
et al. (1989), Holmes (2007), Hyde et al. (2012) and Bresnen et al. (2015). Among other 
issues, these authors have evaluated the power and work boundaries between managers 
and clinicians, and argue that the balance of power between managers and doctors has 
been changed. In particular, Harrison and Lim (2003) have critically reviewed the literature 
about doctor–manager relationship. According to their study, managers have mainly the 
power to establish the organisational structure but their power to influence the delivery of 
service is restricted. However, the relationship between doctors and managers is complex 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
and cannot be explained as a simple dichotomy of either professional autonomy or 
bureaucratic managerial control (Hewison, 2002; Causer and Exworthy, 1999). 
Causer and Exworthy (1999) have developed a more complex dichotomy that shows how 
the activities of managers and professionals are related to each other. They categorised 
professional employees on the basis of three broad roles (Causer and Exworthy 1999. P. 84).  
First, there is the role of practising professionals who exercise the day-to-day professional 
activities. Practising professionals may themselves be divided into those who are the pure 
practitioners and those who are engaged in supervision and the allocation of resources. 
Secondly, practising professionals whose main responsibility is to manage other 
professionals and the resources they use. They are managing professionals that can be 
divided into two groups as the practising and the non-practising managing professionals 
(Causer and Exworthy 1999. P. 48). This division depends on whether these managing 
professionals practice or do not practice their professional activities along their managerial 
responsibilities. Finally, there are those who have a general managerial responsibility of the 
professional employees, but they are not engaged in managing the day-to-day professional 
practices. This group is also divided into the professionally grounded general manager, and 
the non-professional general manager. This complex dichotomy shows the co-existence of 
both managerialism and professionalism logics. 
Johnson (1972) argues that professionals are allowed to have the self-control of their work 
due to having a high level of expertise and specific knowledge, which is called professional 
autonomy (Thomas and Hewitt, 2011). It is argued that the neo-liberal NPM discourse has 
led to decrease in the professional autonomy. Some scholars have investigated the impact 
of managerialism on the professionals, especially medical professionals in the public 
services (Thomas and Hewitt, 2011). The relation between managers and doctors has been 
usually seen as adversarial (Dent et al., 2004). Doctors are considered as the professionals 
whose autonomy and status are at the risk of the managerial and structural threats 
(Exworthy and Halford, 1999; Farrell and Morris, 2003). Some scholars argue that 
organisational and structural changes have led to the decrease in medical professional 
autonomy in NHS resulting in losing their status (McKinlay and Arches, 1985). They argue 
that medical professionals have lost control over their work due to the ongoing healthcare 
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bureaucratisation. Their argument is that doctors mistakenly perceive their roles significant 
and their activities superior to the others (McKinlay and Arches 1985).  
On the contrary, Freidson (1984) asserts that medical professionals have maintained control 
over their knowledge, and actively resisted the bureaucratisation of their work. He argues 
that changes are not forced on medical professions; rather they are the result of 
professionals' responses to the external changes, depending on their knowledge, expertise 
and economic power. Freidson (2001) also refers to the internal stratification and argues 
that medical elites control their own members and that is how they have maintained their 
professional dominancy. He argues that professionals such as doctors have an extensive 
specialised knowledge in their work. Therefore, they deserve to have control over their 
work and to be protected from the law of the market and managerial bureaucracy. He 
(Freidson, 2001) considers the professionalism as a third logic or third principle of organising 
the division of labour alongside the other logics such as managerialism (emanates from the 
legal-rational bureaucracy of Max Weber) and consumerism (stems from the free market 
model of Adam Smith).  
A large body of literature is based on the assumption that professionals have gained their 
power and dominance over other groups from their knowledge. It is assumed that 
managerial bureaucracies are external forces on professions; therefore, managerialism and 
professionalism are considered as contradictory logics (Larson 1979; Thorstendahl and 
Burrage 1990).  According to this view, managerialism as a new mode of governance has 
challenged the professional autonomy especially medical professional power through the 
performance management. Managerialism has been defined as ‘the belief that all aspects of 
organisational life can and should be managed according to rational structures, procedures, 
and modes of accountability in the pursuit of goals defined by policymakers and senior 
managers' (Wallace and Pocklington 2002, p. 68). 
However, some scholars such as Johnson (1995) have challenged the idea of contradiction 
between external regulation and professionalism. Managerialism and /or other new 
governance approaches are not simply external forces on professions as the relationship 
between professions and governance is more complex. The professions such as doctors as 
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policy experts act as mediators between the state and the citizens and professionalism is a 
facilitator of service provision (Kuhlmann 2006, Suddaby and Viale 2011). NPM has 
challenged these relationships. Ward (2014) states NPM aimed to change the direction of 
controlling the professionals from internal ethical and disciplinary protocol of the 
professionals to the managerial authority and/or outsider auditors. According to Ward 
(2014), the changes in the operation of public organisations under the NPM agenda were 
strategically aimed at reducing the power of public professionals by challenging their claim 
over their expertise and specialised knowledge. It is argued that the professional autonomy 
even more reduced by emphasis on corporatisation, market-based competition as well as 
the shift of power towards the arm's length regulatory bodies (Dent et al. 2016).  
However, there is still a strong bond between professions and governance. While 
professions have been the target for more control under NPM, their self-governing capacity 
and the professionalism have maintained their value in the prevailing discussions of 
leadership and governance (Dent 2005, Teelken et al 2012, Denis and van Gestel 2015). 
Medical and other healthcare professionals enjoy a high level of trust by citizens. Having a 
high level of self-governing capacity, public trust and the state support, they are in a good 
position to act as leaders. Tomlinson et al. (2013) argue that ‘these centralised initiatives 
operate as a covert means of perpetuating elite domination' (Brensen et al., 2015, p.). The 
notion of ‘leader' may have some benefits for managers as it might make them more 
legitimate to clinicians and other main stakeholders (Brensen et al 2015). However, it also 
leads to more criticism as it is in conflict with a number of pressure managers face in their 
managerial work.  
In the healthcare sector, individuals have been actively involved in NPM discourses (Thomas 
and Davies, 2005). They reacted positively in each of these circumstances and have taken 
advantage of the changing conditions. These findings are also substantiated by Row (2012), 
who drawing on Lipsky's (1980) theory, argues that individuals act as street-level 
bureaucrats and exploit the limitations and external pressures forced on them to fulfil their 
aims. Individuals have reacted positively and accepted some characteristics of the NPM to 
establish their identities (Thomas and Davies, 2005, p.700). Although professionals are 
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under the central scrutiny, they have the power to determine how it should be done (Levay 
and Waks, 2009).  
Exworthy (2014) in his study of senior doctors in England shows that doctors have shifted 
towards managerialism but they are not passive recipients of the managerial challenges. He 
argues that medical professions have maintained their control over the assessment of their 
work (Exworthy, 2014). It is argued that the role of the medical professions has been 
changed in relation to the healthcare governance and policies (Kuhlmann, 2013). First, 
doctors are not merely the subject of governance interventions, but they are actively 
involved in policymaking and management on various levels. Second, professionalism is not 
a stand-alone mode of governance, but it is intertwined with managerialism. Third, 
managerial tools are not used necessarily as external forces on doctors, while doctors also 
use these tools to achieve their strategic objectives of self-governance (Kuhlmann, 2013). 
In summary, the changes in professions have been discussed in the literature from different 
perspectives such as functionalism and more significantly conflict (Scott, 2008). However, an 
alternative model to study the changes in the professions is provided by Scott (2008). His 
model reconceptualises the professions and states that professions operate as ‘institutional 
agents who define, interpret and apply the institutional element' (Scott, 2008, p.223). This 
model discusses both endogenous (e.g., the growth of knowledge, greater division of 
labour) and exogenous (e.g., change in the institutional logics, change in the nature of 
clients) elements that have led to the changes in the professions. 
The collaboration between the healthcare professionals and managers play a vital role in 
bringing strategic changes in the organisation (Mintzberg 2009). The managers with no 
clinical background, called as non-professional general managers by Causer and Exworthy, 
have a crucial role in co-ordination to achieve their goals and changes required by the 
strategic heads (McGurk, 2011, p.23). This can be achieved by informal communication, 
collaboration and negotiation.  
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3.2.4. Middle manager Identity and Identity Work 
 
More recently, there is more emphasis on the notion of identity. Scholars such as Checkland 
et al. (2011), Hyde et al. (2012), Currie et al. (2012), McGivern et al. (2015), and Burgess et 
al. (2015) argue that identity and in particular identity work have a significant influence on 
managerial practices within organisations. 
As the focus of this study is to reflect on the impact of managerial reforms and 
organisational changes on individual middle managers in two different contexts, it is 
important to know whether the middle managers adopt a particular role or resist it. 
Therefore, the notion of identity work related to the identity construction processes is 
discussed at great length. The identity construction entails acceptance, alteration or 
rejection of a role (Simpson and Carroll, 2008, p. 15). The managerial identity is 
differentiated from other types of social identities by the cultural and normative rules and 
resources. These rules and resources are affected by and affect the managerial practices 
(Hales, 1999). 
Managerial work in organisations can be analysed using the theoretical perspectives of 
identity and identity work (Alvesson et al., 2008). In some studies on middle management, 
the notion of identity has been applied which helps to structure the research and also to 
analyse the findings. Identity work can be defined as ‘people being engaged in forming, 
repairing, maintaining, strengthening or revising the constructions that are productive of a 
sense of coherence and distinctiveness' (Sveningsson and Alvesson, 2003, p. 1165). 
Managers need to do more identity work when there is an organisational change. They are 
also compelled to do more identity work when they face complex and difficult situations as 
compared to when they work in stable organisations (Sveningsson and Alvesson, 2003, p. 
1165).  
The literature on identity can be divided into three strands based on how the notion of 
identity has been interpreted (Checkland et al., 2011, p. 32). Firstly, identity can be viewed 
as a managerial resource with the instrumental aim of improving the outcomes. Secondly, 
identity can be looked as a manifestation of organisational culture with an interest in itself 
giving no regard to any instrumental concerns. Lastly, identity can be located in a discourse 
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rife with control and resistance. This would include ideas about governance of self, and 
adoption of an entrepreneurial identity of any modern managerial text (Foucault, 1988). 
The concepts of personal and social identities have also been studied in Alvesson et al. 
(2008). Relating the two identities, this study finds that both social and personal identities 
are intertwined. The study adds that individual's personal identity is shaped and formed by 
their relation within a social context. Also, their responses to the questions of self-
awareness as who they are and their position within a social context add to the construction 
of personal identities. 
Alvesson et al. (2008) categorise the literature on the notion of identity into three main 
strands. The first strand is the social identity theory. It is related to the individuals' belief 
derived from their perception of their membership in specific social groups and the extent 
to which they identify themselves with the organisation they work for. The second strand 
pertains to the concept of identity work which concerns the processes by which individuals 
build their identities. Individuals are likely to do identity work when they are in a stressful 
situation or experiencing change. The notion of identity work links the personal identity with 
the social identity as Individuals construct their identity out of their social interactions. 
Lastly, the third category of literature analyses identity as how organisational elites and 
discursive regimes play a part to manage the formation of identities (Alvesson et al., 2008, 
p. 16). 
Brown (2015, p.25) classifies the significant debates on identity work on the basis of the 
extent to which identities are ‘chosen by or ascribed to individuals'; ‘generally stable, 
evolutionally adaptive or fluid'; ‘unified and coherent or fragmented and possibly 
contradictory';  ‘motivated (or not) by a need for positive meaning', and ‘framed (or not) by 
a desire for authenticity'. Brown (2015, p.15) summarises how people choose their identity 
and  do the identity work, and how scholars have tried to research and theorise them using 
the concepts of ‘structure and agency', ‘stability and fluidity', ‘coherence and 
fragmentation', ‘positive and negative identities', and finally ‘authenticity and identities'.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
Identity Work 
The notion of identity work as a theoretical discourse has been applied in some of the 
studies of middle managers in various contexts. In a study on middle managers, Holden and 
Roberts (2004) examine the notion of ‘de-powerment' in several countries. The study 
concludes that the middle managers feel remote from the organisational identity and 
therefore, they work to establish their own identities. This remoteness to the organisational 
identity is caused by the relatively larger size of the organisations middle managers working 
in large organisations such as hospitals and banks.  
Senior managers also have an important role in affecting the process of identity work. In a 
longitudinal study of middle managers in a cultural organisation, Beech (2008) focuses on 
one specific manager who faced the organisational change. The study finds that the middle 
managers adopt the managerial identity that is not in line with the identity that their senior 
managers like them to establish. The study also focuses on the narratives and contends that 
the discourse between middle and senior managers can help resolve the conflicts between 
the identities. Currie and Brown (2003) also studied this in a study on middle managers in a 
UK hospital. In this study, the senior managers attempt to introduce a more business-like 
way of working, while middle managers actively resist it. However, the opposing narratives 
of senior and middle managers fall in line over time when they approach using the same 
narrative only for the wellness of the patients (Checkland, 2011).  
In another study, Watson (2008) applies the notion of identity work to examine the 
experiences of two middle managers in the same organisation. He identifies five types of 
social identity: social category, formal role, local organisational identity (e.g., an NHS 
employee); local personal identity and cultural stereotype (e.g., a devoted mother). Watson 
contends that in the process of identity construction, managers may use all of these 
different identities or just some of them, and they experience conflict between different 
types of their identities. He identifies that the manager conducts identity work to develop a 
work identity which is in conflict with his personal identity.  The manager in his meetings 
tries to act as a gentleman (personal social identity) and not to use bad language when his 
female colleagues are around, while he likes to act as a good manager (organisational social 
identity) and have a strong conversation about the situations.  
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Thomas and Linstead (2002) also find conflicts between different types of middle managers' 
identities in their studies. They argue that middle managers have a weak identity when they 
experience change repeatedly. Therefore, they constantly conduct identity work in order to 
gain stability and legitimacy in an attempt to find the type of personal identity that matches 
their social identity within their organisation. Similarly, in another study on the UK NHS, 
Mischenko (2005) emphasises that middle managers struggle to conduct identity work. They 
feel forced to adopt different types of identity: managerial, entrepreneurial and personal 
identity. Therefore, middle managers attempt to play at resistance and self-governance.   
In a study on middle managers in a primary care trust (PCT), McDonald (2004) addresses the 
implementation of the NPM and modernisation initiatives in the NHS and their impact on 
middle managers. McDonald argues that those middle managers who were nominated as 
influencers by their colleagues were selected to go to a training course planned to empower 
the middle managers to implement the change in their organisation. She found that the 
middle managers' resistance is limited because they attribute the problems of the 
organisation to the deficient employees but not to its surroundings. Most of the managers 
who went to that course admitted that they were required to establish an empowered 
identity. Whereas those middle managers who adopted the empowered identity only speak 
about the positive aspects of their organisation and try to avoid the negativities which were 
attributed to not being grown up by the senior managers.  
Similarly, Proctor et al. (1999) identify several elements that prevent middle managers from 
adopting an empowered identity in an NHS Community Trust. These factors include lack of 
money and the perception of mixed messages from senior managers. However, they 
suggest that some middle managers take advantage of the empowerment rhetoric. They 
identify opportunities to improve their position and develop the extent of their roles. Unlike 
Procter et al. (1999), Harding (2005) does not have a positive view on managerial identity 
work in the NHS. He argues that because of the inherent contradictions in the nature of the 
managerial work in the NHS, as a large and unwieldy organisation, it is doomed to adopt the 
rational and organised manager identity.   
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Halford and Leonard (2006) also look at the doctors and nurses who work in the NHS as 
middle managers.  The study concludes that the managers and nurses in NHS shift units until 
they find a place to establish a coherent identity of themselves with their sense of self. 
However, constant changes in the NHS organisations and the increase in centrally dictated 
targets for performance management imply that managers are gradually less likely to have 
variable experience in the NHS organisations.  
The literature discussed so far suggest that senior managers within the NHS attempt to 
modify the middle managers' identity and encourage them to adopt an empowered or an 
entrepreneurial identity (Checkland et al., 2011, p. 37). Nielsen (2009) in her study in a large 
multinational organisation finds that senior managers do that through the discourses taking 
place within the organisations. McDonald (2004) in her study of middle managers in a PCT 
finds that middle managers are trained to only express the positive messages about the 
organisation (PCT).   
Some of the studies examine the typical conflict between doctors and managers. Doctors 
self-identify themselves as only interested in the good of patients, whereas the managers 
are identified by others as only concerned with the bottom line (Checkland et al., 2011, p. 
24 38). In a study of clinicians and managers in the NHS, Hewison (2002) argues that there 
are fundamental differences between the core values that motivate them. He argues that 
clinicians who become involved in management have gone native by their colleagues. 
However, Hewison (2002) finds that managers also think that they are here for the good of 
the patients and that they rationalise their decisions on the basis of the greater good of the 
patients.  
In another study of doctor-managers, Forbes and Hallier (2004, 2006) identify conflict 
between clinical and managerial identities. They use the social identity theory and define 
two groups of clinicians as reluctant and investors. Forbes and Hallier explain the difference 
between the two groups on the basis of the degree to which they perceive being a manager 
valuable, and of the influential social group. However, they applied the social identity theory 
that considers social categories stable and fixed. Therefore, it does not explain the fluidity 
surrounding the middle managerial identity and the doctors' engagement in ongoing 
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identity work overtime. More recently, McGivern et al. (2015) identified two different 
managerial identities for doctor-managers: incidental hybrids and willing hybrids. Incidental 
hybrids accept the managerial identity by obligation whereas willing hybrids embrace it 
(McGivern et al., 2015). 
Carroll and Levy (2008) categorise the professional identity as default identity and 
managerial identity as emergent identity. They argue that professionals who have 
encountered a new identity (managerial identity) have to conduct extensive identity work to 
make a prolonged link between the two identities. Carroll and Levy believe that the 
emerging identity is intertwined with a default identity. However, this process is not always 
successful as Bolton (2005) shows that nurse-managers separate their sense of self from 
their managerial identity. Hoque et al. (2004) in their study of senior managers in the NHS 
and more recently Hyde et al. (2011) in their study of middle managers also find that 
clinician managers (both doctors and nurses) strongly identify themselves with their 
professional identity rather than managerial identity. In contrast, non-clinician managers are 
more likely to identify themselves with the organisation and perceive their role to achieve 
the organisation's goals. They believe that they are the government's agent and their role is 
to meet the centrally dictated targets (Hoque et al., 2004).  
In the study of the NHS, it is evident that senior managers try to encourage the middle 
managers to establish an entrepreneurial or empowered identity. The extent to which this 
identity is perceived as a positive identity or the identity that they have to adopt by 
obligation depends on the theoretical perspective applied in these studies. What is common 
in all of these studies is the important role of discourse and narratives to develop and 
preserve an identity. Furthermore, it is evident that professionals who adopt managerial 
identity must conduct identity work to reconcile their new managerial identity with their 
traditional professional identity (Checkland et al., 2011, p.38). 
Some scholars emphasise the impact of contexts such as ‘organisational' and ‘national 
cultural settings' on individuals' identity and identity work (Brown et al., 2015, p. 31). It is 
argued that organisations provide people with different capacity, resources and support 
that form their identities. However, it is questionable whether members of the similar type 
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of organisations adopt the same topics or the same strategies to do identity work. Empirical 
studies also reveal how organisations assist, manipulate, and hamper their members in 
performing the identity work (Anteby, 2008).  
Some researchers such as Srinivas (2013) also argue how national cultures show shared 
differences among those who exist and socialise in different national culture systems 
(Brown, 2015, p.31). Researchers suggest that the morphology of identity work is influenced 
by their respective cultures and different cultures lead to the variations of identity work 
(Brown, 2015, p.31). However, more recently some scholars such as Currie et al. (2012), 
McGivern et al. (2015), and Burgess et al. (2015) have emphasised the important role of the 
agency in the identity work of clinical professionals.  
Identities are acknowledged by most researchers (Mumy, 1997; Trethewey, 1999) not as 
choices or obligations, but as effects of identity work that occur in the gaps between 
‘domination and resistance' (Brown, 2015, p. 26).  In addition, it is argued that (Fleming and 
Spicer,2003) organisational members can work around the identities by not only 
accommodating them, but also modifying and redefining them, and further distancing 
themselves through irony, humour and cynicism, and contesting them (Brown, 2015, p. 26). 
  3.2.5 Summary  
In summary, what middle managers do is dependent on the context within which they work. 
The contextual rules and resources available to managers shape their practices within the 
organisations. Middle managers due to their unique position in the middle stretch of 
organisational hierarchy perform a wide variety of tasks, which include both managerial and 
professional tasks. Their position in the middle of the organisation can cause role ambiguity 
and role conflict.  
In both generic and healthcare organisations, middle managers communicate in different 
directions, upward, downward and lateral. Their work is characterised by considerable 
workloads and pressures. They play several roles regarding varying conditions.  These roles, 
however, have been changed recently. Some of the scholars have emphasised the role of 
the middle managers in strategic change (Currie and Procter, 2001, 2005) as well as the 
organisational continuity. Middle managers also need to balance their managerial and 
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leadership roles. They are expected to act as entrepreneurial leaders by identifying and 
pursuing the objectives for their organisations. The changing role of the middle managers is 
also evident in the healthcare organisations. Evidence shows that middle managers are now 
expected to act as change agent and leaders rather than operation managers (Buchanan et 
al., 2013). However, middle managers face the central control as one of the main barriers to 
act as entrepreneurial leaders, according to Gatenby et al. (2015).  This is also evident 
(Crawford and Brown, 2008) in the context of healthcare organisations, as the middle 
managers are increasingly subject to the monitoring and accountability (Buchanan et al., 
2013).   
In the healthcare organisations, other than central controls, middle managers face doctors' 
power. Medical professionals have maintained control over their knowledge and actively 
resisted to the bureaucratisation of their work. Thus, middle managers are more restricted 
to enact strategic and entrepreneurial leadership roles in the healthcare organisations. It is 
worth noting that a large number of middle managers in the healthcare organisations are 
clinicians, which indicates that the activities of professionals and managers are interrelated 
(Causer and Exworthy, 1999).  
Research suggests that hybridisation and the changes in the job title of clinical middle 
managers show that their roles have been expanded and their workload has increased 
(Wise, 2007 and Bergin, 2009). By hybridisation, clinicians become responsible for managing 
financial and human resources, business planning and implementing change (Forbes et al., 
2004 and Currie et al., 2009). However, evidence (Porter et al., 2006) shows that there has 
been a lack of preparation for these middle managers to move from clinical to hybrid roles. 
Therefore, they face difficulties to balance their clinical and managerial responsibilities and 
to manage their budgets. In this context, there is a more need for middle managers with the 
clinical background to reconcile their professional identity with managerial identity. This 
would entail an extensive identity work. One of the main issues here is that some 
professionals cannot reconcile these two identities as they separate their sense of self from 
their managerial identity (Bolton, 2005). 
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3.3. Autonomy 
Autonomy has been a persistent subject of public service reforms since the 1980s (Mattei, 
2009). Saltman et al. (2002) argue that its normative groundwork and doctrinal legacy have 
been associated with NPM and entrepreneurial behaviour (Mattei, 2009, p. 20). One of the 
core elements of NPM is to increase the organisational autonomy and increase government 
flexibility by giving them a clear set of targets and more room for manoeuvre to decide how 
to meet them (Hood, 1995; Peters, 1996).   In a restricted sense, autonomy refers to the 
freedoms of individual public managers and ‘letting the managers manage' (Osborn and 
Gaebler, 1992). 
Barber et al. (2000) state that the degree of an agents' autonomy is affected by the decision-
making style of the agent with respect to the other agents. Their study highlights three 
types of autonomy as ‘command-driven', ‘consensus', and ‘local autonomy'. The command-
driven autonomy is where the agents obey orders from above only by not actively making 
decisions. The consensus autonomy is where the agent is free to share his/her decision-
making process and decisions. The local autonomy or the master autonomy is where the 
agent enjoys the role of a sole decision maker (Barber et al., 2000).  
McGrath (2001) applies the work of Goold and Quinn (1990) and identifies two types of 
autonomy; ‘supervision autonomy' and ‘goal autonomy'. The extent to which managers can 
exert control by supervising and specifying the operations is supervision autonomy, whereas 
goal autonomy is the extent to which managers can specify the goals and outcomes without 
the interference of higher level managers. For McGrath (2001) autonomy is the ‘freedom' to 
determine the objectives and the sovereignty to achieve the objectives (Hoque et al., 2004, 
p.357).  
The concept of ‘supervision autonomy' described by McGrath is similar to what Gulowsen 
(1972) called structural autonomy. He explains it as the extent to which the agent is able to 
control factors in the work environment.  Bouchard (2002) also refers to ‘autonomy of 
means' as the ability to resolve an issue with self-determined means. Conversely, ‘strategic 
autonomy' or ‘goal autonomy' is related to the extent to which the agent can determine the 
goals. Strategic autonomy helps the agent goes beyond the limitations of the organisations 
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to address the organisations objectives. Lumpkin et al. (2009) consider autonomy on a 
hierarchical scale, and state strategic autonomy has a higher position compared to 
structural autonomy. 
Osterman (2008) defines autonomy as the freedom one enjoys to make decisions to 
accomplish a task at work. He argues that middle managers with autonomy might be given a 
set of goals and then has the freedom to figure out how best to achieve these. This type of 
autonomy is termed ‘supervision autonomy' by McGrath (2001) and is similar to what 
Lumpkin et al., (2009) called ‘structural autonomy'. Osterman states that ‘autonomy is the 
power to control'. He argues that a central role of middle managers is to exercise control 
over the activities of the members of an organisation (Osterman 2008, p. 83). Drawing on 
the principal–agent approach, he mentioned the role of incentives in the cases that there is 
an inconsistency between the objectives of a superior and those of a subordinate. Osterman 
depicts the changes in the extent of middle managers autonomy and control as a result of 
restructuring and changing the work of middle managers. Utilising the ‘quality of 
employment survey' (1997) and ‘national survey of changing workforce' (1997 and 2002), he 
asked both managers and non-managers questions about autonomy and control. The 
overall data of these surveys show that the jobs held by middle managers are rich in 
opportunities to learn and in autonomy over how the job itself is done. However, their 
power to control the overall nature of their work or the context in which they operate is 
much more limited. 
Among others, Verhoest et al., (2004) have provided a more comprehensive definition of 
autonomy. They developed a conceptual map of autonomy based on two dimensions. First 
‘autonomy as the level of decision-making competencies' and secondly ‘autonomy as the 
exemption of constraints on the actual use of decision-making competencies'. See Table 3.2 
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Table 3.2. Taxonomy of autonomy; Source: Verhoest et al., 2004, cited in Exworthy et al., 2010, p.49) 
 
The first type of autonomy is related to the extent to which ‘the agency has the discretion to 
make the decision itself about matters it finds important'. Accordingly, the level of 
organisational autonomy is established on the basis of the ‘scope and the extent of the 
agency's decision-making competencies' (Verhoest et al., 2004, p. 104). Typically, 
hierarchical organisations follow the higher authorities' instructions or seek their approval 
for taking the steps. However, they still have some discretion to decide how to perform 
their roles and operate their functions.  This discretion implies ‘managerial autonomy and 
policy autonomy'. The managerial autonomy involves ‘discretion over rules and regulations, 
whereas the policy autonomy is about managing inputs and achieving outputs' (Exworthy et 
al., 2010, p. 48).  
Christensen (1999) argues that the second type of autonomy is pertaining to the extent of 
government control over the local agents, and can be divided to four sub- divisions: 
‘structural autonomy; financial autonomy; legal autonomy and interventional autonomy' 
 
Autonomy 
as: 
 
Type 
 
Definition 
Decision-
making 
competencies 
Managerial 
autonomy 
“Ex-ante control on inputs by rules and ex ante approval 
of decisions or involvement in decisions concerning 
management of financial, human and organisational 
resources.” 
Policy autonomy “Ex-ante control on processes or performance control by 
specifying ex ante rules, standards and norms concerning 
(in order of high control to low control) (1) processes, (2) 
policy instruments and (quantity and quality) of outputs, 
(3) and objectives and effects.” 
Exemptions 
on the 
Constraints 
on the actual 
use of 
decision 
making 
competencies 
Structural 
autonomy 
“Control by influencing the agencies’ decisions through 
hierarchical and accountability lines towards the agency 
head or through the supervisory board” 
Financial 
autonomy 
“Control by influencing the agencies’ decisions by 
reducing or increasing the level of budget granted to the 
agency.” 
Legal autonomy “Control by changing the legal status of the agency.” 
Interventional 
autonomy 
“Control by influencing the agencies’ decisions by the 
means of reporting requirements, evaluation and 
auditing provisions against externally set goals and norms 
and by (the threat of) sanctions or direct interventions.” 
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(Exworthy et al., 2010, p. 49). Structural autonomy is ‘the degree to which the agency is free 
from the government control'. Financial autonomy is ‘the extent to which the agency is 
dependent on the government for funding'. Legal autonomy is ‘the extent to which the 
agency is independent on the basis of its legal status'. Interventional autonomy is ‘the 
degree to which the agency is free from assessment and inspection with regards to their 
outcomes'. If higher authorities exert a great deal of control on agents, for example, by 
posing the threat of sanction in case of underperforming, they will feel less autonomous. 
Verhoest et al. (2004) concludes that the formal delegation of autonomy to an agency 
cannot be used as an indicator of its autonomy in practice. They argue that having a 
different level of autonomy on different dimensions may cause tension relating to the 
decision-making competencies of the agency. For instance, a high degree of policy 
autonomy can affect the agency's performance as long as there is a high level of managerial 
autonomy in place.  Similarly, Exworthy et al. (2010) argue that autonomy is only realisable 
if ‘input, processes and outcomes are all controlled by the same agent'. They introduce a 
binary division of autonomy as ‘freedom from' the higher authorities and is related to 
agency's ability to exercise autonomy, and ‘freedom to' be ‘responsive and innovative' 
(Exworthy et al., 2010, p. 172). 
There are some debates regarding the impact of granting autonomy to employees on 
performance at the individual level. It is argued that granting autonomy to employees over 
their daily work encourages them to produce more good outcomes (Anand et al., 2012). 
Applying job characteristics theory, Anand et al. (2012) assert that employees who are 
granted autonomy to perform their day-to-day work feel more responsible for improving 
the work processes which lead to producing good outcomes for the organisation.   
Another study by Shimizu (2012) claims that granting autonomy to middle managers is vital 
to promote ‘corporate entrepreneurship' as autonomy gives middle managers the motive to 
generate more innovative new ideas. However, the results of this study show that too much 
autonomy can lead to a situation that may encourage opportunistic behaviours where 
middle managers, who are not motivated or responsible enough for the organisations' 
success, may follow their own interests rather than the organisational interest. Shimizu 
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(2012), drawing on innovation literature, concludes that both very high and very low 
autonomy may result in ‘negative creative performance'. Similarly, Caza (2011) in an 
international survey of middle managers in research and development (R&D) units of 
European sample argues that a well-moderated relationship by managerial experiences and 
limited unit size may result in the greater managerial autonomy increasing the unit's 
performance. 
In order to assess the degree and level of senior managers autonomy over operational, 
financial and strategic priorities in an NHS trust, Hoque et al., (2004) apply Barber et al.'s 
(2000) and McGrath's (2001) definition of autonomy. They find that consultant managers 
have ‘supervision autonomy' in terms of ‘clinical freedom to apply their professional 
knowledge on a daily basis' but their goal autonomy is limited because they have to meet 
the targets determined by the centre (Hoque et al., 2004 p.357). In their managerial role, 
they neither have goal autonomy nor supervision autonomy because they are not able to 
determine the clinical priorities for the clinicians. They are more limited when it comes to 
managing the finance and budgets. However, the non-consultant managers such as non-
clinicians and ex-nurses who perceived themselves as government's agents had command-
driven autonomy.  
Hoque et al., (2004) make a reference to several important factors that restrict granting 
autonomy to the organisational level. These restricting factors are ‘professional' cultures 
related to both consultant and consultant managers, ‘lack of managerial skills' of consultant 
and ex-nurse managers, consultant managers' lack of commitment to the managerial roles, 
and lack of desire of senior managers to have more autonomy (Hoque et al., 2004, p.357).  
Hoque et al. (2004) draw on the career theory (Holland 1959, 1972) and explain that this 
lack of desire for autonomy is related to the personality traits of these managers. They 
argue that the NHS managers in their study have respect for rules and power rather than 
the aspiration of power (Hoque et al., 2004, p. 373).  
This is in line with Hales' (1999) conclusion that merely granting autonomy to managers 
cannot change their behaviour. He argues that managers' experience, training and 
education, desires and aspirations affect their skills and motivation which in turn affect what 
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they do and how they do it. These factors can determine the differences in the managers' 
responses to the structural opportunities and limitations (Hales 1999; Stewart et al., 1980). 
Managers who have had technical education, worked in only one area and chosen to have 
conventional managerial jobs, are not likely to have the skills and motivation to enact 
entrepreneurial role.   
To examine the Michael Lipsky's (1980) theory of discretion related to public sector 
professionals as 'street-level bureaucrats', Taylor and Kelly (2006) have looked at the public 
sector reforms, in particular, the introduction of increased managerial control over 
professionals. They differentiate between ‘three forms of discretion: rule, task and value, 
and assess the extent to which these different forms of discretion have been compromised 
by reform' (Taylor and Kelly, 2006, p. 629) .They conclude that all these three 
interconnected elements of discretion have been influenced to some extent. Rule discretion 
of the professionals has been reduced because responsibility, accountability and rules 
become more intense.   According to the Lipsky's (1980) theory, this has led to the decrease 
in the policy-making discretion of professionals. However, Taylor and Kelly claim that there 
is a high degree of task discretion because there is more than one way of carrying out tasks. 
They argue that among the three elements task-based discretion has increased as 
professionals are required to consider the implications of their tasks for targets, managers 
and ‘customers'. 
In contrast to the study of Taylor and Kelly (2006) which focuses on the nature of the 
discretion of ‘street-level bureaucrats', Rowe (2012) draws on Lipsky's (1980) model to 
identify the street-level bureaucrats and how they apply the rules, regulations and limitation 
to reach their goals. He argues that Lipsky's framework gives a sense of the external 
constraints imposed on street-level bureaucrats in the form of legal, financial, performance, 
policy and managerial constraints. Rowe argues that not only professionals but also 
managers act as street-level bureaucrats and shape the policies at the workplace through 
their coping mechanisms and value judgements. Therefore, managers, as well as the 
individual professionals, acknowledge the pressures and judgments. This could be argued 
that in order to determine the middle managers' discretion, both top-down and bottom-up 
issues need to be considered. This would also include demands and concerns of the 
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management regarding financial and performance related concerns, frontline managers' 
demands as well as middle managers' assumption of the way they can respond to the 
demand of their organisation. 
The literature discussed so far demonstrated the importance of managers' autonomy and 
the contingencies of the impact of autonomy on performance. There is another strand of 
literature that considers the factors that can affect the extent of managers' autonomy. For 
instance, Meyer and Hammerschmid (2010) compare management autonomy of line 
managers in central government in 27 European countries to examine the current status of 
decentralisation and managerial autonomy in those countries. They define management 
autonomy as the devolution of control over administrative matters down to line managers. 
It also encompasses enlarging discretion in the hand of individual managers to take 
decisions according to the changing needs of organisations (Meyer and Hammerschmid, 
2010, p. 455). This study shows that decentralisation is in line with granting more consensus 
autonomy, where manager shares decision making, rather than master autonomy, where 
the manager exclusively is the decision maker.  
Drawing on institutional theory, Meyer and Hammerschmid (2010) conclude that 
institutional factors such as the HR system, administrative tradition and national culture 
emphasise the path dependency of ‘institutional arrangements' and ‘management reforms'. 
Those deeply institutionalised factors can explain the variations in interpretation and 
translation, as well as practices of global reforms in various contexts. However, this study is 
limited in the sense that decentralisation and managerial autonomy is only assessed in 
European countries, and also in relation to the human resource management. It is not clear 
whether these institutional factors have the same impact on managerial autonomy in the 
areas of performance or financial management.  
The importance of institutional factors has been emphasised in another comparative study 
by Dobbin and Boychuk (1999). The study compares the job autonomy between Anglo-
Saxon and Nordic countries. Drawing on neo-institutionalism approach, the study concludes 
that there is a certain logic behind the institutions such as ‘national management', ‘training' 
and ‘employment' that influences autonomy in all types of jobs. According to this study, in 
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the Anglo-Saxon countries ‘management', ‘training', ‘employment' and ‘bargaining systems' 
are rule-oriented.   Management systems are based on clear rules; educational systems 
provide managers with inadequate ‘training'; ‘bargaining systems depend on clear work 
routines'; and employment systems consider employees as expendable and are not willing 
to invest in developing the skills of the employees (Dobbin and Boychuk, 1999, p.280).  
Conversely, in the Nordic countries, work practices are skill-oriented. For example, 
management systems give the employees the discretion to decide on the work processes, 
educational systems provide a wide range of job-related skills, ‘bargaining systems ensure 
the maximisation of worker participation', and ‘unemployment systems make dismissal 
costly', as a result, encouraging employers to re-train their workers and invest in developing 
their skills. The influence that national employment system has on the autonomy of various 
jobs shows that these ‘systems are highly institutionalised' (Dobbin and Boychuk 1999, p.  
280).  
Lonti (2005) also examines the factors affecting the degree of middle manager autonomy in 
Canadian governments in the areas of finance and HRM. She argues that during the period 
of intense government restructuring the different degrees of autonomy reported by the 
middle manager is related to the structural and environmental factors. She finds that the 
extent of perceived managerial autonomy is considerably associated with the subject 
position of the unit within which they work, the size of the unit, and the degree of emphasis 
on results.  
In summary, autonomy is a multi-dimensional concept. Managerial autonomy can be 
derived from formal organisational structures and industrial characteristics. Organisational 
and organisational field features offer varying levels of autonomy to managers. On the basis 
of this literature, it can be argued that the level of autonomy of middle managers could be 
looked at as the reflection of organisational and environmental characteristics.  
3.4. Institutional theories  
 
There are many varieties of institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991b; North, 1990; 
Peters, 1999), all of which share the assumption that ‘institutions make difference' which is 
associated with the idea that organisational structures and procedures affect the way the 
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staff of those organisations think, decide and behave (March and Olsen, 1989; Lowndes, 
1996; Ranson et al.,1997). Therefore, changes in structures and procedures should lead to 
new patterns of thought, decision and action (Pollitt et al., 1998).  
Organisations are deeply embedded in their institutional contexts and are supported and 
constrained by institutional forces (Meyer & Rowan, 1991; Scott, 1995). One of the 
theoretical backgrounds for these institutional factors is neo-institutionalism. The neo-
institutionalism approach tended to recognise the importance of the mutual relationship 
between political phenomena and contextual factors. Roness (2001) argues that studies that 
examine how structural features of organisations, at any time affect, and over time are 
affected by how actors behave may constitute institutional analysis.  
As Pollitt et al. (1998) argue, it is not possible to cover all the varieties of new 
institutionalism but two of the main sets of ideas can be described here. The first is that of 
seeing the activity of public management not as a process of maximising utilities but rather 
as one mainly characterised by norm-governed activities. March and Olsen (1989, p.22) 
state: ‘action is more often based on identifying the normatively appropriate behaviour than 
on calculating the return expected from alternative choices.' Therefore, they introduced two 
basic logics of action; the logic of consequence and the logic of appropriateness. These are 
the two sets of assessment the actor is confronted with when making a decision.   
The examples of actions, based on the logic of consequence, are problem-solving or 
bargaining with regard to the alternatives, preferences, expectations and decision rules 
confronted with. According to the logic of appropriateness, the actions can take the form of 
rule-following based on the situation, the identity of the actor and the roles of the actor. 
When actions are based on the logic of consequence, the organisational structure and the 
past history may restrict the alternatives and the decision rules. Expectations and 
preferences may also be formed by the past experiences and the present structure. In the 
case of the logic of appropriateness based action, rule following implies the linkage of a set 
of existing rules to a situation by actors with specific identities. These identities are 
developed over time and are established in the existing organisational structure (Roness 
2001). 
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3.4.1. Theoretical frameworks  
Institutional Pillar 
The influence of institutions and institutional structures on managerial action and behaviour 
has been studied in detail by Scott (2001, 2008). Scott proposed a framework called 
institutional pillars, which explains the interplay of rules and resources with the managerial 
practices. Scott (2001) puts forth that institutions comprised of regulative, normative, and 
cultural-cognitive elements. These together with associated activities and resources provide 
stability and meaning to the social life at the organisation (Macfarlane et al., 2011, p.916). 
According to his framework, institutional elements such as rules, norms and beliefs are 
though symbolic in nature, they contribute at large towards constructing social behaviour. 
These elements are then reflected in activities and resources (Macfarlane et al., 2011, 
p.916). Therefore, managers' behaviour can be explained using three elements of rules and 
regulations, the legitimacy of the action, perception towards behaviour and the meaning 
attached to that particular behaviour. A manager's behaviour can have all these three 
behavioural aspects (Macfarlane et al. 2011, p. 916). 
The impact of the public management reforms on managers can be assessed based on the 
institutional pillar framework of Scott et al. (2000). This framework provides a good insight 
into the changes in the institutional and resource environment within which the managers 
perform. Any changes in the resource and institutional environment challenge the 
managers. The resource environment comprises of both supply and demand side factors. 
Supply side factors can be the availability of physicians, technologies, and external grants, 
while demand side factors are the demographics, such as ageing population.  
On the other hand, the institutional environment comprises of institutional logics, 
institutional actors, and the governance system (Scott et al., 2000). Institutional logics are 
defined as the socially shared assumptions and values that form a framework for reasoning, 
criteria for legitimacy and organisation of time and space (Macfarlane et al., 2013, p. 11). 
Furthermore, institutional actors such as purchasers and providers of healthcare facilities 
are in fact the carriers and creators of the institutional logics (Macfarlane et al., 2013, p. 11). 
It is the institutional actors whose ownership of institutionally defined identities and 
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perceptions affect the resource environment and institutional environment of an 
organisation (Macfarlane et al., 2013, p. 11).  
Institutional logics can be seen as cultural beliefs, rules and deeply held values that are 
shared socially and have a great influence on the cognition and behaviour of the actors 
(Friedland and Alford, 1991). Friedland and Alford (1991) describe institutional logics as 
"supra-organisational patterns of human activity by which individuals and organisations 
produce and reproduce their material subsistence and organise time and space. They are 
also symbolic systems, ways of ordering reality and thereby, rendering experience of time 
and space meaningful" (Friedland and Alford, 1991, p. 243). The professions have ‘one' 
dominant institutional logic that guides organising and provides actors with vocabularies, 
identities, and rationales for action (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton, 2004). 
Professionalism is one such institutional logic, which guides the actors within an 
organisation. Professionalism is described as a set of institutions which permit members of 
an occupation to make a living while controlling their own work (Friedson, 2001). Friedson 
(2001) argues that professionalism is a third logic or third principle of organising the division 
of labour. He presents a model of the logic of professionalism by establishing the basic 
institutional characteristics of ideal-type professionalism and analyses the circumstances 
which make those characteristics possible.  
The two most general ideas underlying professionalism are the belief that certain work is so 
specialised that it is un-assessable to those lacking that particular skill or expertise. The 
second is the belief that it cannot be standardised or rationalised. This distinction sets the 
base for the social processes which establish the social and economic status of professional 
work. Conflicts can arise when professionals from different roles come together, as the 
underlying logics may get disassociated from each other (Dunn and Jones, 2010. P. 140). 
Thus, when the balance between the multiple logics is disturbed, the professionals may 
become more vulnerable to threats from internal groups and external invaders alike (Dunn 
and Jones, 2010. P. 140). 
Even as the balance between the multiple logics is disturbed, the competing logics can co-
exist and rivalry between logics can be managed through the development of collaborative 
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relationships (Reay and Hinings, 2009). In their study, Reay and Hinings (2009) examine the 
actions of micro-level actors as they managed competing logics by developing localised 
structures and systems that enable day-to-day work. They find out that institutional change 
can occur through collaborative efforts that encourage independence and separate 
identities of collaborators. This, according to them, connected the competing interests of 
the actors to the different co-existing institutional logics that are sustained by the 
collaborative arrangements.  
The institutional logics may react sharply to the market forces. A good example can be taken 
from Glynn and Lonusbury's (2005) study. Glynn and Lounsbury (2005), based on the critics' 
review of Atlanta Symphony Orchestra (ASO) performances, studied how broader shifts in 
institutional logics before and after the strike of 1996 shaped the discourse of critics and 
their judgment of musical performances. The authors analyse that aesthetic logic that 
traditionally informs the practices of symphony yielded to more commercially oriented 
market logic. The study highlighted that before the strike the critics were highly in favour of 
the traditional musical symphony and they condemned any kind of change in genres or 
symphony of ASO. The reason was that they did not want to lose the authenticity and 
classical beauty of ASO's genres (Glynn et. al, 2005. p.21).  
On the other hand, the market logics were also worth to adopt and blend with ASO's 
culture. The strike resulted in a shift in ASO's culture because after that the reviews of critics 
were changed. The reason for the change in critics' review was that the market logic was 
getting inspired by contemporary mainstream music that is why the audience of ASO was 
falling down with less interest for the old musical culture style. So, this caused the 
dramatically shift in critics' review after the strike.  They welcomed the change in musical 
culture and reviewed the change as in a favour of ASO's production and success. However, 
they did not completely change the culture. They accommodate the market logics but 
within the boundaries of genres, they restructure the ongoing institutional logics. 
In summary, institutional pillars (e.g., actors, governance and logics) affect the managers' 
behaviour and practices within the organisations. As institutional logics shape the 
professions' behaviour, when they come together from different roles, they may face 
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competing logics. However, the rivalry among different logics can be managed by 
coordination and cooperation. Also, logics are influenced by the market changes. The 
ongoing emphasis on financial issues and efficiency savings has led to the accommodation 
of managerialism while professionalism is still a very strong logic within the professional 
bureaucracies.  
It can be concluded that changes in the institutional pillars can challenge managers. For 
example, within the regulative pillar of institutions, the extent of autonomy managers can 
exercise can be identified as one of the managerial challenges, because it can demarcate the 
space of freedom managers have within the organisations. According to the job 
characteristics model of Hackman and Oldham (1975), autonomy affects the workers’ 
experience of responsibility and implies the extent to which an individual has discretion and 
freedom to schedule their work and to decide the approach and procedures to do their 
tasks. The greater the level of individuals’ autonomy, the more it is likely to be motivational.   
Autonomy increases the epistemic motivation, which is the desire to process the 
information thoroughly and hold well-informed conclusions (Parker and Axtell, 2001). 
Epistemic motivation leads to epistemic cognition, which is individuals’ tendency to adopt 
others’ perspectives and develop more complex ways of thinking.  Individuals, who have the 
autonomy and are in control of the sources, can get immediate feedback about the impact 
of their actions, which helps them develop their mental models ((Wall and Jackson, 1995 in 
Parker, 2014).  
According to Scott (2001), the ‘logic in the normative pillar of institutions is appropriateness' 
(Johansen, et al., 2015, p. 3). March and Olsen (1989) call this the ‘logic of appropriateness' 
or legitimacy that can be defined as one's conformity to the established norms, values, and 
requirements (Scott, 2001). According to the logic of appropriateness, managerial actions 
can ‘take the form of rule-following' based on the ‘situation', ‘identity of the actor', and ‘the 
roles of the actor' (Pollitt et al., 1998).  
Within the cultural-cognitive pillar, the main managerial challenge could be the affirmation 
of the sense of self and identity. It is argued that individuals can change and develop their 
identities through the process of autonomy (Hague, 2011). Autonomy motivates individuals 
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to act on their choices. Motivation to make choices implies that individuals have some end 
identity that they value or they think they would value. They need to have the capacity or 
agency to change and/or develop their identity (Hague, 2011). Agency is a purposive action 
of managers that may lead to the building, sustaining and changing the institution 
(Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) call this institutional work, 
which is discussed in the next section. The argument is managerial agency of the individual 
managers can affect their behaviour and practices within the organisations. 
Institutional work  
‘Institutional work' describes the range of ways that people build, sustain and change 
institutions (Lawrence and Subbaby, 2006). Institutional work is defined as "the purposive 
action of individuals and organisations aimed at creating, maintaining, and disrupting 
institutions" (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006. p. 2). According to them, there are enduring 
elements in social life, which have a profound effect on the thoughts, feelings and behaviour 
of individual and collective actors toward the institution. 
Actors are engaged in actions of institutional work, which can be categorised into ten 
distinct set of practices (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006).  The first three types of institutional 
work, "vesting", "defining" and "advocacy", reflect overtly political work in which actors 
reconstruct rules, property rights and boundaries that define access to material resources 
(Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006. p.16). The second set of practices, "constructing identities", 
"changing norms" and "constructing networks", emphasise actions in which actors' belief 
systems are reconfigured (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006. p. 16). The final group of actions, 
"mimicry", "theorising", and "educating", involve actions designed to alter abstract 
categorisations in which the boundaries of meaning systems are altered (Lawrence and 
Suddaby, 2006. P. 16). All these activities are specific forms of work undertaken to create, 
maintain and disrupt institutions.  
One of the important factors in the discussion of institutional work is the understanding of 
how actors and institutions interact with each other (Lawrence, 2009). If institutions and 
actions are considered in a ‘recursive' relationship in which institutions provide templates 
for action, as well as regulative mechanism that enforces those templates and action 
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affecting regulative mechanisms, then we are studying institutional work in the second row 
i.e. the arrow from action to institution (Lawrence et al., 2009. p. 7) 
Institutional work can be considered as "permanent recursive and dialectical interaction 
between agency and institution" (Lawrence et al., 2011. p. 55).  According to Lawrence et al. 
(2011, p. 55), ‘agency is neither just an effect of the actors' institutional embeddedness nor 
isolated from this embeddedness'. Agency is an ongoing activity whereby actors reflect on 
and strategically operate within the institutional context where they are embedded.  
Identity construction can be viewed as more interactive and more problematic than the 
relatively straightforward adoption of a role or category (Pratt et al., 2006). This view helps 
to take into account the significant influence of the social groups on the identity 
construction.  Pratt et al. (2006) detail how the process of identity work occurs among the 
professionals. They identify the different types of ‘customisations' (e.g. identity enriching, 
patching, and splinting); ‘sources of customisation' (identity sets); and ‘sources of validation 
of these identities' (e.g., grapevine feedback and role models) (Pratt et al., 2006, p.253). 
According to Pratt et al.'s (2006) framework, identity work can be explained using the 
interplay of work and identity learning cycles in professional identity customisation. Figure 
3.2 shows that identity-work is linked into two learning cycles. The first cycle, indicated by 
the white arrows, is categorised as work learning cycle. According to the framework, 
"individuals work, experience work-identity integrity violation, and receive social validation 
for their performance" (Pratt et al., 2006. p. 253). The second cycle, indicated by the black 
arrows, involves learning about professional identity. It is called the identity learning cycle. 
According to Pratt et al. (2006), "When who you are does not match what you do, another 
possible outcome is a change in your sense of who you are. This process is called ‘identity 
customisation' (Pratt et al., 2006. p. 253). Pratt et al. (2006) assert that the two cycles are 
inextricably linked.  
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Figure 3.2: Pratt's framework of identity work. Source: Pratt et al. (2006, p. 253) 
 
The role of the identity work in the reproduction and translation of new institutional logics 
has been studied by viewing the relation between identity construction and institutional 
logic by demonstrating how identity can be contested and reconstructed (Lok, 2010). In his 
study, Lok (2010) found out that both managers and institutional shareholders worked with 
identities in their everyday talk in ways that enable them to translate the new logic in 
particular ways. They preserve a degree of autonomy for themselves within the constraints 
of the new logic.  
The discussion contributed to the literature on ‘embedded agency' by illustrating how the 
everyday identity work of actors in response to a new institutional logic is an important 
form of the agency through which they can resist some of a new logic's identity and action 
implications. Identity work need not be predominantly oriented toward the creation of new 
institutions, but can also serve to maintain aspects of both old and new institutional logics 
at the same time (Lok, 2010). Lok and De Rond (2013) used ethnography of Cambridge 2007 
season preparations for University Boat Race to explore the micro-processes through which 
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highly institutionalised practices are maintained. They examined how institutional 
inhabitants collectively restore breakdowns in institutionalised practice. According to them, 
the collective breakdowns can be resolved in such ways that the basic organising principles 
on which they rest are inoculated against the practice performances that challenge them 
(Lok and De Rond 2013, P. 183).  
In analysing the practice breakdowns, they say that when things are not going as planned; 
the disruptions are controlled through a process called "containment" (Lok and De Rond, 
2013, p. 183). However, the strategy of ‘containment' fails in controlling the breakdown that 
result from the accumulation of minor breakdowns. These according to the authors require 
a different form of ‘maintenance work' (Lok and De Rond 2013, p. 183). These are called 
‘restoration'. During this process, the institutional scripts are stretched to accommodate the 
changing practice performance. 
The interrelation and interaction between the institutions and the actors enable and 
support the reconstruction of the role identity (Cherim et al., 2007, p.21). Cherim et al. 
(2007) focus on the wellness of the institution and the change in role identification of the 
professionals (physicians) in a Canadian health care centre. The study highlighted three 
change areas as salary (payment system), the institution of the integrated service system 
and the hiring of more professionals (e.g., physicians and nurses) in other fields (Cherim et 
al., 2007, p.5).  
The reconstruction of the role of professionals was strongly influenced by the provincial 
government and funding bodies. The pay role system was changed from the fee-service 
system to fixed salary. The professionals delegated their routine work regarding patient care 
to newly hired physicians. This caused less interaction between physicians and patients and 
affected the privilege of senior professions. However, the positive side of the delegation of 
power was that the wellness of patient care was increasing by the interaction and day to 
day meetings with physicians and other occupational group members (Cherim et al., 2007, 
p.18). Actors had a great control on task delegation and their effective communication 
helped them in reconstructing role identity (Cherim et al., 2007, p.19).  
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During the institutional change process, the relation between the high-level staff and low-
level staff contributes a lot towards the identity construction. Kellog (2009) argues that ‘free 
spaces' enable the change reformers to build trust, hope and abilities to cope with the 
defenders of status quo. The free spaces require the communication between different 
middle levels working on different service positions and departments (Kellog, 2009. p.4). 
Kellog (2009) conducted a comparative ethnographic study on two US teaching hospitals.  
The hospitals presented the same institutional change to improve the surgical occupants 
and patient care area (Kellog, 2009. p.3).  
The analysis shows that the institutional change in one hospital was successfully generated 
and accepted by the middle managers and subordinates. The reason was that the chief or 
senior managers negotiate the change, problems, and their solutions with subordinates, 
interns and middle managers. This brought a sense of trust and relational efficiency 
between higher and lower management. The tasks and changing work identity was 
communicated within the departments. On the other hand, the change process in the other 
hospital turned into a failure.  The reason was the communication gap between the higher 
order and lower order management. They did not avail the free spaces in their institutional 
change, which caused a bigger fault (Kellog, 2009, p.43). 
Based on the studies of Lok (2010), Lok and De Rond (2013), Cherim (2007) and Kellog 
(2009), it can be viewed that the identity construction by the actors in any organisation is 
closely intertwined to the institutional logics. The construction or the reconstruction of the 
identity by the actors can be in conflict to the institutional logics. However, as evident from 
the above-mentioned studies, seamless relationship between the actors and the higher 
order management supports identity construction.  
The impact of the agency on institutions is also studied by Lawrence and Suddaby (2006). 
They suggest that the agency should be viewed as a multi-dimensional concept. Drawing on 
the work of Emirbayer and Mische (1998), Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) highlight the 
impact of the agency on institutions, as a result of the interaction between the individual's 
habit, judgment and imagination. Emirbayer and Mische (1998, p. 971) argue that the 
agency consists of three different elements: iteration, projection, and practical evaluation. 
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Iteration is oriented towards the past and it describes the reactivation of the past patterns 
of thoughts and actions by the actors (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998, p. 971). This 
reactivation is often overlooked as a form of agency. The actors, although, choose and apply 
those patterns in their interactions. Thus, they become personal activities over time and 
gives stability and order to the social lives. It also helps to maintain identities, and 
interactions within the institutions over time.  
The second dimension of agency is projection. It involves an imaginative engagement of the 
future. According to this theory, the actors are projective when they generate imaginations 
of possible trajectories of their potential actions in the future. In this process, the actors 
creatively reconstruct the received structure of thoughts and actions with regards to their 
hopes, fears and desires (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, p. 971).  
The third dimension of agency refers to the present and is described as practical evaluation. 
It corresponds to the actors' capacity to make practical and normative judgements among 
alternative possible trajectories of action, in response to the emerging demands, dilemmas, 
and ambiguities of the presently evolving situations (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, p. 971). 
Deploying the ‘institutional work' framework of Lawrence and Suddaby (2006), Creed et al. 
(2010) offer a theoretical model of the micro-processes through which actors with 
embodied identity work resolve the experience of institutional contradictions. Creed et al.'s 
(2010) framework is akin to the previous models developed by Pratt and Foreman (2000) 
and by Pache and Santos (2013b). Jay (2013) suggests that the managerial response to 
multiple internal demands and identity claims caused by multiple logics is common in all 
these frameworks (Johansen et al., 2015, p.4). These responses have been categorised as 
deletion, compartmentalisation, aggregation and integration (Johansen et al., 2015, p.4).  
Deletion, in hybrid settings, can be referred to the removal of one or more institutional 
logics by the manager. An example could be a hospital manager resisting the 
implementation of a new economic logic. Secondly, compartmentalisation describes a 
strategy where the manager utilises different logics in different situations or settings, based 
on the situational requirements. For example, a manager can decide on an economic logic in 
a situation that calls for it but will use the patient welfare logic in taking decisions in other 
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situations. Aggregation, as the word implies, refers to retaining all logics while forging links 
between them. In a hospital setting, an example of this can be the development of new 
organisational practices that can combine the economic and patient welfare logics to 
optimally utilise both strategies (Johansen et al., 2015, p.4). Lastly, integration refers to 
fusing multiple logics into a new separate logic. Integration helps in creating something that 
serves as an umbrella logic, which somehow includes the previous different logics and fuses 
them together as a single logic.  
Using the above-mentioned classification, Creed et al. (2010) add the concept of role claim 
and role use. Using these concepts, Creed et al. (2010, p.1342) explain the micro-processes 
through which gay pastors can resolve the institutional contradictions and act as change 
agents. The first micro-process is the internalisation of institutional contradiction, which 
includes various ways that actors internalise the contradictions. The second micro-process is 
identity reconciliation, through which the actors create self-narratives to reject the 
institutional contradictions. The third micro-process is role claim and role use by which the 
actors change the content of the role they play and consequently change the institutional 
norms.  
Creed et al. (2010) explain how institutional actors change the institutional norms through 
the identity construction processes. In other words, they link the institutions with the 
identity work and explain how actors can change the institutions via the processes of 
identity construction. McGivern et al. (2015) also explain the interaction between 
institutions and identity. They explain the differences among professionals in conducting the 
identity work and reconciling their traditional professional identity with the new managerial 
identity. They argue that some professionals take up hybrid roles willingly more than others, 
whereas others assume the role by obligation (McGivern et al., 2015). 
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3.4.3 Analytical framework  
This research aimed to: 
 Explore the extent of autonomy hospital middle managers exercise in two developed 
(England) and developing (Iran) countries  
 Explain the impact of public management reforms on middle managers’ autonomy in 
the two countries 
 Identify the similarities and differences of middle managers’ responses to 
management reforms. 
In order to address the main research objectives the following specific research questions 
were posed: 
Research question 1: To what extent do hospital middle managers in England and Iran have 
autonomy? 
Research question 2: How do public management reforms affect middle managers’ 
autonomy? 
Research question 3: How do middle managers of the two countries respond to these 
reforms?  
In order to achieve the objectives of this study, a multi-level analysis has been conducted to 
capture the underlying factors affecting middle managers' autonomy. The institutional 
framework of Scott (2001) has been applied to explain how the macro-level institutional 
elements affect middle managers' autonomy in two different country contexts. It also 
helped address the changes in the structural and environmental factors as a result of public 
management reforms and their impact on middle managers.    
The changes in professions have been discussed in the literature from different 
perspectives. One of them is functionalism according to which ‘the provider’s expertise 
would be employed to serve the best interests of the client’ (Scott, 2008, p. 220). The 
functionalism perspective was dominant in the sociological discussion until 1960s. Later on 
during the decade of 1960s, some of the scholars adopt the conflict perspective and shed a 
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different light on the professions. The conflict approach shifts the focus from clients to the 
providers’ interest and from the specialised knowledge and expertise to the politics. This 
perspective highlights the contests among professions for professional status and tangible 
rewards (Scott, 2008). In line with this perspective, Freidson (1997) argues that the position 
of a medical profession is more dependent on their social and political position rather than 
the technical knowledge.  
However, the conflict approach cannot capture the changing conditions of real life of health 
professions that are in line with the social constructionist paradigm. These changes and 
shifting the balance of power between professions and management have expanded the 
socially constructed theories such as neo-institutionalism. Scott (2008) has provided an 
alternative model to study the changes in the professions. His model reconceptualises the 
professions and discusses both endogenous (e.g., the growth of knowledge, greater division 
of labour) and exogenous (e.g., change in the institutional logics, change in the nature of 
clients) elements that have led to the changes in the professions. 
According to Scott (2001) the three institutional pillars in a given environment are 
regulative, normative and cultural cognitive pillars. Examples of these three pillars are 
institutional actors, logics and governance. These institutional elements (e.g., logics, actors 
and governance) incorporate the contextual rules and resources available to the 
organisations and their members including the managers. These rules (e.g., moral and 
cognitive) and resources challenge the managers of those organisations along different 
dimensions. First, they demarcate the room for manoeuvre (i.e., autonomy) for the 
managers. Second, they give managers the insight into the norms and legitimate actions. 
Third, they provide managers with the meaning of who they are and what they do. 
However, managers do not respond to these environmental and structural factors 
identically. According to the Scott’s (2008) re-conceptualisation of professions, managers 
can be looked at as institutional agents, who interpret, define and apply the institutions.  
The way they interact with the institutions depends on the individuals’ habit, judgment and 
imagination. Managers use their habitual agency when they iterate their past patterns of 
thoughts and actions. This happens when they reject one or two institutional logics (i.e., 
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deletion), therefore, they select among the established routines rather than adhering to a 
new logic.  However, managers use their practical evaluation when they make practical and 
normative judgments among alternative possible trajectories of action. This happens when 
they act on different logic in different situations (i.e., compartmentalisation). Finally, 
managers use their projective imaginative agency when they restructure the received 
pattern of thoughts and actions with regards to their hope, fears and desires (Emirbayer and 
Mische, 1998). This can happen when they maintain all the logics while forging a link 
between them (i.e., aggregation) or when they combine all the logics to create a new whole 
(i.e., integration).  
 
 
 
 
83 
 
 
  
Analytical framework  
 
Institutional pillars                 Challenges                    Identity work                            Responses                    Agency                            Role claim/use 
  
                                                                                                                  
                                                                                                                           
  
         
                                                                                                                                             
                                                                                                                                 
  
   
 
 
  
Figure 3.3  Analytical framework
Regulative  
Cultural 
cognitive  
Identity  
Normative  Legitimacy  
Autonomy  Internalisation 
of institutional 
contradiction 
 
 
 
Identity 
reconciliation 
 
 
 
 
  
Deletion  
 
Compartme
ntalisation 
 
 
Aggregation 
Integration 
Habitual 
agency 
Practical 
evaluative 
agency 
 
Projective 
imaginative 
agency 
Diplomat 
administrator 
 
 
Change agent  
 
Entrepreneurial 
leader 
 
 
 
 
 
84 
 
Chapter four: Methodology  
 
This chapter begins with a discussion of research philosophy by considering the nature of 
the research aims and positioning them in the ontological and epistemological perspectives 
of interpretivism. In this chapter, the research strategy, methodological principals, and 
research approach and design are discussed. The multiple case-study is identified as an 
appropriate research design to conduct this research. After that, data collection method in 
relation to interpretivism is explained. Finally, a summary of the research methodology is 
presented. 
4.1.   Research philosophy 
Decisions regarding research methodology, rest on a number of assumptions i.e. the nature 
of knowledge (ontology), and researcher understands of what human knowledge is 
(epistemology). Epistemological questioning (probing the basic nature of knowledge) is vital 
in establishing the validity and legitimacy of research. It is the philosophical basis of 
knowledge concerning reality. All research is inextricably embedded in a particular world 
vision, and its associated assumptions influence one's approach to research, design, data 
collection, method choice, and analysis of data (Thietart et al., 2001). The two major 
epistemological paradigms-positivism and interpretivism- are considered in terms of their fit 
to the nature of the phenomena of interest.  
 
Positivists hold an objectivist view of reality, emphasising that the world exists independent 
of our knowledge of it. They adopt a philosophical stance to natural science in which the 
natural and social worlds are viewed as operating within a strict set of laws. Findings from 
empirical enquiry are therefore presented as objective facts and established truths (Crotty, 
1998). For positivists, reality exists independently, independent of a person's knowing 
(Thietart et aI., 2001; Popper, 1972). 
 
Interpretivists assess ‘how the social world is interpreted, understood, experienced, 
produced or constituted’ (Mason, 1996, p.4), and they believe that the social world is 
‘interpreted by people’, whose ‘involvement in the interpreting’ of the changing world is 
considered essential and ‘favours naturalistic inquiry … in the natural setting’ (Williamson et 
 
 
 
 
85 
 
al., 2002, p.9) rather than the sort of scientific principles used by ‘positivists’ who advocate 
‘the application of the methods of the natural sciences to the study of social reality and 
beyond’ (Bryman, 2001, p12).  
 
Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) offer a comparison of the positivist and interpretivist research 
approaches (Table 3.1). Considering the subjective-objective dimension, the philosophical 
perspective informing this study falls into the subjective dimension (interpretivism 
paradigm). 
 
  
Criteria Positivism Interpretivism 
Research 
interests 
Science is value free Science is driven by human interest 
The 
observer 
Must be independent Is part of what is being observed 
Results Must demonstrate causality Aim to increase general understanding 
of the situation 
Research 
approach 
Hypothesis and deductions Derive theories from rich data from 
induction 
Methods Operationalise concepts so that they 
can be measured( quantitative) 
Use mixed methods for multiple views 
(qualitative) 
Sampling Large numbers from which to 
generalize to the population 
Small numbers for in-depth research 
Units of 
analysis 
Data reduced to their simplest form Retain richness of the whole situation 
and meanings 
 
  
Table4.1. The distinction between positivism and interpretivism ; Source: Easterby-Smith et al. (2002)   
The notion of autonomy cannot easily be described in objective terms. Revealing the unique 
interpretation (constructs) middle managers attribute to the concept of autonomy requires 
a methodology that will facilitate arriving at the manager's unique understanding. As 
Fransella et al. (2004) point out, it is important to ensure the assumptions underlying 
research are not in conflict with assumptions of methodology or techniques. In this study, it 
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is necessary to explore, in depth, individuals’ personal experiences and views of 
management reforms in order to describe and explain the possible changes in their 
responsibilities, and their perceived autonomy over those responsibilities. This implication 
bases this study in the interpretivism epistemological realm.  
 
 4.2. Comparative case study 
The questions that need to be answered in this study include ‘how’ management reforms 
affect middle managers’ autonomy within hospitals, ‘why’ the perceived autonomy of these 
managers has changed, and what are the contributing contextual factors. To answer these 
‘how’ and ‘why’ questions, in depth information need to be achieved from various sources. 
Case study research strategy is a good approach to obtain the required information from 
multiple sources (Yin 1994). 
 
The advantage of the case study method over other methods is that it gives a more 
comprehensive insight into the factors that produce an outcome rather than just the 
outcome (Denscombe, 2002).The case study is a suitable research strategy to understand 
the processes together with the organisational context (Hartley, 1994). However, there are 
examples of case studies that focus on the ‘outcome’ characteristics and they still have 
produced important empirical and conceptual contributions to knowledge and are well-
cited standard sources (see, for example, Exworthy et al., 2012). 
 
Yin (2009, p.18) has suggested a ‘twofold technical definition’ for the case study. The first 
part is associated with the scope of a case study according to which case study is defined as 
‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its 
real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context 
are not clearly evident’. However, Exworthy et al. (2012) disagree with Yin on the need for a 
focus on ‘contemporary events’. They include ‘historical case studies’ (see, for example, 
Powell, Evans, Locock & Dopson in Exworthy et al., 2012), as Yin’s condition would exclude 
some of the narrative descriptions such as many of the individual accounts of the creation of 
the NHS. The researcher agrees with Exworthy et al. and applies case study strategy because 
she believes that case study enables her to holistically explain the processes, structures, 
systems and the history behind the phenomenon being studied, which are idiosyncratic to 
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each country. Idiosyncrasies may point to the exceptionality of particular cases. In public 
management, and with specific reference to this study, the idiosyncrasies could be 
associated with the peculiarities of a country’s culture, politics, and administrative 
experiences that may shape managers’ autonomy. 
 
The second part of Yin’s definition is related to ‘technical characteristics’, such as ‘data 
collection’ and ‘data analysis strategies’ (Yin, 2009, p.18). In this respect Yin (2009) argues 
that in case study, data is collected from multiple sources and needed to converge in a 
triangulation fashion. Data can also be collected and analysed on the basis of the theoretical 
propositions.  
 
Case study research includes both single and multiple case studies. These two types of case 
studies have been distinguished in political science and public administration (Yin, 2009). In 
this research, multiple case studies are applied as opposed to the single case study, for the 
reason that using two cases rather than one would bring ‘compelling results’ and the study 
would be regarded as more ‘robust’ (Herriott & Firestone, 1983). A comparative case study 
of England and Iran is a form of multiple case studies. Choosing two contrasting cases would 
give us insight into the conditions under which a particular phenomenon is not likely to be 
found (theoretical replication). In addition, there is an intense interest in how others have 
tackled, or are tackling the same or similar issues. In this study, these ‘’others’’ are hospitals 
in the two different countries. This interest has also tended to cause a degree of 
competition and rivalry in keeping abreast of the latest developments (Exworthy et al. 2012, 
p.318). 
 
There are some issues regarding the use of the case study method that need to be 
addressed. First, what is the case? As Bryman (1989) argues an organisation or a 
department within an organisation could constitute ‘the case’.  Events and activities can also 
be viewed as the unit of analysis in case studies.  The case can also be a person. In this 
study, public hospitals that are involved in decentralisation reforms and have been granted 
autonomy provide the focus of investigation (case), although the unit of analysis is middle 
managers in those hospitals in Iran and England.  
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Second, it is argued that it is not possible to generalise the results of research deriving from 
just one or two cases (Bryman, 1989; Bryman, 2008; Yin, 2009).  Yin (1984) and Mitchell 
(1983) contend that case studies need to generate adequate theoretical inferences.  The 
purpose is to bring about the theoretical patterns not to deduce the findings of a sample to 
a population.  
 
 ‘Living with these concerns(about the external validity of findings) 
may be a necessary cost of providing new insight in as yet 
incompletely documented management processes in complex   
organisations ... The purpose of such efforts is primarily to 
generate new insights that are useful for building theory’ 
(Burgelman, 1985, p. 2) 
 
In addition to generating theories, case studies can also be used for a number of other 
purposes. For example, they can be employed in an exploratory manner to achieve insight 
into a previously uncharted area. Another example is using case studies to test theories 
rather than merely generating new ideas. Case studies can also allow the findings from 
other studies to be confirmed. This corroboration would reduce the doubt of the external 
validity of those studies that have been questioned by some writers (Bryman, 1989). 
 
In this study, the case study was used to investigate the phenomenon of autonomy and 
personal views within a ‘real-life context’ with the hope that the case study is ‘the essential 
ingredient in calling attention’(Yin, 2003, p. 145) to the issue of managerial autonomy for 
both Iranian and English hospitals. Case studies are related to the ontological and 
epistemological position of the researcher, in that the individual managers’ view of their 
autonomy as a social phenomenon in a specific context is socially constructed and could be 
interpreted through the lens of their eyes. The case study was employed here as a research 
strategy to deal with a variety of evidence to generate and analyse data from observations, 
documents, and interviews (Yin, 2003, p14). The case study approach helped the researcher 
to study the process (Becker 1966 cited in Stoecker, 1991). The emphasis on process 
corresponds with the application of the neo-institutional theory, which was used here to 
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define the appropriate design and data collection, and as a means to generalise the results 
of the case study.  
 
To explore the perception of middle managers on hospital management reforms (in 
particular, hospital autonomy) in England and Iran, a multi-level of analysis has been 
undertaken. Institutional pillars framework of Scott (2008) has applied to address the 
external forces that affect MMs behaviour within the hospitals in the two countries. To 
explain the responses of MMs to the challenges of external forces, the concept of identity 
work has been used. Considering the notion of identity work as an ‘institutional work’ 
(McGivren, 2015) helps the researcher to explain the differences of managerial behaviours 
within the same organisations which are located in the same organisational field. The 
analytical framework used in this study has been shown in figure 3.5. 
     
            
According to this framework, it was expected that MMs in the two countries (England and 
Iran) with different rules, norms and cultures would have different views on the extent of 
autonomy they can exercise in hospitals. Accordingly, it was assumed that MMs would 
respond differently to the changes as a result of hospital autonomy in ENG and IRI.  
 
4.3. Case selection  
One of the reasons for choosing and comparing England and Iran is that, in spite of the 
differences in their political, economic, and institutional contexts, both of these countries 
started with highly centralised command and control systems and have been implementing 
policies designed to increase autonomy in their public hospitals. In these countries the 
notions of NPM and decentralisation have led to granting more autonomy to public 
hospitals.  Based on these policies, semi-autonomous public hospitals -FTs and BTs- have 
been created in England and Iran (Jafari et al., 2010), respectively, since 2004. In this 
research, these public hospitals in two contrasting contexts (England and Iran) were 
selected for analysis. This selection of case studies is in line with the notion of ‘replication 
logic’ (Yin’s, 2002, p. 47). 
 
The notion of ‘replication logic’ offers particular methodological significance to case studies. 
Yin ( 2009, p. 54) states ‘the logic underlying the use of multiple-case studies is that each 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
case must be carefully selected so that it either (a) predicts similar results (literal replication) 
or (b) predicts contrasting results but for anticipatable reasons(a theoretical replication)’. 
Replication logic relates to the theoretical framework, ‘which needs to state the conditions 
under which a particular phenomenon is likely to be found(a literal replication) as well as 
the conditions in which it is not likely to be found( a theoretical replication)’( Yin, 2009, p. 
54).  
 
Drawing on the institutional pillars framework of Scott (2001) the literature on institutional 
factors- including governance, logics, actors and resources of the two countries- is examined 
(section 2.3). Politico-administrative systems and national culture of each country are 
compared (section 1.2).  These factors explain the different characteristics and idiosyncratic 
peculiarities of England and Iran. They provide an overview of the environment within which 
hospitals are embedded, and hospital managers perform their role. These factors are 
influenced by and influence the behaviour of managers within those hospitals.  
Comparing the effects of management reforms on middle managers in these two 
contrasting settings enables the researcher to have a better and greater understanding of 
managerial practice as a social phenomenon (Bryman, 2008), to explain similarities and 
differences, and to gain a greater awareness of social reality in these two different national 
contexts (Hantrais, 1996).  
 
In both countries, it is not clear whether the inception of autonomous hospitals has had any 
effects on middle managers-whether the range of their responsibility has shifted or the 
extent of their autonomy has changed. Exploring middle managers’ autonomy helps to 
understand how far managerial functions have been decentralised.  
 
The other reason for choosing Iran is that during the implementation of hospital autonomy, 
the researcher was working in a public hospital in Iran that was piloted to have more 
autonomy and to have a Board of Trustees (BT). Accordingly, decision rights regarding 
strategic, financial and operational management had been granted to the hospital 
management. The researcher was a middle manager and part of the hospital management 
team in charge of preparing hospital’s strategic, business, and operational plans. Therefore, 
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she has first-hand experience of the context of Iranian hospitals, in particular of the 
relationship between managers at different levels and their interactions. This experience 
has made her interested in studying middle managers who are thought to be the neglected 
group in hospitals. 
4.4. Getting research access  
Obtaining research access was not an easy task. To get to know the hospital context in 
England and to start negotiating with hospital managers, the researcher started arranging 
meetings in one FT in May 2012. Finally, a meeting was arranged with the deputy chief 
nurse and the head of organisational development in July 2012 in that hospital. During this 
meeting, some issues were raised, such as lack of management qualification and skills, and 
emphasis on efficiency and effectiveness rather than on organisational development. This 
meeting was helpful in terms of getting familiar with the current management issues in 
hospitals. However, this hospital was not the possible case in this study for two reasons: 
first, it did not have a long history of being FT (this hospital had FT status for 18 months at 
that time), and second, it was located very far from where the researcher lives. This could 
make the journey to the hospital very time consuming.  
In order to find possible cases for this study, first, a list of NHS FTs by authorisation date was 
provided through the Monitor website (http://www.monitor-nhsft.gov.uk/). From this list, 
hospitals were selected based on two criteria: first, having a long history of having 
autonomy, i.e., hospital that have become FT since 2004, 2005, and 2006; second, those FTs 
were located in London, because the researcher lived in North London. Five FTs were 
selected in London. Three of those were authorised in 2004 and the rest in 2006. The 
researcher started contacting HR departments by phone at the beginning of August 2012. By 
mid-August, a letter was sent to HR managers in each of those hospitals. In this letter, the 
purpose of the research, benefits of participating in this research, and the research 
methodology were clearly explained.  
Two weeks later, the researcher phoned those hospitals to talk to HR managers and to ask 
whether they had received the letter. Among those five FTs, one workforce manager agreed 
to have a meeting with the researcher in mid-September 2012. In this meeting, hospital 
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structure, the current issues regarding managing people in the hospital, and the hierarchical 
relationship of managers were discussed. Based on the hospital structure and middle 
managers’ definition, a sample of middle managers was identified. However, the workforce 
manager suggested that before negotiating with managers to participate in this research, 
the researcher needed to get the research passport.  ‘The ‘Research Passport’ system and 
associated procedures was developed in parallel with the development of the Integrated 
Research Application System and other arrangements across the UK to streamline the 
arrangements for obtaining permission for research from NHS organisations’. 
(http://www.nihr.ac.uk/systems/Pages/systems_research_passports.aspx  8.09.2012). 
Getting a research passport was also suggested by an HR manager in another FT whom I had 
a conversation with on the phone. Getting the research passport was very challenging; I had 
to have a collaborator in those hospitals that I wanted to conduct my research to be able to 
get that passport, and at the same time without having that passport (which was a kind of 
approval from R&D department) it was very difficult to convince any managers to be my 
collaborator. Therefore, I emailed all five FTs’ R&D managers to find out what the process 
was.  The R&D manager in one FT emailed me a list of documents that I was required to 
submit to this department in order to get both a research passport and hospital approval to 
be allowed to talk to managers. All those documents, including the research passport 
application form, data protection review, finance and use of resources form, R&D service 
evaluation registration form, along with research proposal, interview schedule, participant 
information sheet, participant consent form, and university ethics approval, were 
completed and submitted to the R&D department of hospitals by the end of September 
2012. University ethics approval was obtained following the negotiation with the research 
supervisor and the university’s ‘Director of Research’ in September 2012. 
Finally, on 10th of October 2012, I received approval from R&D department of one of the FTs 
(called hospital G in this study). However, having access to hospital G did not necessarily 
mean that researcher had secured access to managers. Although the workforce manager in 
hospital G had promised to email the managers and suggest them to take part to this study, 
apparently his attempt was not successful.  As he mentioned that the managers had not 
replied to his email. Therefore, I decided to contact his senior manager. So, I contacted the 
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director of workforce. She suggested me to contact the PA of the director of operation of 
hospital G to facilitate my access to the managers. As this process took long, I started 
contacting each individual manager, by using the name of the director of work force and 
director of operation; I tried to convince the managers to take part to my study. Getting 
access to the managers of hospital G took approximately seven months.  The first manager 
in hospital G accepted to be interviewed on 12th of April 2013 (while the R&D approval was 
issued in October 2012).   
 
I started interviewing the managers in hospital G in April 2013 while the process of 
negotiation with another FT (hospital H) was still in progress. I sent several emails to the HR 
managers of this hospital and each time I was referred to another manager. They all refused 
to be a collaborator or a participant. My emails were circulating among different managers 
for about nine months. Finally, I received a phone call from R&D manager of hospital H that 
she accepted to be my collaborator. On 30th of May 2013, I received my approval letter via 
email from R&D admin of hospital H. I was asked to call them to arrange a date and time to 
go to this hospital to collect my ID badge and honorary contract to be able to start my field 
work there. Then, I started contacting managers and encouraging them to take part to my 
study as I had approval from the R&D of the hospital.  
 
In order to get access to the hospitals in Iran, the researcher made a trip to Iran in 
December 2012. She arranged a meeting with the head of the ‘Health Management and 
Economics Research Centre’ who was the researcher’s former lecturer in Isfahan Medical 
Science University. In that meeting the research aims, objectives, and the research methods 
were discussed. In January 2013, the researcher’s lead supervisor sent an email to the head 
of the research centre of Isfahan University. Following that email, he replied in affirmative 
to help the researcher arrange meetings with hospital managers and observation in those 
hospitals, and also to give the researcher guidance and support on her research in Iran. On 
24th of June 2013, the researcher –while conducting fieldwork in London- sent a reminder to 
her former lecturer to inform him that she would be available to start her fieldwork, in Iran, 
early September 2013. She received his reply that everything would be arranged for that 
time.  Three weeks before starting the fieldwork on 13th of August 2013, the researcher sent 
 
 
 
 
94 
 
another email to remind him the starting time of fieldwork and to arrange a few meetings 
with managers in hospitals prior to her arrival.  
 
Despite the head of research centre’s reassurance, the researcher contacted a friend who 
had recently finished her PhD in healthcare management and appointed as a lecturer in 
Isfahan Medical University.  As she had been working with hospital managers for more than 
10 years, she was able to facilitate the process of getting access to managers for the 
researcher. She arranged a meeting with the director of ‘support and development’ in one 
of the potential cases at the beginning of the September. He was a good source of 
information and he easily encouraged other managers to have a good cooperation with the 
researcher.  
 
4.5. Fieldwork 
This research employed a qualitative comparative strategy for data collection. ‘Comparative 
design in relation to the qualitative research strategy takes the form of a multiple-case 
study’, (Bryman, 2008, p. 60).  In recent years, multiple case study research has become a 
common research design in certain social science fields, such as organisational studies 
(Bryman, 2008; Exworthy et al., 2012; Welch and Piekkari, 2011.). Multiple-case study 
methodology was applied, for example, in a study of decentralisation and autonomy in the 
English health system by Exworthy et al. (2010). In this study, in-depth interviews, 
observation, and documentary analysis were undertaken in two contrasting Local Health 
Economies (LHEs). Similarly, Ferlie et al. (2009) have undertaken the multiple case study 
methodology to assess the management and performance of healthcare networks in the 
English NHS. In their work, investigating the governance of autonomous public hospitals in 
England, Allen et al. (2011) have also used a multi-site case study of NHS foundation trusts. 
The argument is multiple-case study is helpful to build the theory. Comparing two or more 
cases help the researcher to have a better understanding of the conditions that develop a 
theory (Yin, 2003).  
In this research, In line with the principle of interpretivism, multiple cases from two 
contrasting contexts were investigated with a range of research methods to explore 
managerial autonomy and its contributing factors in those different contexts. The choice of 
method was determined by the nature of the phenomenon being investigated. The 
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following sections outline each method of data collection and evaluate its efficacy in 
answering the research questions. First, case study selection criteria are discussed below. 
 
4.6. Research sampling 
The purpose of this research is to explore the managerial autonomy at middle level hospital 
management in those hospitals with a long history of having autonomy. Thus, in this study, 
hospitals are the cases and middle managers are the units of analysis. Non- autonomous 
hospitals (non-FTs in England) were not included because the aim of this study was to 
examine the effects of management reforms such as hospital autonomy on middle 
managers. Therefore, hospitals not involved in these reforms were excluded. This enabled 
the researcher to determine the effects of the new governance structures on middle 
managers by asking interviewees to reflect on differences in their autonomy since hospitals 
became autonomous compared to when they were non-autonomous.  On the other hand, 
all hospitals in England and Iran are required to improve their performance in order to be 
eligible to acquire the autonomous status. Therefore, sampling (Merriam et al., 2002, p. 12; 
Mason, 2002, p. 134; Bryman, 2008) was implemented purposively, and it occurred at three 
levels: 
 
1. Hospital  
Public hospitals were chosen based on the time period they have been granted autonomy. 
This was translated to the stage of the FT career in England, and the time period in which 
Iranian hospitals have become BTs. Some of the public hospitals achieved autonomous 
status at the beginning of the inception of FT status in England in 2004, and in Iran at the 
start of the implementation of the BTs in 2003. Some others in both England and Iran have 
recently achieved autonomous status. To conduct this study, two first-wave applicants for 
FT status in England, and two public hospitals in Iran that have become BTs at the beginning 
of hospital autonomy plan were selected. Selecting two hospitals in each country is based 
on literal replication, while comparing those hospitals in two countries addresses the 
theoretical replication.  
 
In England, both cases are university hospitals gained FT status in 2004 (both are first wave 
applicants). Hospital G, with nearly 1200 beds and 13000 staff is the larger case. It has 16 
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directorates. Hospital H, with divisional structure (three divisions) has 500 beds and 3500 
staff. It is the smaller case.   
 
Two cases were also selected in Iran to conduct the fieldwork. These cases are university 
teaching hospitals that have become BTs.  The first one (Hospital M) is one of the 18 
hospitals across the country that was piloted to have more autonomy in terms of strategic, 
financial and operational decision makings in 2004. It has 173 beds and around 650 staff. In 
this hospital, each clinical department is led by a clinical director who is a doctor and a head 
nurse. There is no a dedicated general manager (GM) for each department in this hospital, 
therefore, GM is in charge of all clinical departments by cooperating with clinical directors 
and nurse managers (http://amin.mui.ac.ir ).  
The second case is hospital Z with 950 beds and more than 2600 staff.  After Hospital M, this 
is the second hospital in Isfahan that has implemented the ‘board of trustees’ policy since 
November 2009 (for more information please see http://alzahra.mui.ac.ir/en/ ).  Although 
this hospital was not one of the first wave applicants of being BT, this is the largest hospital 
in Isfahan. It was assumed that the size differences of these two hospitals, would lead to 
yielding interesting comparative results of the extent of autonomy managers have in those 
two hospitals.  
 
Although inclusion of the hospitals that have recently become involved in autonomy 
reforms would be illuminating, it would also be unwieldy and complicate the level of 
analysis. Thus, according to the purpose of this study, the hospitals in a longer stage in their 
autonomous career in both countries were looked at.  This enabled the researcher to 
capture the changes in management structures, practices, and managerial autonomy over 
time in those hospitals with autonomy for several years. It also helped to have a review of 
the changes of the middle managers’ roles and responsibilities as a result of hospital 
restructuring. Comparing these two cases in England and Iran gives a good insight into the 
similarities and differences of managerial autonomy as a social phenomenon in these two 
different contexts, and the impact of contextual factors on management reforms and their 
effects.  
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2. Hospital departments 
Middle managers perform a coordinating role between hospitals’ strategic and operational 
levels. They also perform this role in connection with other middle managers across the 
hospitals as a network. To evaluate the changes in middle managers’ roles, responsibilities, 
and managerial autonomy, it is necessary to elicit the views of managers at different levels, 
both vertically including senior managers and horizontally across different divisions and 
departments of hospitals.  
To identify the departments and divisions of hospitals across which middle managers 
operate, it is useful to look at a typical general hospital in each studied country. A typical 
district general acute hospital in England with 2,500 staff members could organise its clinical 
services within five to seven directorates or divisions – e.g., surgery and anaesthetics, 
children’s and women’s services, general medicine and older people, diagnostics and 
therapeutics, and clinical therapy and rehabilitation ( Walshe & Smith, 2006). The specific 
departments and services within the five directorates are detailed in table 4.2.  
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Clinical directorates Departments and Services 
Surgery and anaesthetics Accident and Emergency 
General Surgery 
Trauma and Orthopedics 
Ear, Nose and Throat 
Oral Surgery 
Intensive Care 
Children’s and women Maternity 
Gynecology 
Medicine and older people  General Medicine 
Dermatology 
Diabetes 
Hematology 
Oncology 
Neurology 
Diagnostics and therapeutics Radiology 
Pharmacy 
Pathology 
Clinical therapy and rehabilitation Community Rehabilitation 
Physiotherapy 
Dietetics 
Occupational therapy 
Podiatry 
Speech and Language therapy 
Table 4.2. Clinical services at a typical district general acute hospital in England; Source: Walshe & Smith (2006, 
p. 58) 
 
The management team of each clinical directorate consists of a director who is commonly 
(not exclusively) a doctor, business or service managers and a nurse manager as well 
(Walshe & Smith, 2011). The number and type of clinical directorates, departments, and 
services delivered in a typical general public hospital in Iran are relatively similar to this 
classification (http://alzahra.mui.ac.ir/sakhtar.html, 28 July2012). In Iranian hospitals, the 
clinical director in each clinical division is a doctor supported by a head nurse, and general 
managers are in charge of a number of divisions (see figure 3). In some of the Iranian 
hospitals, general managers are considered senior management team members, while in 
some others they are categorised as middle managers.  
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Key individual managers of hospital directorates/divisions were interviewed in order to 
evaluate the relational dynamics between middle managers and other managers within 
these departments. The size of the directorates/divisions and their representativeness were 
considered as the elements that influence the autonomy of the general managers who serve 
in these departments. 
 
3. Middle managers 
Who are middle managers? 
In the NHS, FTs have complete discretion to design their management structure (Saltman et 
al., 2012), however, most of them have a relatively similar divisional structure. Below the 
board level the management team of each clinical division (e.g., hospital H) and/or 
directorates (e.g., hospital G)-consists of a clinical director, business managers and a nurse 
manager- are in charge of delivering the services. (Walshe and Smith, 2011). A relatively 
similar structure in Iranian hospitals that have achieved autonomous status can be seen, in 
the sense that below the board level, middle managers are in charge of a number of 
departments. (http://alzahra.mui.ac.ir/sakhtar.html, 28 July, 2012) See figure 4.2 and figure 
4.3. 
 
Figure 4.2 Hospital organisational charts in England  
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Figure 4.3. Hospital organisational chart in Iran 
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Management structures and organisational charts are different from one hospital to 
another, let alone from one country to another. For instance, the number of executive 
directors and their titles are different, and in some cases there are several CEO Deputies (in 
Iranian hospitals), while in English hospitals there might be one deputy or even no deputy.  
A comprehensive review of the literature and hospitals’ charts has made it clear that some 
similarities exist that help to identify managers at different levels in hospitals.  
 
Head Nurses 
CEO 
CEO 
Clinical Directors 
General Managers 
Executive Directors  Medical HR Nursing Finnce commersial 
Head Nurses 
CEO 
CEO 
General Managers 
Clinical Directors 
Executive Directors  Medical HR Nursing Finnce commersial 
 
 
 
 
101 
 
Middle managers were defined as managers who are below the executive level (senior) and 
above the first-line managers. However, there could be a wide range of managers in this 
category. Floyd and Wooldridge (1992) argue that the hierarchical level of middle managers 
need to be considered in finer detail as middle managers at the higher level of hierarchy are 
more involved in strategising in the organisations (Currie, 2006). Therefore, general 
managers who are below the board level and are at the first or second rung of the hierarchy 
(of middle managers) were considered middle managers.  
 
  
4.7 Research Methods: 
4.7.1 Semi-structured interview 
Face-to-face semi-structured interview helped the researcher to explore the middle 
managers’ views and perception of their autonomy in the hospitals. The interviews were 
carried out over a period of seven months (from mid-April 2013 to mid-August in England, 
and during September and October 2013 in Iran) with senior managers, general managers, 
as well as HR and finance managers. 25 managers in England and 20 managers in Iran, in 
total 45 managers, were interviewed (see table 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9 of samples) at their 
workplaces, as this was the easiest way to take almost one hour of their time. Each 
interview approximately took an hour (between 50 to 90 minutes). The interview sessions 
were recorded using a digital voice recorder device that was acknowledged at the beginning 
Table 4.3 
Items Items Hospitals with a long history of autonomy 
 
 
 
Case 
study 
 
 
 
Hospitals  
 
 
 
4 
cases 
 
 
ENG 
 Hospital G 
Hospital H  
IRI  Hospital Z 
Hospital M 
Unit of 
analysis 
Middle 
managers 
 General managers 
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of each interview. Note taking was also used to record important body language, 
appearances, demeanour, and key points.  
 
Table 4.4 Samples in hospital M in Iran 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Pseudo names  of 
the interviewees  
Position    Gender Total  
M F 
1 
 
 Naser Director of operation  1   
2   Ali General manager 1   
3  Zahra Operation manager   1  
4  Cyrus  Finance manager  1   
5  Mohammad HR manager 1   
6  Hossein Employee relations 
& communication manager 
1   
7  Maria Nursing manager  1  
8  Shirin Head of planning & service 
development    
 1  
9  Leila   Manager  Of Research & 
education 
 1  
 Total   5 4 9 
 
 
 
 
103 
 
Table 4.5. Samples in hospital Z in Iran 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Pseudo names  
of the 
interviewees  
Position    Gender Total  
M F 
1 
 
Amir Director of operation  1   
2 Reza General manager 1   
3 Mustafa Finance manager  1   
4 Ahmed HR manager 1   
5 Majid Head of Employee relations 
& communication 
1   
6 Mina Nursing manager  1  
7 Jasmin Head of planning & 
performance   
 1  
8 Kian   Manager  Of Research & 
education 
1   
9 Bijan  Director  Of Research & 
Education 
1   
10 Ashkun Manager  of treatment 1   
11 Nima  Director   of treatment 1   
 Total   9 2 11 
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Table 4.6. Samples in hospital H in England 
Table 4.7. Samples in hospital G in England  
{{{{{{{ 
 Pseudo names  of 
the interviewees  
Position    Gender Total  
M F 
1 
 
 Douglas Divisional director  2 1  
Erich 
 Rose  
2 Jill Divisional Operations Manager  3  
Lesley  
Marian  
3 Charles  Finance  1   
4 Patricia HR 1   
 Thomas    1  
 
 Total  
 
 4 5 9 
 Pseudo names  
of the 
interviewees 
Position    Gender Total  
M F 
1 
 
Ann General managers   1  
Sue   1 
Andrew 1  
Margaret    1 
Mary  1 
Jane  1 
John 1  
Kate  1 
Jack    1  
Simon  1  
2 Susan Clinical director  1  
4 Robert Finance  1   
5 Betty HR 
 
1   
 David  1  
6 Richards  Head of planning and performance  2   
 Total   8 8 16 
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The interview questions were prepared based on the literature review as a general guide for 
the interviews (see the appendix 2). These questions were designed to help develop a 
coherent discussion of the key research themes. This method of data collection enabled the 
researcher to elicit the managers’ opinion about their autonomy. The first section of the 
interview asked about the background of the respondents, including their work experience, 
expertise, as well as, the directorate or division they worked for in the hospital. This 
provided data to help analyse the context within which middle managers communicate and 
collaborate with each other and with other managers.  
 
The second part of the interview questions was related to the range of responsibilities 
middle managers have, and their accountability structure. Middle managers were asked 
about their relationship with clinicians and other managers (both senior managers and 
other MMs). MMs were also asked about the training schemes available to them.  
 
In the third part, middle managers were asked about the range of the responsibilities 
delegated to them over three main areas: HR, finance, and strategy. Managers were asked 
to what extent they had autonomy over HR practices such as appraisal, training, 
development, recruitment and selection (Convey & Monks, 2010). They asked whether they 
consult with HR in managing the issues or whether they believe that HR issues are mainly 
the responsibility of the HR departments.  In terms of financial management, managers 
were asked whether they had the authority to retain the savings they made in their 
directorates/divisions; whether they had the responsibility to allocate the budgets, and 
whether they were consulted in determining the use of capital budget raised from different 
sources within the organisation. These questions were asked to evaluate the extent of 
financial and human resources available to the MMs. They were also asked whether they 
involved in formulating the hospital strategies. Overall, this section provided data for 
analysing the delegation of managerial function within hospitals to middle managers, and 
the extent to which these managers are included in the strategic management of HR and 
finances.  
Finally, respondents were asked whether a) there were changes in their responsibilities as a 
result of organisational restructuring and hospital reforms, whether they were given more 
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responsibilities, and b) their discretion in making decisions had enlarged according to the 
changing needs of the organisation. These questions generated data that helped to elicit the 
middle managers’ perception of the degree of their managerial autonomy within hospitals.   
 
To elicit good quality data from interviews, different techniques have been suggested 
(Robson 1993; Gray 2004; King and Horrocks 2010). However, the researcher received 
valuable advice following the pilot interviews with two other PhD students who already had 
interviewed their respondents in relatively similar fields. Some key issues mentioned by 
them were: 
 Listening carefully while getting prepared for the next question 
 Avoid answering my own question  
 Ask clear questions 
 Avoid getting lost through the interview 
 continuing the conversation 
 encouraging the participants to talk about their experiences, feelings and thoughts 
 
4.7.1 Documentary analysis 
In qualitative research, it is essential to gather and examine the documents (Bryman, 1989). 
They are sources of information where other methods are not effective, and they can 
confirm whether the information obtained from other methods are valid. Documentary 
analysis is suggested as an important source to corroborate data (Bryman, 2008; Saunders 
et al., 2009). It helps with triangulation (Abbot et al., 2004; Elston & Fulop, 2002) as well as 
providing important evidence of the gap between policy and practice. 
 
Documents relating to hospital management structure, financial management structure, 
and staff satisfaction, helped the researcher to have a better understanding of the hospital 
context within which managers operate. Other various documentary records, such as annual 
reports, minutes of board meetings, hospital strategies, business plans, and managers’ job 
descriptions were investigated to triangulate data gleaned from interviews. Those 
documents were examined critically, as a research resource (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995, 
p.168). 
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4.7.2 Observational fieldwork 
Observation allows the direct study of people’s behaviour rather than indirect study through 
the people’s reports of their behaviour.  Another advantage of participant observation is 
that it helps the researcher come across the new areas of investigation that could not be 
anticipated at the outset (Bryman, 1989, p.142). 
Observation of 16 performance review meetings was undertaken (4 meetings in each case). 
These meetings were held monthly among MMs and the hospital executive team to review 
the performance of each directorate and/or division. Observations corroborated data from 
interviews and documentary materials. In the performance review meetings, the researcher 
observed participants and was able to compare and contrast participants comment with 
their interview accounts. In addition, talking to the managers in the coffee room was an 
opportunity to become more familiar with their work. Using field notes and diary was also 
helpful.  
 
Interviewing the middle managers was easier by observation, since it enhanced the ability of 
the researcher to talk more meaningfully with the respondents about their work. Attending 
the hospital committees in Iran, in which middle managers were involved led the researcher 
to observe group dynamics that were different from those of one to one interview. It helped 
the researcher to observe who the main speakers were, what the agenda of the meeting 
was and what the nature of the discussion in those meetings was. Attending the meetings 
also revealed some issues that were raised in the following interviews.  
 
4.7.3 Data analysis  
The data was analysed using the analytical stages suggested by Ritchie and Spencer (1994): 
‘familiarization, identifying a thematic framework, indexing, charting, mapping and 
interpretation’. The details of each stage are explained respectively.  
Familiarization began from the start of the interview process. Each interview recording was 
downloaded onto the computer, as soon as possible to avoid loss of data. After that, the 
recording was transcribed verbatim onto a Microsoft word document. Transcription is the 
process of converting recorded material into text and, as such it is a necessary preliminary 
to commencing analysis of the interview data (King and Horrocks 2010, p. 142).  Langdridge 
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(2004) suggests that doing your own transcription is ideal, and considers it to be the first 
step in data analysis. However, time limitations made this unrealistic and the transcription 
was done by a carefully chosen administrator, with previous experience in transcribing data. 
An important aspect of this situation was developing a good relationship with the 
transcriber, and ensuring effective communication occurred throughout the process. A good 
rapport between the researcher and the transcriber helped to ensure that the downloaded 
recordings were received, and were both accessible and audible. Furthermore, the 
researcher impressed upon the transcriber that supplying missing content or attempting to 
tidy up the script would have a deleterious impact upon the data analysis (Poland 2002). The 
transcriber was experienced and very happy to complete the task to the specifications 
requested and as a result high quality verbatim transcripts were produced in a timely 
fashion.  
 
Once the first five transcripts were complete, each was printed out and read thoroughly 
without making any attempt to code it. This helped the researcher evaluate the flow of the 
interviews and the appropriateness of the questions. As a result three questions added to 
the interview schedule (see appendix).  The interview schedule was modified and revised as 
the researcher went along doing interviews with hospital managers in London, which 
provided the researcher with a good base for interviewing hospital managers in Iran.  
One issue that needed to be considered was how to translate the questions into 
Farsi/Persian without changing the meanings. To ensure that hospital managers in Iran were 
asked the same questions as the managers in England, the researcher asked her former 
lecturer’s advice on the questions. As he knew English and he was an expert in healthcare 
management field in Iran, the researcher believed that with his guidance and advice, she 
could preserve the accuracy to its possible greatest extent. The interviews with managers in 
Iran transcribed in Farsi (or Persian), however, the quotes used in the finding chapters were 
translated to English.  
The second stage was to identify a thematic framework. Once transcripts were complete, 
the researcher listened to the records several times and re-read the transcripts to immerse 
to the data. The interview transcripts examined line by line. The researcher used the margin 
of the transcript to write brief comments and select key words from the text. Each sentence 
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and each incident coded into as many codes as possible to ensure a thorough examination 
of data (Streubert and Carpenter 1995, p.156). At this stage, there were two kinds of codes: 
those taken from the accounts of the participants, for example: ‘we are here for the good of 
the patients’ and ‘I use the term businesses’, and codes constructed by the researcher based 
on the literature.  
‘Codes are tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential 
information compiled during a study. Codes usually are attached to chunks of varying size – 
words, phrases, sentences or whole paragraphs, connected or unconnected to a specific 
setting’ (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 56).  
 
After coding the first few transcripts the researcher consult with her supervisor as an 
experienced researcher to critique this approach. As coding process progressed, the 
researcher merged certain codes where there was an overlap, defined new codes and 
modified codes from early transcripts. Following that the researcher determined the 
particular categories that were appropriate for the grouping of similar codes. This enabled 
the researcher to identify the sub-themes, and then the related sub-themes were 
categorised as the main themes. ‘Each category was then compared with other categories 
to ensure that they were mutually exclusive’, (Streubert and Carpenter 1995, p.157), the 
development of the thematic framework was an iterative process.  
Third, the researcher needed to Index and chart the data. The thematic framework or index 
was applied to the interview transcripts and field-notes (indexing) using Nvivo software 
(version 10). The Nvivo software provided a picture of the data as a whole and enabled the 
researcher to consider the range of attitudes and experience for each theme (charting).  
The final step was mapping and interpreting the data. At this stage the researcher reviewed 
the charts and research notes. The perceptions, accounts and experiences of the 
respondents were compared and contrasted. For example, managers’ views on the factors 
that they thought had affected their autonomy were compared and contrasted, and the 
associations between certain characteristics and experiences with particular views were 
identified.  
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4.8 Limitations 
This study adopts qualitative approach which provides rich data but at the same time 
presents some limitations. This method is limited in that interviewees might have told 
stories to show that they were heroic managers. In addition, the MMs’ perceptions were 
elicited and their actions were observed only at the time of the research. The respondents 
were also asked to recall the changes in their managerial responsibilities and their 
autonomy since ten years ago when the hospitals gained semi-autonomous status. 
Therefore, retrospective accounts provided. Macfarlane et al. (2011, p.927) state that:  
The creation of a retrospective account (which unfolds over time and makes sense) 
requires post-hoc rationalisation, whereby the narrator seeks to explain what might 
have been diffuse and disparate influences, and to present a coherent, sequential 
account of their own actions and motives, and those of other actors. 
Thus, the accounts of respondents cannot be presented as facts rather they are seen as 
perspectives.  
This study is conducted in two countries; extending this study to other nations would bring 
more compelling results about the effects of management reforms on middle managers in 
various contexts, but it was beyond the scope of this study.  
4.9 Summary  
This chapter starts with a discussion of the research philosophy and places the study in the 
ontological and epistemological perspective of interpertivism. The research strategy is 
explained to show how the research aim will be addressed. The aim and objectives of the 
research take on an interpretive purpose as the experiences of the middle managers will be 
explored in order to understand the managers’ views on their autonomy in practice.  
 
The research employs a multi-method strategy for data collection to explore multiple layers 
of the phenomena of interest and compensate for method inefficiencies.  The range of data 
sources included literature, interviews and document analysis and field observation. 
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Chapter five: Findings 
 
The findings chapter has been divided thematically into three sections based on the 
research questions they address. These three sections are Autonomy, Identity and Identity 
work. The section on autonomy addresses research question one of the thesis (to what 
extent do hospital middle managers in England and Iran have autonomy?) using Verhoest et 
al.’s (2004) framework. The section on identity addresses the impact of public management 
reforms on middle managers, and the final section ensues on identity work, which reports 
the middle managers' responses to those reforms. 
 
5.1. Autonomy 
 
The views of hospital middle managers were elicited to record their perceptions of 
autonomy. The perceived autonomy reported by middle managers reflects the 
organisational and organisational field features within which they perform. These features 
include the structure of the organisations, lines of hierarchy and accountability, rules and 
regulations. According to Verhoest et al.'s (2004) framework, the views of middle managers 
on their autonomy can be explained based on four main themes of managerial, policy, 
structural and interventional autonomy. This section gives a country wise description of the 
managers' views on the four themes. 
5.1.1. Middle managers’ autonomy in England  
 
5.1.1.1. Managerial Autonomy 
 
The managerial autonomy, according to Verhoest et al.'s (2004) framework, can be further 
divided into two sub-themes of managerial autonomy concerning human resource 
management (HRM), and managerial autonomy concerning financial management. 
 
Managerial autonomy in human resource management (HRM)  
 
Recruitment  
Middle managers in England stated that they were able to recruit the staff they want as long 
as it was within their budget. This budget is established at the beginning of the financial 
year, starting April the 1st each year. According to this budget, if the funds are available and 
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the recruitment type is a vacancy replacement, middle managers can recruit a member of 
staff without permission. In the case, if appointing the new staff is not within the budget, 
managers must ask the executive team for permission. Middle managers have autonomy to 
recruit administration staff of Band 3 or 4 without permission. However, to recruit, for 
example, a head of a department of Band 8C or above, they must seek approval.  
The band of a hospital staff is determined according to the Agenda for Change (AFC), which 
currently grades and pays all the NHS staff, excluding doctors, dentists, and some senior 
managers (as cited in the NHS employers handbook). The AFC has developed nine pay bands 
to arrange the pay scales and career progression of these professionals (see Appendix 6). 
The staff members are placed in any of these nine bands based on their knowledge, 
responsibility, skills, and effort needed for the job. Each post is defined using Job Evaluation 
Scheme (JES), which is also used to define the pay bands for each post (as cited in the NHS 
employers' handbook). 
To recruit a medical staff like a consultant, managers have to make a business case and take 
that to the trust board of the consultant planning group to get the executive team's 
permission. One reason could be that these are long-term, high-level jobs and financing 
them is challenging. It may also be the fact that doctors have excluded themselves from 
local managerial control to ensure that medical staffing decisions are taken at the highest 
level.  
Andrew, who has been in the NHS for about 14 years and has been a general manager (GM) 
for more than three years, explained how he could go over rigid policies, take risks, and 
recruit two pharmacists without getting permission because ‘they were excellent 
pharmacists' and also because he ‘did not want to lose them'. This could be an example of 
an innovative and entrepreneurial middle manager. 
It is not always that easy. It happens to be a high-profile project, so I have got the 
levers to talk to key people and say come on, this bureaucracy is going mad. Let's just 
do it. (Andrew, GM, Hospital G, Line 307) 
On the other hand, Mary, another GM, preferred to be in control. She mentioned that she 
herself put committees and processes in place for recruitment, as she thought the level of 
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scrutiny of posting establishment was not enough in her directorate. However, it must be 
borne in mind that her directorate was in deficit and financially challenged. So, financial 
problems may be the reason for more scrutiny and control. 
Restructuring  
Regarding restructuring, a number of middle managers said that they could restructure the 
staff in their directorate or division. They could also change the bandings (for more details 
on banding structure see Appendix 6) of the staff and increase or reduce them. For example, 
if they had two Band 7s and they wanted three Band 5s instead, they need to consult with 
HR department to implement this change. Middle managers can change the bandings of 
their personnel to get more experienced and skilled staff. They can also reduce the bandings 
or numbers to cut costs. They have the autonomy to do so as long as they demonstrate how 
to finance it, especially in the case where they want to establish more senior posts. 
However, middle managers do not have the autonomy to put the staff up in a higher band. 
Jill, Divisional Operations Manager at Hospital H, said she felt frustrated with this restriction 
as she feared her staff would go to the other places that have higher grades for the same 
level of the job. Jill added:  
I think that if we could restructure some positions and really incentivise them, things 
would be different. I think we would change the structure and some of the bands. 
We would change some of the hours we work. We would become more efficient and 
more commercial (Jill, MM, Hospital H, Line 576). 
Motivation  
Another general manager, Kate, also mentioned the lack of incentives and motivation. She 
noted that there was no longer enough energy for the staff to meet the saving targets. She, 
therefore, arranged a party for them as a gesture to thank her staff for meeting the targets.  
You can't keep pushing people. And there isn't a financial reward bonus thing at the 
end. So nobody gets a bonus compared to the private sectors, where if you have a 
good G [grade], you have a bonus. You don't get that. So, you have to work out other 
ways to keep incentivising your teams to keep doing work. (Kate, Line 898) 
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Dismissal  
Middle managers in the NHS do not have autonomy to dismiss a staff member. There is a 
formal investigation process in place, and it has to be approved at the executive level. Sue 
mentioned that:  
It took me two years to manage someone out and the amount of time it takes to 
complete the process usually drains everyone (Sue, GM, hospital G, line 574). 
Salary  
Middle managers are not in the position to decide the salary of the staff, the conditions that 
enable promotions, staff evaluation, and the conditions for their appointment. Foundation 
trust managers can have some flexibility regarding local pay and conditions. However, they 
have chosen not to because they are likely to face resistance from unions and open 
themselves up to equal pay claims and public opinions. Therefore, they have introduced the 
‘Agenda For Change’ (AFC), a national pay scheme for non-medical staff. The principle 
behind the AFC is equal pay for equivalent work done. According to a manager: 
I suppose again that we don't have the ability to just, you know, pay people what we 
want to pay them. So you know, it was an idea at one point; the foundation trust 
would be able to offer the kind of salaries that were, you know. It was up to them to 
say how much a particular post would attract – that sort of thing. We don't seem to 
have gone down that path; we are just implementing Agenda for Change and that's 
that, so, I don't think there is much flexibility around that. There is no kind of 
performance-related pay available. I do not think they really have any kind of 
autonomy to do any of those things. (Jill, Divisional Operation Manager, Hospital H, 
Line 414) 
Delegation 
Different directorates/divisions have slightly different styles and structures.  This might be 
an indication that managers have the autonomy to decide how their relationship is with 
their subordinates. Some of them say that they like to control, such as Margaret, the GM of 
community services at Hospital G. She has been in the NHS for over 25 years and joined 
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Hospital G when the management of the community and acute services came together two 
years ago. She notes that she likes to control. Another example could be Mary, the GM who 
joined the organisation seven months ago (prior to the time of the interview) to run a 
financially challenged directorate.   
I mean, to be honest, it is pretty much down to me how I run the division. So I think 
we are allowed to do things differently in three divisions provided that it does the job, 
so you know, whatever works for you and your division. So we have slightly different 
structures. (Rose, Divisional Director, Hospital H, Line 213) 
However, some middle managers explained that they delegated responsibility in most areas 
unless it involved signing off of high financial value or public representation. John, the 
general manager at Hospital G, mentioned allowing service managers of his directorate to 
have access to the budgets. He stated that if the service managers did not know the 
business, they would not be able to run it appropriately. According to him, if he does not 
empower the staff, they will not understand their job properly. He mentions that if he 
empowers his staff, they are going to manage their services properly and come to him with 
better strategies.  On the other hand, some other middle managers such as Lesley 
(Divisional Operation Manager at Hospital H) did not share the same opinion as John 
regarding delegating responsibilities to subordinates. Lesley stated that there was no one 
she could delegate the responsibilities to and she would have delegated the responsibilities 
if she found someone responsible.  
Managing sickness absence 
One of the areas that caused a debate between HR managers and middle managers was 
managing sickness absence. Managers complained that they had to go through a long 
process to manage sickness absence. On the other hand, HR managers stated middle 
managers were not willing to manage the sickness absence properly and that they did not 
have the skills to tackle those issues. 
In summary, managers in the English cases said they believed that they had the decision-
making competency, and they were able to make decisions regarding human resource 
management, but policies and procedures constrained them. A manager summarises the 
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state of managerial autonomy in the NHS as:  
I am at the level to dismiss staff; I have heard of lots of cases in the past and continue 
to get cases. I manage my own staff. Strictly speaking, I can make my own decisions 
about what I do with those staff – except I can't because there are a number of HR 
policies that limit the decisions you can make and this is what you need to do – the 
process and the protocols that you need to follow. So, whilst I can make a range of 
decisions – a limited range of decisions – they're constrained by the organisation 
policies; the same with finance. (Mary, GM, hospital G, Line 129) 
Managerial autonomy concerning financial management  
 
Budgeting  
Middle managers in England deal with two budgets: revenue budget and capital budget. 
They have control over their revenue budget, which pays the day-to-day running costs, such 
as the cost of staff and medical supplies. This budget is established at the beginning of each 
financial year. Middle managers have the flexibility to purchase as long as they stay within 
their financial envelope without getting a sign-off. On the other hand, the managers have to 
meet an income target, bringing in financial surpluses. These surpluses make the capital 
budget, which is used for overall trust investment and is spent on things with longer life 
expectancy, such as building, equipment, and IT. Managers do not have control over this 
capital budget. They have to go through a process of placing bids to use this budget. 
Carrying forward the surplus 
Middle managers cannot carry forward the surpluses they make. It goes to the trust budget 
at the end of each financial year, and it cannot be transferred to the next financial year. In 
other words, managers do not have the autonomy to carry money forward from one year to 
the next, and that is something that has stayed the same even after the formation of the 
foundation trust. The financial year ends on 31st of March. So, if a manager has made a 
surplus of £50,000, they are not allowed to carry that over to spend on something else next 
year. This trend is the same in both hospitals studied in England. This limits the middle 
managers' long-term planning and encourages them to spend their surpluses as long as they 
can meet their targets. Ann, a general manager at hospital G, quotes that:  
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   At the end of last financial year, we had some money left. We were going to have a 
little bit of surplus – a couple of hundred Ks. So, we used that to buy some theatre 
trolleys and we used some of it to buy some syringe pumps, but the syringe pumps 
were on the five-year list, and it just comes at the end of the list, so by buying them – 
by spending a hundred K [pounds] on them – we'd saved seventy k [pounds] in having 
to brand them. So we made that decision locally. (Ann, GM, Hospital G, Line 185) 
Another manager added: 
We got the authority to spend up to £50,000. Let's just spend it. Let's identify the 
projects that fall in that kind of…and just spend it. It's not about asking. You know, 
don't ask permission; ask forgiveness. So, that's what we did. We got on and did that. 
Consequently, at the end of the year, instead of a surplus of a million and a half, once 
you look at the sort of – a million and two million, I think we ended up with some 
£50,000 surplus. We managed to spend some amount of money; so there are ways 
around. (Simon, GM, Hospital G, Line 521) 
In case managers are able to over-perform and make a large amount of savings, they can 
ask to shift part of the budget from revenue to capital. This can happen if managers do 
something differently than what they used to do and results in some savings due to 
improved productivity and efficiency. For example, by increasing the number of procedures 
or reducing the length of stay, they can reinvest 3–5 percent of those savings as a capital 
item in the following year. For instance, the GM of dental services was able to ask for 
revenue to capital transfer and buy two equipments, each worth £50,000 pounds. 
There are some directorates or divisions that are unable to meet their saving targets, 
especially those who are financially challenged. When they cannot make that amount of 
savings but they still need the funding beyond their budget, they have to make a business 
case and convince the executive team to secure the required funding. Rose, the divisional 
director at Hospital H explained: 
At the moment we ran QIPP [quality, innovation, productivity, prevention] schemes, 
we deal with them as a division. However, the divisions are monitored centrally. So, if 
the money comes out of the budget, the income is getting monitored, and at the 
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moment we are not really able to plough your own divisional service QIPP savings 
back into your service. 
Service Line Reporting (SLR) and Service Line Management (SLM) 
Finance managers in both case studies explained service line reporting (SLR) and service line 
management (SLM). SLR is a financial reporting system which calculates the contribution or 
profit derived from an activity by linking the income earned from a business activity with the 
associated costs. Therefore, managers know which activities are financially beneficial 
(Harradine and Prowle, 2012, p. 217). SLR is developed by Monitor and improves the clinical 
and strategic decision making of the trusts. Although general managers agree with finance 
managers on the advantages of SLR, they think it is in its early stages and is not completely 
integrated and embedded. According to Lesley, Divisional Operation Manager at Hospital H:  
When we get service line management, the idea would be that yes we could save, 
make something more efficient, and the savings from that would go directly back into 
that service so that they could, you know, buy equipments, or increase the staffing or 
whatever they want to do related to the way of funding them in. (Lesley, Divisional 
Operation Manager, Hospital H, Line 189) 
Middle managers in both cases in England mentioned that SLR could enhance their 
autonomy by making all the essential charges on each service more visible. They stated that 
SLR could enable the managers to figure out what they were being charged for and to 
evaluate whether they were getting good service or a good price by benchmarking against 
other hospitals. The managers stated that ‘service line reporting would provide 
transparency in the cost and delivery of service’. 
Middle managers at Hospital G acknowledged that SLR had been implemented in their 
hospital.  
In this trust, we have service line reporting, which for our directorate is quite 
important. If we went back three or four years, essentially we would just get in a large 
sum of money at the start of the year's budget and that would be it. There was no 
activity-related income because we are essentially the support service. You know, we 
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are supporting other directorates in the delivery of healthcare to patients. Now we get 
paid for every scan and, you know, X-ray and MRI that we do by the directorates that 
we support. (Simon, GM, Line 161) 
In contrast to Hospital G, middle managers of Hospital H believed that SLR had not been 
fully implemented. However, Charles, the finance manager at Hospital H, explained that 
other than SLR, they have also applied patient-level information and costing systems (PLICS), 
which measures the resources that each patient consumes. Charles believed that compared 
to SLR, PLICS provides more visibility and greater transparency, which enables clinicians to 
look at individual cases, thus enabling them to avoid overspending. This enables middle 
managers to control waste. Charles, the finance manager at hospital H, states his example: 
So, for instance, in gastro [gastroenterology], we were able to identify that some of 
the junior doctors just order pathology and radiology without considering what they 
are ordering. So a patient comes in and you just, order maybe pathology, just to make 
sure that you are doing the right thing. But, by doing that, through SLR and PLICS, we 
actually identified on a patient-level basis that some of the patients didn’t need the 
pathologic tests they were ordered. So what came out from this was for – as to 
actually build into the system, into the pathology and radiology system – a kind of a 
drop-down menu. So, if a patient comes in for a hip surgery, this is the menu of 
options you may order from. If a person comes in for a bowel screening, this is the 
menu, and by doing that, we are actually reducing unnecessary tests that were being 
carried out and did not add any value to the patient recovery. So those are some of 
the areas that the divisional directors have explored in the past. Financially, of course, 
you need to invest in SLR and PLICS system to be able to identify some of these easy 
wins. (Charles, Finance Manager, Hospital H, Line 554) 
 
Tariffs  
 
There is no negotiation on the price of the services, as the tariffs are set by Monitor, the 
economic regulator across the NHS (‘our prices are nationally determined' – Andrew, GM, 
Line 266). So, managers have no control over the price of the services they deliver. On the 
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other hand, they are not able to grow their services as much as they want because 
commissioners limit the number of some of the services. One of the managers said: 
... a good example of that is the follow-up ratio. Lots of commissioners placed a cap on 
the number of follow-ups to every new appointment that you can have, because it's 
perceived to be … hospitals hanging on to patients needlessly for extended periods of 
time… (Mary, GM, Line 393)  
 
Financial support  
 
Middle managers (mostly GMs) at Hospital G, whose financial support sits outside their 
directorates, said that they felt that they lacked consistent support from finance. They 
stated that they needed someone with good analytical reporting skills to be able to point 
out areas where savings could be made. However, there were no complaints from middle 
managers at Hospital H regarding the lack of support from finance managers. This may be 
due to the small size of Hospital H compared to Hospital G, as well as its divisional structure. 
Each division has allocated finance managers who sit within those divisions, whereas in 
Hospital G, GMs across different directorates had to share their finance managers. 
  
5.1.1.2. Policy Autonomy  
 
Central policies  
The middle managers in both hospitals of England stated that they were restricted by 
centrally determined policies and procedures. They said they had to go through a long 
process to get things done. According to Mary, she could take autonomous decisions on a 
set of policy issues, but at the same time she is ‘restricted and constrained by the 
organisational policies, protocols and procedures’ (Mary, Hospital G, Line 146).  
HR policies  
Middle managers in England expressed their frustration with HR policies, such as 
recruitment and dismissal, as they stated there was a long process attached to them. They 
said they had no autonomy to appoint staff whom they thought was ‘appropriate' for the 
role. According to the recruitment law, they had to advertise the job equally. They also said 
that they got frustrated because they needed to go through a long process to get things 
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signed off. However, some middle managers did not see having robust policies in place as an 
autonomy issue. They attributed that to the system and the within which they worked. 
According to some of the middle managers, these policies were not a challenge to their 
autonomy as their decision making competencies. They related their frustration to the 
system and bureaucracy. 
Middle managers in England also presented a case of lack of clarity in the policies. Betty, 
senior HR managers at Hospital G, who manages the pay policy and partnership, mentioned 
that managers themselves prefer to have a policy in place on single individual cases. She 
explained her experience in a meeting with the trade union to review a pay policy. The trade 
union wanted a very clear procedure in place, as they believed that discretion would be 
misused and the staff would be disadvantaged. A senior nurse, who was part of the 
discussion agreed with the trade union and refused to have a general policy in place as she 
thought ‘this feels less comfortable'. According to her:  
There seems to be a prevailing sentiment among the trade unions and arguably from 
sections of the management community that no, we need to be absolutely, clearly, 
precisely delineated, and at the same time complain about the prescription that's 
available. I just think it's one of those organisational contradictions and cultural issues 
that you just have to keep on debating, discussing, and hopefully modifying them over 
a period of time. (Betty, HR Manager, Hospital G, Line 520) 
Betty had work experience in another major hospital in London. She said there were more 
general guidance based policies, much more flexibility, and much more autonomy in that 
hospital, and their trade union was perfectly happy with that. 
Middle managers in English hospitals explained that their policy autonomy was restricted in 
two ways. First, the emphasis on result control restricted their room for manoeuvre to 
determine the objectives. There is no room for negotiation or debate about the centrally set 
standards that managers have to achieve. There is some negotiation or agreement between 
middle managers and senior managers about the way they are going to achieve those 
standards and the extent to which they are allowed to risk that they might fail to achieve it. 
For instance, a couple of specialities were not in the position to achieve that standard for 
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the patients. So, the executive team and middle managers negotiated the extent to which 
the situation could be improved over time and at what point that they ought to reach the 
point where they could achieve the target. Therefore, there was only some flexibility around 
the process of achieving targets. 
Second, they said that they lacked financial, HR and IT support from these services to 
achieve their objectives. Susan pointed out that though the middle managers can play 
around the policies, they really need someone to get it through the HR. According to her, 
‘there are processes which are frustrating to deal with because they are stuck with the 
system’. (Susan, Hospital G, Line 413) 
 
5.1.1.3. Structural Autonomy 
 
Bureaucracy  
In England, middle managers at Hospital G stated that they felt constrained by the 
burgeoning bureaucracy that comes with the organisation. They mentioned that there was 
‘an awful lot of bureaucracy to wade through, just to get on with doing what is obviously the 
right thing to do'. For example, some bureaucratic processes have been placed to control 
service development. Richard, the Head of Planning and Performance at Hospital G, stated 
that it was partly related to the nature of the directorate's structure that made it difficult for 
the manager of a directorate to do anything that had an impact on other directorates. 
Richard explained that if middle managers had an idea about changing the way their 
directorate worked, but it had implications for several other directorates, they would have 
to get that idea to the board. This can cause frustration for managers and make them feel 
constrained. 
Organisational structure  
Simon (GM at Hospital G) described the structure of Hospital ‘G' as ‘modelled'. He said that 
introducing a divisional structure instead of directorates would be more effective. His 
argument was that in the directorate structure, the appointed leader is the clinical director 
and the power is not invested in GMs. However, senior managers had different views. One 
of them explained that this hospital (Hospital G) had the divisional structure several years 
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ago. There were seven divisions (six clinical and one state division), but due to the lack of 
cooperation among those divisions, the divisional management layer was removed three 
years ago.  
The way it was described by the chief executive at that time was that we previously 
had a single organisation that might not be working perfectly, but was working 
together and was principally focused on trying to do the best thing for the patient, and 
we turned into six organisations plus corporate and support services – so seven in a 
way. They spent a lot of their time in conflict and were not working for each other, 
and that's the key I think – that there is a real danger in autonomy, that you can 
almost incentivise people to be and to not pay regards to other people, to benefits in 
other people. (Richard, SM, Hospital G, Line 113) 
However, not all senior managers agreed on the advantages of the new directorate 
structure. For instance, Robert, the Head of Finance, stated: 
 We took out the layer that was a divisional management structure, and we created 
– I think at the time – about thirteen or fourteen clinical directorates. I think we lost 
a lot of that interaction. The performance culture three years ago wasn't as clear, 
wasn't as visible within the organisations. (Robert, Hospital G, Line 141) 
Thus, instead of divisions, directorate structure was put in place. Each directorate is run by a 
management team, including a clinical director, a head of nursing, and a general manager. 
General Managers directly report to clinical directors. Above that, there are two deputy 
directors of operations, a director of operations, and the chief operating officer above the 
director of operations.  
The chief operating officer role was established a year prior to the time of the study. 
General Managers have monthly performance review meetings with the chief operating 
officer and her team, finance team, and HR manager. The majority of managers view the 
introduction of the chief operating officer post as a positive change in the trust's structure 
and their line of accountability. They say they feel their level of autonomy has increased 
because they have their representative at the board level, although the level of scrutiny has 
also increased. For instance, the performance review meeting that was held quarterly 
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before introducing this role is now being held on a monthly basis. In this respect, the 
operational director added:  
So the introduction of the chief operating officer, the post, would have definitely 
made a big difference to directorates and the general manager's way of life. So I think 
it would have empowered them in some ways to have a clearer kind of representation 
at the top level of the organisation of operations. But it would also probably have 
constrained them more than the previous model as well, in some ways. (Richard, Line 
588) 
Hospital H has three divisions, each led by a divisional director with the support of the 
clinical director and head of nursing. Divisional directors report directly to the chief 
operating officer. In that respect, they are higher than general managers who report to 
clinical directors. In both cases, managers consider the organisational structure as a flat 
structure. Charlotte, the divisional operation manager at hospital H, said that ‘it is a 
hierarchy, but at the same time, it is also quite a flat hierarchy’. Richard also states that they 
have a flat structure, which means that they need to invest in probably a greater level of 
autonomy in directorate teams (Richard, Hospital G, Line 248).  
Power structure  
Although Hospital ‘G' seems to have a flat structure, according to some of the middle 
managers they ‘still do not feel empowered and autonomous at the moment’. According to 
Simon: 
I think the structure – the power structure – is just not clear, and they are going to 
struggle in years to come. I think the structure the trust had with these directorates, 
finding times of plenty when there are lots of opportunities to go – and you need to 
be clear about where you're investing power. And as I said, the power is not invested 
in general managers. But there are still expectations of responsibility. So you're being 
asked to be responsible for the things that you don't necessarily have sufficient power 
to actually go and do. So you are relying on influencing your own personal power to 
make things happen. (Simon, GM, Hospital G, Line 477) 
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5.1.1.4. Interventional Autonomy 
 
Middle managers in England stated that they can work together with the clinicians and 
contribute in implemeting organisational strategies. They can identify the services needed 
to be developed and the way they can do it. They set the strategies for their directorates or 
divisions through their business planning process every year. In this business plan or service 
delivery plan, they prioritise the resources for the next 12 months and thereafter. However, 
these strategies should be in line with trust-wide strategies. The majority of managers talk 
about the complex nature of setting strategies for their directorates or divisions: 
...but in terms of more strategic or tactical kind of pieces of work, it's not so clear. 
(Mary, GM, Hospital G, Line 214)  
We set out what we're going to do in the year. Admittedly that is driven, I think, by the 
trust strategy, and that is something which I guess is not always that clear. If you take 
a commercial organisation, I think probably strategy is much easier and clearer. 
(Marian, Hospital H, Line 31)  
In their account, middle managers covertly made references to the pluralistic field within 
which hospitals are located. They mentioned that their autonomy over formulating 
strategies (determining objectives) was restricted by internal and external interventions as 
well as local policy, and the rest of the NHS. For middle managers in the English cases, 
different priorities of stakeholders have made strategizing complex. Different priorities of 
the management team within a certain directorate or division, priorities and business plans 
of other directorates and divisions, the priorities of the executive team, the rest of the NHS, 
and the central government's emphasis on results have restricted the interventional 
autonomy of middle managers.  
Middle managers state that if they perform well financially and operationally, they are left 
to run their directorates. However, they are still subject to monitoring through monthly 
performance review meetings. They are also constrained by centrally driven targets and 
standards and policies. Margaret, GM in Hospital G quotes that: 
We over-perform every year. We have earned or we are meant to earn a form of 
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autonomy to manage in the way we want. But actually, you can't do that. You are 
still… the autonomy we've earned is not to be micro-managed. So we are a high-
performing directorate. Kevin [clinical director] and myself – we both did our post 
grads in Cranfield [university], and we are both very keen on lean [lean methodology], 
and we are putting in processes to stop waste and everything. We don't have any 
autonomy in that. So we were told that we have autonomy, but actually, we can't do 
what we want to do to run a directorate more efficiently because we are bound by 
Agenda for Change, HR policy, and everything else. (Margaret, GM, Hospital G, Line 
62) 
5.1.2. Middle managers’ autonomy in Iran 
 
5.1.2.1. Managerial Autonomy 
 
Managerial autonomy in human resource management (HRM)  
Recruitment  
In Iran, middle managers in both Hospital M and Hospital Z mentioned that they were not 
able to recruit any permanent staff even if the recruitment was a vacancy replacement. 
They notified senior managers of the vacant posts and attended interview panels to select 
among the applicants. Then they would get the required staff according to the 
establishment and allocated budgets. Middle managers could contract only support staff, 
and that too only for short-term contracts, which could only be conducted through 
corporate organisations and not by the direct hire. According to Reza: 
We are not authorised to recruit the staff. We can restructure them, but in terms of 
recruitment, even my senior manager is limited to bringing staff in and recruiting 
them. There is very little flexibility around this issue. (Reza, MM, Hospital Z) 
One of the issues regarding staff recruitment in Iran was mentioned as replacing the retired 
staff. According to the early retirement scheme (pension scheme), staff who had been 
working for up to 20–25 years were eligible to apply for early retirement. However, middle 
managers had not been able to accept their staff's application, as it imposed a financial 
burden on the hospital. Mohammad, the HR manager at Hospital M, stated that there had 
been a one-year or even greater gap between the retirement declaration by a staff and its 
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approval.  He added that long delays have adversarial effects on staff's job satisfaction and 
their effectiveness to a great extent.  
Another recruitment issue that Mina (MM at Hospital Z) made a reference to was the 
replacement of staff who were on maternity leave. She mentioned that this process was 
slow, as she had to ask senior managers for permission.  
I wish I had autonomy to advertise the vacancies and put temporary staff, without 
permission, for nine months until my permanent staffs get back to work (Mina, 
Hospital Z). 
Restructuring  
A majority of middle managers stated that they had room for manoeuvre to restructure 
their staff, change their arrangement, determine what they need to do, and how to do it. In 
some cases, middle managers restructure their staff to reduce the staff shortage in a 
specific area. For instance, one of the middle managers explained that he needed more HR 
staff, while there was no more established vacant HR post. After consulting the HR 
department, he selected one staff member who was willing to work as an HR manager, 
trained that staff member in relevant training courses, and finally appointed him with a new 
job title. Another middle manager mentioned that he had the autonomy to bring a nursing 
staff member to the lab to overcome the staff shortage in the lab. The middle manager said 
that her salary as a nurse was higher than her salary as a healthcare scientist. However, the 
middle manager could fill the gap and manage the difference under the ‘additional 
payment' heading.  
Motivation  
As illustrated in the Literature Review chapter, hospitals are able to generate their own 
revenue. Twenty percent of this income in Iran is divided among hospital staff as their 
personal income, which is called Karaneh. One of the middle managers at Hospital M 
mentioned that she used this payment as leverage to encourage the staff accomplishing 
some important training courses. She said she had the autonomy to reduce the amount of 
this payment, in case any member of the staff did not attend their courses. She stated that 
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this led to increased staff attendance in the training courses. She also mentioned that she 
could also increase staff's Karaneh, in case they were high performing and contributing to 
the hospitals' income.  
Middle managers at Hospital Z had contradictory views on the extent of their autonomy to 
pay remuneration to their staff. Ahmad, the HR Manager, explained that he did not have 
autonomy to remunerate his high performing staff or to do the opposite in the case of 
malpractice. However, Mina, who has been a nurse manager for over 20 years at Hospital Z, 
stated that she had made some agreements with senior managers to be able to remunerate 
the high performing staff. However, this was a local decision, therefore, in case the senior 
managers were replaced, this agreement would no longer be accepted as binding. These 
two examples point to autonomy as a negotiated issue. It seems that Mina's long experience 
and her relationship with the senior managers' had facilitated such arrangement.  
Middle managers in both Hospital M and Hospital Z stated that they should have more 
autonomy to be able to incentivise hardworking staff. In this regard, middle managers at 
Hospital Z (the larger hospital) felt more restricted compared to their counterparts at 
Hospital M. Ahmad, the HR Manager at Hospital Z, explained that according to the national 
regulation, they are not allowed to pay for uniforms to the nursing staff who work on 
contract. He attributed this difficulty to the large size of the organisation as he said that if 
they worked for a small hospital, they might have been able to bend the rules and pay for 
the uniforms of nursing staff. However, in a hospital of 800 contract staff nurses, it has 
larger financial costs (around ten to fifteen thousand pounds), and may not be acceptable 
under the current circumstances. 
Promotion  
Middle managers in Iran are in the position to take decisions locally about the conditions for 
promoting staff. Ali, GM at Hospital M, mentioned that he established a scoring system to 
promote a senior staff nurse to the ward sister position. To make his decision legitimate, he 
arranged a meeting with possible candidates, asked them to score themselves based on 
years of experience and education, among other factors, and finally reached a decision to 
promote the one who got the highest score. Ali believed that middle managers' autonomy 
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to promote a member of staff has been restricted since the new accreditation system for 
hospitals was implemented across the country three years ago. According to this new 
system, hospitals are required to meet standard criteria to promote the staff, and the 
process should be evidence-based. However, there are still cases where middle managers 
have promoted certain employees without adhering to the criteria. It seems that their 
autonomy over some of the HR matters is negotiable, except for dismissal.  
Dismissal  
Middle managers do not have autonomy to dismiss a staff member. There is a formal 
investigation process in place, and it has to be approved by senior managers at the medical 
university.  
Training  
One of the issues mentioned by middle managers was the lack of autonomy to provide the 
required training courses to their staff to overcome the skill shortage. In order to support 
staff training, Leila, a nurse manager at Hospital M, made a case and convinced the senior 
managers to permit private students of nursing associations to have their fieldwork 
completed in their hospital. In return, she could use part of the income they received from 
the nursing association to pay the cost of the hospital staff training. 
 
Managerial autonomy concerning financial management 
 
Budgeting  
Similar to middle managers in England, middle managers in Iranian hospitals deal with two 
budgets. One budget is allocated to the hospital by the medical university which is 
established at the beginning of each financial year. Part of this budget pays for the day-to-
day running costs, such as costs of staff and medical supplies. The remainder is spent on 
long-term planning, such as building, equipment and IT. As long as middle managers stay 
within their financial envelope, they have the flexibility to buy what they want, but they 
have to get a sign-off from senior manager. However, there is not much flexibility around 
this allocated budget's head. Middle managers are unable to carry the unspent budget to 
the following year. They have to return this amount to the medical university, and in the 
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following year, they need to apply for that budget under a different heading. According to 
Cyrus, the finance manager at hospital M, middle managers try to break even by shifting 
between budgets and moving the funds from one budget heading to another.  
The second budget comes from the hospital's annual income. This income goes to the 
medical university at the end of the financial year and is received by the hospital after ten 
percent reduction. Twenty percent of this income (Karaneh) is given to the hospital staff. 
The rest is spent on running cost and capital in accordance with hospital priorities, which are 
reflected in the hospitals' business delivery plan (annual operational planning). Middle 
managers have more flexibility to spend this budget. Shirin, a middle manager at hospital M, 
shared her views on the flexibility of spending the budget. According to her, they secure 
funding for their plans from the hospital income, as they do not have much room for 
manoeuvre over the budget that is allocated by the medical university. 
Ten percent of hospitals' annual income in Iran goes to the medical university budget. It is 
earmarked for the capital budget for hospitals. If middle managers want to use this budget 
to spend on hospital development or to purchase an expensive piece of equipment out of 
their financial envelope, they need to place a bid to secure funding.  
Ali, the GM at Hospital M, stated that middle managers do not have financial autonomy to 
pay for hospital purchases without prior consultation with senior managers. According to 
him, they engage in the purchasing process, but senior managers take the ultimate decisions 
regarding payments. Ali mentioned that the senior managers of the medical university had 
restricted the hospital middle managers' autonomy. Previously (8 years before the time of 
this study), this was not the case as middle managers were able to make payments without 
prior consultation with their seniors. According to Ali (the GM), he had to spend a lot of time 
negotiating the payment process with the suppliers. As he said sometimes it took him more 
than three months to make the payments. He stated: 
I believe it is essential to have authority in the areas that you have responsibility for. 
(Ali, GM, Hospital M). 
Similarly, Jasmine, another MM at Hospital Z, mentioned that they could vire between 
budgets only with prior consultation with their senior managers. Her statement makes a 
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reference to the lack of autonomy of the middle managers. It seems that their autonomy 
was not a clear-cut property but something that was contested and negotiated. 
Service Line Reporting (SLR) and Service Line Management (SLM) 
A majority of middle managers in both hospitals in Iran mentioned that SLR and SLM were 
not implemented. Ali, the GM at Hospital M, explained that service line management (SLM) 
begins with service line reporting (SLR). Service lines refer to units that deliver the hospitals' 
services. Each unit focuses on specific medical conditions or procedures as well as their 
specialist clinicians while identifying resources, which include support services, staff, and 
finances. Ali stated that SLR could clearly define how each service works at both the 
operational as well as financial level. However, he explained that SLR was not embedded in 
the hospital and that the required financial resources of each unit were not completely 
identified. Therefore, it was difficult to estimate and secure funding for operational 
planning. He added: 
Full implementation of SLR and SLM could help us be productive. But at the moment, 
our operational planning is not backed by the required budgets. So I can deliver the 
plans as long as I can get funds; otherwise I won’t be able to deliver them. (Ali, GM, 
hospital M) 
Similarly, in Hospital Z, regarding SLR and SLM implementation, Reza (the MM) stated that 
they do not have the accurate budgeting to measure their savings efficiently and identify 
the areas to reinvest those savings. Shirin (another MM at Hospital M) supported the view 
of earlier middle managers. According to her, there was a lack of budget to execute 
operational planning. She mentioned that she had autonomy in all aspects except for those 
involving budget. According to her, they had to restrict the strategic plan for their EFQM 
[European Foundation for Quality Management] where it required the budget. 
Although most of the middle managers in both hospitals mentioned that they did not have 
financial autonomy, they explained that granting autonomy to hospitals gave them the 
opportunity to get charities involved and get funding in some areas.  
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They [charities] helped our hospital to a great extent. We've renovated a number of 
our wards with their financial support. (Cyrus, Finance Manager, Hospital M)  
I could get the required financial support from charities to develop the waiting area of 
our A&E. And because it did not have any financial implication for the hospital, I did 
not have to go through the hierarchy to get it done. (Majid, Hospital Z) 
Leila (a middle manager at Hospital M) also mentioned she lacked autonomy in the 
marketing issue. According to her, the request for procurement of equipment goes up and 
down the hierarchy before it is delegated to her. She stated that she did not have the 
autonomy to make decisions regarding the purchasing of required equipment and that she 
needed the permission of senior managers. 
Middle managers made a reference to the implementation of the accrual accounting system 
in hospitals. Accrual accounting measures the performance of the hospital by recognising 
economic events regardless of when cash transaction occurs. On the contrary, cash 
accounting recognises transactions only when there is an exchange of cash. Middle 
managers stated that the accrual accounting system implemented has obliged them to 
consider their budget prior to purchasing. Their emphasis was that the implementation of 
the accrual accounting system had curtailed their financial autonomy.  
5.1.2.2. Policy Autonomy  
 
Middle managers in the Iranian hospitals had contradictory views on their autonomy in 
terms of policy. They stated that they had autonomy to contribute to policymaking. Kian 
who serves as the manager of Research and Education at Hospital Z mentioned that he 
appointed a doctor to supervise and monitor the performance of junior doctors. Thus, 
depicting the kind of authority middle managers enjoy in that hospital.  
A special committee is held every two months at both hospitals. Middle managers are 
encouraged to attend this committee and have their say to improve the content and 
structure of the service delivery process. When middle managers have an idea to improve 
the processes and sub-processes of service delivery in the hospital, they are given rewards. 
However, middle managers said they were not provided with the required budgets to 
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implement their ideas. According to Shirin, at Hospital M, managers were encouraged to 
suggest ways of improving the service delivery process as long as it did not involve budgets. 
Ashkun who serves as treatment manager at Hospital Z added: 
Strategies are being formulated, but you are never sure whether those strategies 
become operational, especially due to the financial implication they have for 
hospitals. (Ashkun, Treatment Manager, Hospital Z) 
HR policies  
On the other hand, middle managers also stated that they felt frustrated by HR policies. For 
example, according to the HR policies, the working hours of nurses in the hospitals should 
have been reduced, as illustrated in the following table, since September 2012:  
Job experience 
(years) 
Reduced working 
hours (per week) 
0–4 1 
4–8 2 
8–12 3 
12–16 4 
16 and over 5 
Table 5.1. Source: Adapted from policy document of Hospital M 
 
This policy was centrally made to help nurses balance their work and personal life, as most 
of them are in their late 20s and 30s and they have young families. Middle managers stated 
that they were in agreement with this policy as long as they had autonomy to recruit more 
nurses. However, the recruitment entails a long process. So, middle managers had not 
reduced the working hours of their nurse staff due to the low number of the nurses in the 
hospital. However, it seemed that middle managers’ resistance to policies was restricted, as 
the following quote illustrates:  
The maternity leave of the staff has increased; however, we cannot afford to get 
temporary staff to substitute them. This puts a lot of pressure on the staff who have 
to cover the work of their colleagues on leave. (Mina, Hospital Z) 
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Central policies 
According to the hospital middle managers, central policies in Iran have two key features; 
vagueness and inconsistency. Some of the middle managers in Iran complained about the 
lack of clarity of some of the centrally determined policies. They said that this caused 
ambiguity. It seems that middle managers prefer to have a policy in place on individual 
cases. According to Mohammad, the HR manager at hospital M: 
One of our main issues is that, unfortunately, during recent years, the policies that are 
made by the Ministry of Health are ambiguous, while they were clearer previously. We 
knew exactly what a specific policy wanted us to do. But now they are vague and 
problematic. Sometimes, we do something and then realise that we've been doing 
wrong. (Mohammad, HR Manager, Hospital M) 
According to middle managers in Iran, policies were not consistent and they were not 
implemented fully before the next policy was formulated. According to Ahmad, working in 
the HR department at hospital Z: 
Recently [one month ago], we received an HR agenda based on which our staff who 
have been working on long-term contracts are now eligible to become permanent. 
The number of these staff in this hospital is around two hundred and twenty. We 
started changing their recruitment status in line with this policy, but two days ago we 
received another agenda that nurses' and healthcare assistants' contracts should not 
be changed. This is a waste of time and energy. (Ahmad, HR, Hospital Z) 
Mohammad, the HR manager in the payroll department of Hospital M, mentioned that a 
new national pay system for healthcare staff was introduced in 2008. This aimed to 
harmonise the staff pay scales and career progression arrangements. However, this was not 
fully implemented. Therefore, they had to deal with the staff's payments such as overtime 
and remuneration based on the previous rules and regulations. So, it seems that middle 
managers prefer to embrace institutional routines to avoid uncertainty, rather than acting 
as street-level bureaucrats. 
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5.1.2.3. Structural Autonomy 
 
Middle managers in Iran are accountable to the hospital's director of operation as well as 
the managers of the medical university of the province for the support and development 
(the position is similar to the director of the operation in English cases). The managers of 
medical universities are ‘support and development' managers who supervise the 
performance of all the hospitals of the province. So, the middle managers' decision making 
is controlled not only by senior managers of the hospital but also by the managers of the 
medical university.  
Organisational structure  
The organisational structure of hospitals is established at the ministry level. Middle 
managers mentioned that they had the autonomy to make some changes in the hospital 
structure with prior consultation with their seniors. Management structures of hospitals are 
slightly different. According to Ashkun, the treatment manager at hospital Z, the boundaries 
of each manager's work are defined in the organisational structure chart. However, some 
specific roles might not exist in the organisational chart of other hospitals. For instance, in 
Hospital Z, according to Ashkun, it was a local decision to have a ‘manager of treatment 
affairs' who reports to the deputy medical director (Ashkun, Treatment Manager, Hospital 
Z). 
Despite the changes in the hospital structures, middle managers stated that the structure of 
hospitals with the Board of Trustees (BTs) was still hierarchical. Maria at hospital M asserted 
that though she was able to take decisions, she needed to consult her seniors to approve. 
Jasmine, the middle manager at hospital Z, also made a reference to the extant bureaucracy 
and stated: 
Here we have to go through the hierarchy. If we want to make a change, we would 
coordinate that with managers level by level. 
Middle managers are also allowed to make some changes in the job description of their line 
managers according to their local needs. However, they need to meet the requirements of 
national policies and initiatives. Middle managers stated that this had caused tension and 
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contradiction. For instance, there were cases where middle managers upgraded or 
promoted their staff to encourage them to take more responsibility according to their local 
needs. However, they could not secure funding to support those staff financially. Some of 
the middle managers mentioned that they vire between budgets to be able to pay their 
staff.  
Lines of hierarchy and accountability  
Hospitals with the Board of trustees (semi-autonomous hospitals) had the authority to 
operate without the interference of medical university of the province. Up until 2011, 
hospital managers received their budget directly from the Ministry of Health. They were 
accountable to the board of directors of the hospital and an independent organisation that 
monitors the hospital's financial performance. However, this did not last, as there are still 
lines of hierarchy and accountability between hospitals and the medical university of the 
province. It seems that Medical universities are willing to keep a tight rein on the hospitals 
to be able to bail out those who have not been able to deliver their plans. They receive 
income from hospitals, reduce ten percent of that income, and redistribute it to those 
hospitals.  
Middle managers in both hospitals said that the inception of the board of trustees (i.e. 
granting autonomy to hospitals) was a good policy. According to them, it helped managers 
to formulate and implement policies at the local level. Ashkun mentioned that he was 
working in a hospital, which was one of the first-wave applicants of autonomous status in 
Tehran in 2006. This hospital was granted financial autonomy and its management 
structures changed.  According to him: 
The hospital income increased steadily along with the rate of patient and staff 
satisfaction. However, unfortunately, lack of budget brought this to a halt. (Ashkun, 
Treatment Manager, Hospital Z) 
Jasmine (middle manager at Hospital Z) stated that before autonomy was granted to 
hospital managers, the performance of her department was under greater scrutiny by 
senior managers. However, at the time of the interview, she said her department (planning 
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and performance improvement) was known as an independent unit that provides guidance 
and support to the rest of the organisation.  
Mohammad (middle manager at Hospital M) also agreed with the advantages of the BT 
status. According to him, the patients have been benefited due to the change in the 
management structures as a result of being BTs. He also added that the service delivery has 
become instant as the hospital directly received its budget from the ministry instead of the 
medical university. This, according to Mohammad, was one of the reasons for the increase 
in staff and patient satisfaction. Comments like these were rare. However, Ali, the general 
manager at Hospital M, stated:  
Autonomous status was used as a tool for bending the rules. It gave managers the 
opportunity to go around the regulations and the medical university’s intervention. 
In my view, it reduced the hospitals’ productivity. For instance, there were cases in 
which some project managers contracted with three different suppliers to do a 
single project in three stages, and they charged hospital two or three times higher 
than the real value.  
 
5.1.2.4. Interventional Autonomy 
 
In order to elicit the perception of middle managers on their interventional autonomy, they 
were asked about their contribution to the strategies of their hospitals, in Iran. Middle 
managers explained that they contribute to develop the strategic and operational planning 
of the hospital and its departments using the SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, 
threats) analysis model. However, those plans should be in line with the medical university’s 
strategies. Mina, the nurse manager at Hospital Z, explained that they had a long-term plan 
to train some of their male staff within the wards to provide intimate clinical interventions 
to the same gender nurses for. Therefore,, they arranged a separate unit with the male 
nursing staff who were willing to take part in the plan. Thus, they provided relevant training 
courses to the male nurses and prepared to serve the male patients. 
However, the main problem, according to most of the middle managers was that the 
financial implications of some of those strategies were underestimated. Therefore, middle 
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managers had to delay some of their operational plans until they could secure funding for 
the implementation of those plans. In these cases, middle managers were not subject to 
evaluation. Ali, the general manager at Hospital M, explained that operational budgeting 
should have been the prerequisite of operational planning; and without funds, the 
operational plan was not valuable. According to him, they were supposed to deliver ten 
plans during a year under their strategic planning. However, they could only afford to 
deliver three, which was not productive. Leila also mentioned that they had to delay some 
of their plans due to lack of the required funds. (Leila, MM, Hospital M).  
Senior managers 
Another issue mentioned by middle managers that restricted their interventional autonomy 
was senior managers. Some of the middle managers prefer to have shared decision making 
with senior managers to reduce the resistance and spread the possible risk of the outcomes.  
Six months ago, my service manager retired, and I wanted to promote one of my 
deputy service managers into that role. I had a prior consultation with my senior 
manager to justify my decision. (Ali, GM, Hospital M) 
Middle managers also stated that the turnover of senior managers was high. This led to 
constant re-negotiation of autonomy. On the other hand, some of the senior managers 
replace middle managers when they take their position at hospitals, no matter how good 
those middle managers have been performing. Senior managers also supported this view 
that due to the ongoing managerial reforms, it was hard to plan for long-term. The new 
reform begins before implementing the previous one. WOne of the reasons might be the 
high turnover of senior managers who plays a crucial role in implementing those plans.' 
(Nima, SM, Hospital Z) 
In general, middle managers in Iran have reporting requirements against the hospital’s goals 
and norms. They are subject to be monitored and evaluated by their senior managers within 
the hospital. They participate in monthly meetings, as well as informal face-to-face meetings 
with their seniors. Their performance is evaluated against their job descriptions as well as 
locally negotiated responsibilities. In addition to the senior managers of hospitals, 
occasionally, middle managers are also accountable to the senior managers of the medical 
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university of the province.  
5.1.3. Comparative analysis between England and Iran 
 
Based on the findings presented above, this section provides a comparison between 
hospitals in both countries. First, the extent of hospital autonomy in the two countries is 
presented (Table 5.2) according to the hospital autonomy framework developed by Bossert 
(1998). The data have been gathered through interviews (with senior managers, middle 
managers and key individuals like financial and HR managers) and document analysis. After 
that, the extent of middle managers’ autonomy in the two countries is explained.
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Table 5.1 Hospital autonomy in England and Iran 
 England Iran 
Functions Hospital G Hospital H Hospital Z Hospital M 
 
 
 
 
 
Service 
organisation 
Required 
programme  
e.g., QIPP 
 
 
e.g., QIPP 
 
EFQM 
New accreditation 
system  
EFQM 
New accreditation system 
May be able to 
modify the required 
plan  
May be able to modify 
the required plan 
Is able to modify the 
required plan  
Is able to modify the 
required plan 
 
Insurance plan  Not applicable  Not applicable  No control over 
insurance plan  
No control over insurance 
plan 
Contracting  Is able to enter into 
contracts with other 
organisations to 
deliver specified 
services(e.g. public 
private partnership) 
Is able to enter into 
contracts with other 
organisations to 
deliver specified 
services(e.g. public 
private partnership) 
Is able to enter into 
contracts with other 
organisations to 
deliver specified 
services(e.g. 
diagnostic services) 
Is able to enter into 
contracts with other 
organisations to 
deliver specified services( 
e.g. diagnostic services) 
Procurement 
of goods  
Is not able to procure 
locally goods and 
services (e.g., 
pharmaceuticals, 
equipment, supplies) 
Is not able to procure 
locally goods and 
services (e.g., 
pharmaceuticals, 
equipment, supplies) 
Is not able to procure 
locally goods and 
services (e.g., 
pharmaceuticals, 
equipment, supplies) 
Is not able to procure 
locally goods and services 
(e.g., pharmaceuticals, 
equipment, supplies) 
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Table 5.1 Hospital autonomy in England and Iran 
 England  Iran  
Functions Hospital G Hospital H Hospital Z Hospital M 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HR 
Management  
Civil service  Is able to decide 
compensation 
package and 
determine terms 
of 
Employment  
Is able to decide 
compensation 
package and 
determine terms 
of 
Employment 
Is not  able to decide 
compensation package 
and determine terms of 
Employment 
Is not  able to decide 
compensation package 
and determine terms of 
Employment 
Contracting (with 
individuals) 
and provider 
payment 
mechanisms 
Is able to contract 
with clinicians ( 
e.g., bank and 
agency staff) and 
non-clinicians  
Is able to contract 
with clinicians ( 
e.g., bank and 
agency staff) and 
non-clinicians 
Is able to contract with 
clinicians ( e.g., 
temporary  nurse staff) 
and non-clinicians ( e.g., 
support services) 
Is able to contract with 
clinicians ( e.g., 
temporary  nurse staff) 
and non-clinicians (e.g., 
support services) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial 
Management  
Expenditure  Is able to 
determine 
budgetary 
allocations (e.g., 
planning, 
budgeting and 
execution) 
Is able to 
determine 
budgetary 
allocations (e.g., 
planning, 
budgeting and 
execution) 
Is not able to  determine 
budgetary allocations 
(e.g., 
planning, budgeting and 
execution) 
Is not able to  determine 
budgetary allocations 
(e.g., 
planning, budgeting and 
execution) 
Sources of 
revenue  
Is able to use 
funds raised  
Is able to use 
funds raised 
Is not able to  use funds 
raised ( is only able to 
vire between budgets)  
Is not able to  use funds 
raised( is only able to 
vire between budgets) 
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5.1.3.1. Hospital autonomy in England and Iran 
 
Table 5.2 shows the similarities and differences of the hospitals in both countries. As it 
shows, the first function  is the ‘required programme’ is one of the service organisation’s 
function. In this regard, it can be argued that hospitals in both countries are undergoing the 
quality improvement and quality assurance movements. The respondents’ accounts and 
documents show that in England QIPP targets and in Iran EFQM are implemented.  Also, 
hospitals in Iran are being accredited according to the new accreditation system since 2014. 
Therefore, hospitals now need to adhere to the standards of the new accreditation system. 
Hence, they are now subject to an extreme monitoring system compared to the past.  
The difference lies between the ability to modify the required programme. For instance, in 
the accounts of middle managers in England, they repeatedly made a reference to the 
centrally dictated targets in the areas of quality improvement and quality assurance that 
they need to meet. They can modify the required plans as long as they meet the centrally 
dictated targets. However, in Iran, middle managers mentioned that they have voluntarily 
implemented the EFQM as a quality improvement programme. Some stick to the previously 
established plans when they feel uncertain about how to implement the new plans. 
Another function of hospitals’ service organisation is insurance plan. In England, hospitals do 
not deal with this function as healthcare is tax-funded and delivered for free. However, in 
Iran, patients need to have an insurance coverage or pay for their services as an out-of-
pocket payment. Hospitals do not have control over the insurance plan. Hence, they have a 
limited autonomy to provide uninsured services. 
Hospitals in England and Iran can enter into contracts with other organisations to deliver 
specified services. For instance, middle managers in England work in partnership with other 
hospitals. They refer their patients to those hospitals for specific services. Similarly, 
according to the respondents in Iran, hospitals enter into contracts with other organisations 
to provide services such as diagnostic services. This gives a degree of autonomy to the 
managers in both countries to organise their service delivery.  
One common issue for the hospital managers in both countries is the procurement of goods. 
Hospital managers including middle managers are not able to procure their goods such as 
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pharmaceutical and equipment locally. In both countries, the autonomy of hospitals over 
the marketing issues is limited. They need to procure their goods from the suppliers 
assigned by higher authorities. 
Regarding the human resource management, FTs in England and BTs in Iran can work on 
contractual agreement. For example, nurses and non-clinicians such as support services staff 
can be on a contract to compensate the staff shortages. The difference is that FTs in England 
have the ability to decide the compensation package and determine terms of employment. 
Even though, FTs are not willing to do so, as they are likely to face resistance from unions 
and open themselves up to equal pay claims and public opinions. Contrary to the FTs, BTs in 
Iran cannot decide the compensation package and determine terms of employment. 
Therefore, hospitals’ autonomy over the HR issues is more limited in Iran compared to 
England.  
In the areas of financial management, FTs have the autonomy to allocate their budgets, 
while BTs’ budgets allocation is determined by the medical university of the province.  BTs 
are autonomous to generate revenues but are not able to use the fund raised without 
higher authorities’ permission. They can only vire between the budgets.  
 
5.1.3.2. Middle managers’ autonomy in England and Iran  
 
Managerial Autonomy in HRM 
 
Middle managers in both England and Iran are restricted in the areas of HR management. 
For instance, they cannot dismiss a member of staff without permission and without going 
through the formal process. However, in terms of recruitment, middle managers in Iran are 
more limited than their counterparts in England. Middle managers in England can recruit 
the established vacancies. For example, Andrew at Hospital G hired two pharmacists 
without going through the formal process, while middle managers in Iran cannot recruit 
even if there is a vacancy.  
Conversely, middle managers in Iran appear to have more autonomy over promoting and 
motivating their staff compared to middle managers in England. In the Iranian cases, staff 
promotions can take place locally, and hospitals may pay the promoted staff (the gap in 
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their salaries) under a different heading. However, in England, staff should go through the 
formal process and apply for a new position to get a promotion. Although there might be 
some negotiation between the candidates and the middle managers before applying for the 
new post, promotion cannot take place without staff going through the formal application 
process.  
Middle managers in England did not report consistent view on their willingness to delegate 
responsibilities to their subordinates. Some of them are in favour of delegation while others 
are willing to insert control. It seems that the financial status of the directorates or divisions 
is a determining factor, affecting the middle managers’ willingness to delegate the 
responsibilities to their staff. Middle managers in Iran rather emphasised on the lack of 
training for the staff as the main reason for not delegating the responsibilities to their staff. 
According to them, the member of staff did not have the required skills to tackle the new 
responsibilities.  
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Table 5.2 
Managerial 
Autonomy in HRM 
England Iran 
Staff Recruitment Middle Managers can recruit 
vacancy replacement and 
administrative staff of Band 3 
or 4 without permission from 
executive team 
Middle managers in Iran cannot 
make recruitment decisions and 
had to request senior managers.  
Staff Restructuring Middle managers can 
restructure staff in 
consultation with HR in their 
division as long as it falls 
under the budget. 
They had room to restructure 
their staff, change their 
arrangement, determine what 
they need to do, and how to do it. 
Staff Dismissal Middle managers in NHS do 
not have the authority to 
dismiss a staff member. 
Middle managers do not have 
autonomy to dismiss a staff 
member. There is a formal 
investigation process in place, 
and it has to be approved by 
senior managers at the medical 
university.  
 
Staff Motivation 
(salaries/promotions) 
Middle managers ask the staff 
to go through the formal 
process to get promoted. 
MMs cannot offer financial 
incentives. 
Middle managers in Iran are in 
the position to take decisions 
locally about the conditions for 
promoting staff. 
Delegation  The main reason for not 
delegating is financial status. 
The main reason for not 
delegating is the lack of skills on 
the side of the staff. 
Managing sickness 
absence  
Middle managers feel 
restricted by the policies they 
need to go through to handle 
the staff’s sickness absence. 
Middle managers feel restricted 
by the lack financial support to 
cover the staffs that are absent. 
 Table 5.3 Managerial Autonomy in HRM 
 
Managerial Autonomy in Financial Management 
 
Middle managers in both English and Iranian cases have to stay within the predetermined 
financial envelope. However, in both countries, there are cases where middle managers vire 
between budgets and take up entrepreneurial roles. For instance, they buy equipment (as 
Anne, Simon, and Margaret explained) and they pay staff’s overtime (as Ahmad and Cyrus 
mentioned). According to Iranian middle managers in both cases, financial measurement 
techniques (such as SLM and SLR) had not been implemented in their hospitals. However, 
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middle managers at Hospital G and Hospital H in England had different views. Apparently, in 
Hospital H, the same level of understanding regarding the implementation of those 
techniques among middle managers and finance managers did not exist. On the other hand, 
middle managers at Hospital G stated that they were frustrated with the lack of financial 
support they received. The comparison of different factors of financial autonomy in both 
countries is given as below. 
Table 5.3 Managerial Autonomy in Financial Management 
 
Managerial 
Autonomy in 
Financial 
Management 
England Iran 
Types of financial 
accounts 
Middle managers have two 
budgets: revenue (day to day 
running costs) and capital 
(overall trust investment) 
budget.  
Middle managers have two 
budgets: Medical University budget 
(day to day) and annual income 
budget (spent according to 
business development plans). 
Control over 
purchase 
Middle managers have the 
flexibility to purchase as long 
as they stay within their 
financial envelope without 
getting a sign-off. 
As long as middle managers stay 
within their financial envelope, 
they have the flexibility to buy 
what they want without getting a 
sign-off. 
Carry forward 
surplus 
Middle managers cannot carry 
forward the surpluses they 
make. However, the surplus 
goes to the trust budget at the 
end of each financial year.  
Middle managers are unable to 
carry the unspent budget to the 
following year. They have to return 
this amount to the medical 
university, and in the next year, 
they need to apply for that budget 
under a different heading. 
Shift budget 
within accounts 
In case managers can over-
perform and make a large 
amount of savings, they can 
ask to shift part of the budget 
from revenue to capital. 
Middle managers are able to vire 
between budgets to pay for staff 
overtime but again with seniors’ 
permission.  
Service line 
reporting 
Not consistently applied 
across all the hospitals. 
A majority of middle managers in 
both hospitals in Iran mentioned 
that service line reporting (SLR) and 
service line management (SLM) 
were not implemented. 
Increase hospital 
services 
The managers are not able to 
increase the services as the 
commissioners have limited 
the number of the services. 
Middle managers are able to 
increase the number of services 
they provide and increase their 
annual income. 
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 Policy Autonomy  
 
Middle managers in both Iran and England face restrictions regarding policy autonomy. 
Middle managers in the NHS were of the view that the centrally set policies undermined 
their autonomy regarding their ability to exercise authority. However, middle managers in 
Iran in both hospitals had contradictory views on policy autonomy. Middle managers at all 
the hospitals visited in both the countries presented their resentment on the HR policies. 
According to them, the HR policies were ambiguous and inconsistent at times. Also, it did 
not allow the middle managers to perform different functions relating to managing their 
human resource. Following is a brief comparison of the state of policy autonomy in both 
countries: 
Table 5.4 
Policy Autonomy England Iran 
Policy Autonomy The middle managers in both 
hospitals of England stated 
that they were restricted by 
centrally determined policies 
and procedures. 
Middle managers in the Iranian 
hospitals had opposite views on 
autonomy regarding policy 
autonomy. 
HR Policies Middle managers in England 
expressed their frustration 
with HR policies.  
Middle managers stated that they 
felt frustrated by HR policies as 
they were ambiguous and 
inconsistent. 
Policy Restrictions Middle managers were 
restricted in two ways: Firstly, 
in their room to manoeuvre 
the centrally set standards; 
Secondly, lack of financial, HR, 
and IT support to be able to 
go through policies and 
procedures. 
According to the middle managers 
in Iran, if the new central policies 
are ambiguous, they stick to the 
previous policies of which they 
have more confidence. 
Table 5.5 Comparison of autonomy in policy for both countries 
 
Structural Autonomy 
 
In all four cases, the structures of hospitals are considered as hierarchical by middle 
managers. In Iran, the middle managers’ structural autonomy has been affected by the lines 
of hierarchy and accountability towards senior managers of both hospitals (e.g. director of 
operations) and medical university (e.g. directors of support and development). In England, 
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it seems that middle managers at Hospital H with divisional structure reported more 
structural autonomy compared to the middle managers at Hospital G with directorate 
structure.  
Table 5.5 
Structural 
Autonomy 
England Iran 
Accountability In the English cases, there are 
two different structures: 
directorate and divisional. The 
directorate is run by a 
management team, including 
a clinical director, a head of 
nursing, and a general 
manager. General managers 
directly report to clinical 
directors. They are also 
accountable to the director of 
the operation at the board 
level. The division is run by 
the divisional director, nursing 
managers and divisional 
operation manager. The 
divisional director is the 
ultimate point of decision 
making at the divisional level 
and reports directly to the 
director of the operation 
(which is at the board level).   
Middle managers in Iran are 
accountable to the hospital’s 
director of operation as well as the 
managers of the medical university 
of the province for the support and 
development. 
Change Structures The middle managers were 
not autonomous to make 
changes in the structure and 
will have to consult with all 
the directorates to pass the 
changes.  
Middle managers mentioned that 
they have the autonomy to make 
some changes in the structure with 
a prior consultation with their 
seniors. 
Hospital Structures Middle managers had split 
views and they said that the 
hospitals are hierarchical as 
well as flat at the same time. 
Despite the changes in the hospital 
structures, middle managers stated 
that the BTs are still hierarchical. 
Table 5.6 Structural Autonomy 
Interventional Autonomy 
 
According to the middle managers in all four hospitals, their autonomy to design strategic 
objectives is restricted by several external authorities. For instance, in England, middle 
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managers were restricted by internal and external interventions in the NHS. In Iran, the 
middle managers had to keep their strategies in-line with the decisions of the medical 
university. Also, hospitals in both countries faced different monitoring and evaluation 
mechanisms put in place by the senior managers. Following is a brief comparison of 
interventional autonomy in both countries.  
Table 5.6 
Interventional 
Autonomy 
England Iran 
External 
Interventions 
Middle managers’ autonomy 
over formulating strategies 
was restricted by internal and 
external interventions as well 
as local policy, and what was 
going on in the rest of the 
NHS. 
Strategic planning of the Iranian 
middle managers should be in line 
with the decisions of Medical 
University’s strategy.  
Performance 
Monitoring 
Middle managers are subject 
to monitoring through 
monthly performance review 
meetings. They are also 
constrained by centrally 
driven targets and standards 
and policies. 
In general, middle managers in Iran 
have reporting requirements 
against the hospital’s goals and 
norms. They are subject to 
monitoring and evaluation by their 
senior managers within the 
hospital. 
Table 5.7 Interventional autonomy in both countries 
5.1.4. Summary  
 
Considering the autonomy framework of Verhoest et al. (2004), it can be argued that middle 
managers in all four cases have unbalanced autonomy. In the English hospitals, while they 
have more autonomy over managerial issues, such as human resources and finances, there 
is a lack of autonomy over policies and procedures. Middle managers are subject to 
intervention even when they are over-performing and growing their services. According to 
the middle managers, senior managers (including the finance team) and the external bodies 
(such as commissioners) restricted them to even increase the number of services they 
deliver. Despite the rhetoric of ‘let managers manage’ under new public management, 
managerial autonomy is limited by regular performance evaluation, where centralised and 
highly specified controls have been introduced. 
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 On the other hand, Iranian middle managers’ autonomy over financial and human resource 
management is limited. Although, they could contribute to the strategic management of 
financial and human resources, their ability to secure funding for their objectives is limited 
due to the increasing central control over inputs. In terms of policy autonomy, middle 
managers, to some extent, can enjoy dealing with more general principles in some areas. So, 
they might be able to affect norms and objectives set by the central government. However, 
in order to exercise policy autonomy, middle managers heavily rely on senior managers’ 
support. In other words, middle managers may exercise policy autonomy, if senior 
managers support them; otherwise, they would prefer to play safe. In all four cases, 
unbalanced autonomy causes tension and frustration for middle managers.  
The middle managers’ perception towards their autonomy reflects the similarities and 
differences of the structural elements of the two countries. These include the structure of 
the health system including hospitals, lines of hierarchies and accountabilities, rules and 
regulations. Scott (2001) categorises these elements as regulative pillars. In addition to 
these structural elements, as stated by the middle managers, there are also references to 
the cultural-cognitive and normative elements of the management reforms in the 
healthcare systems in both countries. To reveal the middle managers’ perception towards 
these issues, their views on their identities were elicited and explained in the next section of 
the research findings.  
 
5.2. Identity 
This section is about the views of middle managers on their background, role, 
responsibilities, and their perception towards their identities. Middle managers’ beliefs 
were captured in this study, as it is argued (Scott, 2001; Hales 1999) that interpretive 
schemas in the form of cognitive rules (beliefs) inhibit and encourage the actions of 
managers. When managers function under these rules and use them, their practice 
becomes more meaningful. In other words, middle managers’ perception of themselves 
influences how they behave or how others expect them to behave.  
In the following section, the findings on middle managers' identity have been presented 
according to framework discussed earlier in the thesis. The first part is about the factors that 
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affect the identities of the middle manager. This study considers middle managers as 
‘institutional agents' (Scott, 2008) whose autonomy is dependent on the extent of their 
ability to create and apply the regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive institutions. 
Attention to middle managers as ‘institutional agents encourages the use of the 
organisational field level analysis,' (Scott, 2008, p.227) that can be addressed by the case 
study approach. The factors affecting the identity of middle managers are background, 
followed by extra individual factors like the division of hierarchies, the division of labour, 
reporting structure, organisational agent and finally organisational discourse. This study 
presents the middle managers' perspective on these factors. 
5.2.1. Individual factors and identity 
This section reflects middle managers’ reports on their background and how they identify 
themselves. It starts with the views of middle managers in England (first hospital G and then 
hospital H) followed by the views of Iranian middle managers of hospital M and hospital Z. 
Middle managers background and their identity in England (Hospital G) 
Ann is a general manager at Hospital G. She is a nurse by background. She was trained in 
1997–2000 and had performed various nursing roles. She was working in Derby as a nurse 
when she was asked to take up a project role to do theatre utilisation and reschedule 
theatres. After two years, she became a service manager. Then she moved to London and 
got the deputy general management position at Hospital G. Her general manager left, and 
she became the acting general manager overnight. However, she felt that she needed to be 
at the deputy general manager level for longer, so she stepped aside and applied for 
another deputy general manager post. She stayed in that position for six months before she 
came into her current position (general manager at Hospital G). In short, she has performed 
her roles as a nurse, project manager, service manager, deputy general manager (two jobs), 
and general manager.  
In her account, Ann stated that she did not have any intention to become a manager, but 
she was asked and encouraged to be a manager. According to her, she did the theatre 
utilisation project for a few months, and she did well in that project. After two years, as she 
wanted to go back to nursing, she was encouraged to take the role of service manager. 
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According to her, she never planned on going to a managerial role. Ann acknowledged that 
she liked being a nurse and sometimes missed her job too. However, she was also happy 
with her managerial role. She added that she had a wonderful team of clinicians, service 
managers, and theatre staff and they got along very well.  
Ann said her background as a nurse had given her good insight into the clinical aspects of 
service delivery. Knowing the clinical and safety issues as well as financial aspects of the 
services, Ann states that this is a great privilege for a manager. Rather than talking about 
role conflict, Ann referred to the notions of ‘visibility’ and ‘credibility’ that she had gained in 
her job as a manager. According to her report, she has used the general management role 
to gain influence in decision making and to build professional legitimacy in a historically 
medically-dominated health organisation. Ann stated that she had a good relationship with 
clinicians and described her team as a ‘tripartite family’ who work together and make 
decisions as a team. According to her, this gives her more room to be herself.  
I think it makes me more visible, so I’m not scared to get my hands dirty if a patient 
complains. Then I’m happy to meet the relatives, so I go and try to find out what’s 
going on.... So I think it’s a very good thing (Ann, GM, hospital G, Line 526) 
Ann said she considered herself a senior manager. John also a clinical manager confidently 
said that he was a senior manager. John started his job in the NHS as a porter when he was 
18. He became a healthcare scientist and a healthcare science manager later on. He then 
took an MBA course and moved into a general management position. John stated that 
moving into band 8 and above, he started having an influence as a senior manager. He said 
that ‘general managers are definitely senior managers’. 
The important role of background in the identity formation of middle managers in the NHS 
is also evident in the account of general managers with non-clinical backgrounds as well. 
Sue, a GM at Hospital G stated that she knew nothing about the NHS, even the simplest of 
the things like changing forms and hiring somebody. She added that she had to learn all the 
things ‘quite painfully’. Ann (GM at Hospital G with a nursing background) also supports this 
view. According to Ann: 
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“If you don't have an understanding of the NHS, you haven’t grown up in the NHS, 
you haven’t walked in peoples’ shoes, and I think it’s more difficult. And I saw some 
of my colleagues who come and say that the management training schemes take 
them a little while to adapt to understand my certain perspectives and of clinical 
staff. (Line, 292) 
Unlike Ann, Sue came from the commercial sector to Hospital G seven years ago (before the 
time of the study). As a graduate in business studies, she was a customer service manager; 
divisional manager, operations manager, and director of photo processing laboratories. 
After that, she took her master’s fellowship in lean manufacturing, which included a year in 
the industry, and she chose the NHS. Then she went to the Hospital G to lead the 18-week 
change team, following which she became the general manager. Sue said she was a middle 
manager.  
Simon, who has come from a military background, became a general manager of clinical 
imaging directorate at Hospital G two years ago. Before that, he had never been a general 
manager, and this directorate did not have a general manager before Simon. He considered 
himself a senior manager. 
All female general managers at Hospital G identified themselves as middle managers. 
However, among four male general managers, just one of them (named Jack) confidently 
said that he was a middle manager. He was stated as one of the most successful middle 
managers by his senior managers, who had good managerial as well as financial skills. Jack 
completed his management training schemes in 2003. He has been in Hospital G since 2010. 
In addition to his own directorate, Jack was recently asked to run another challenging 
directorate that has failed to deliver its business delivery plan.  
Managers who identified themselves as senior managers claimed to have more autonomy 
compared to those managers who thought they were middle managers. For example, John, 
who has worked his way up through the hospital hierarchy to become a general manager, 
stated that he was a senior manager and was autonomous. He asserted that he could effect 
change within his directorate and once he decided to make things happen, he had complete 
freedom to act within his directorates. According to him: 
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If you are dedicated and you genuinely want something, and you go after it, then 
you get it, and I think again that’s another trait of senior managers and strong 
leaders (John, GM, Hospital G, line 838). 
Middle managers background and their identity in England (Hospital H) 
Rose (Divisional Director at Hospital H) has a clinical background. She was originally a nurse 
and then a midwife. She entered in management in the 1990s. She has been in a general 
management role for the last 15 years. Rose was a general manager up until two years ago 
when the hospital underwent reorganisation. The trust had three divisions. It integrated 
with the community provider, so the acute services and community services were brought 
together into a single division. The three divisions were retained, but the divisions had acute 
and community services after restructuring. As a divisional director, Rose described herself a 
senior manager.  
The other two divisional directors at hospital H also viewed themselves as senior managers. 
Douglas, who has been in this role for three-and-a-half years from before restructuring until 
now, said that he was ‘the chief executive of a third of the organisation’. Douglas has no 
clinical background. Before working at Hospital H, he worked in the voluntary sector, third 
sector social care organisations, and housing associations. 
Other than divisional directors, Jill who was a divisional operation manager also stated that 
she was a senior manager. Jill is a social policy master’s graduate. She started working as an 
information analyst in the Healthcare Commission 15 years ago. After that, she moved into 
the investigations team and then method development team in the then Healthcare 
Commission (now Care Quality Commission). She worked in a district general hospital on the 
outskirts of London before her current deputy general management role at Hospital H (four 
years ago). After the hospital restructuring, Jill became Divisional Operation Manager. She 
also considers herself a senior manager. 
The two other female operation managers (Maria and Lesley) were not as confident as Jill 
that they were senior managers. They had a less coherent sense of their position within the 
organisation. Maria was a radiographer. She came to Hospital H as the head of radiography 
fifteen years ago and then moved into management since 2003. Before her current position 
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(divisional operation manager), she was a general manager. Maria said that she was a senior 
manager, but she did not express that in a certain manner. This was obvious from what she 
said in response to a question relating to her position. 
I have a senior management role, but I’m not the divisional ops [operations] 
director. But I suppose [I’m a] middle manager with senior management experience 
… yeah, somewhere in between.  
Lesley also had a clinical background. She was a language and speech therapist. She came to 
Hospital H ten years ago as a stroke coordinator and has been operation manager for three-
and-a-half years. Her colleague Jill (another operation manager without clinical background) 
considered Lesley, a senior manager. For Jill, Lesley was even a few steps ahead of her 
because she was already known by people in the organisation before becoming an 
operation manager. 
In summary, middle managers in Hospital G, who had clinical background considered 
themselves as senior managers. Ann, who had a nursing background and currently was a 
general manager, said that her clinical background had given good insights into her job. 
According to her, it has helped her gaining influence in decision making and builds 
professional legitimacy in a medically dominated health organisation. Similarly, John who 
started working as a porter in NHS said that once managers move to band eight and above, 
they start having influence as senior managers. On the other hand, in Hospital H, managers 
with clinical background were not sure if they were senior managers. Maria, who was a 
radiographer in the past, said she was a senior manager but she was not sure. Similarly, 
Lesley, a clinical manager was not too sure if she was a senior manager. However, Jill who 
was a non-clinical manager considered herself a senior manager.  
Non-clinical Managers in hospital G considered themselves as middle managers. Sue who 
had a commercial background said that she was a middle manager, as she did not have the 
total authority delegated to her by senior managers. Another general manager Mary, with 
non-clinical background stated that the organisational hierarchies had made her a middle 
manager. However, at hospital H, non-clinical managers considered themselves as senior 
managers. Douglas, who has no clinical background, viewed himself the chief executive of 
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one-third of the organisation. Also, Jill who too did not have a clinical background 
considered herself a senior manager. Similarly, Eric, another divisional director at Hospital 
H, stated that he was a senior manager as his position was only one below the executive 
board.  
There is no consistent view among middle managers with the same background (either 
clinical or non-clinical) on their position within the hospitals. Comparing the middle 
managers' report on their identity in the two hospitals in England, it can be concluded that 
the impact of the career path and experience on the identity formation is stronger than the 
individuals' background. 
Middle managers background and their identity in Iran (Hospital M) 
This section gives a summary of middle managers’ report on their background and who they 
think they are.  
Ali is a general manager who joined Hospital M in 2010. He became a healthcare 
management graduate in 2002. He has taken an MBA course and had several general 
management roles in other hospitals prior to his current role. Ali stated that he regularly 
attended executive team meetings and believed that he was a middle manager. Ali informed 
that the hospital M had categorised its managers in three levels: senior managers, middle 
managers, and operation or frontline managers. According to him: 
Operation managers are those who supervise the operations and do what they are 
told to do. However, middle managers also contribute to the policymaking and goal 
setting. (Ali, Hospital M, line 45) 
Similarly, Mohamed who has a clinical background and currently an HR manager stated that 
he was an operational manager. He came to the healthcare system 25 years ago as a nurse. 
He served as a ward manager for four years. After that, he accomplished his Bachelors in 
Public Management and became service manager and then operation manager. Now he has 
been an HR manager for five years. According to him, since it was a university hospital, the 
senior managers were university level managers. The managers at the hospital level were 
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the middle and operational manager. According to his classification, he considered himself 
as an operational manager. 
Another middle manager, Zahra who has a nursing background, joined hospital M as a nurse 
in 2004. She has been in her current role as an operation manager for three years. Zahra can 
be considered as someone having multiple identities. According to her, she is dependent on 
the senior managers for taking decisions, and the senior managers make her feel a middle 
manager. However, she considers herself as a senior manager when senior managers are 
not around.  
Shirin has been in the healthcare system for more than 27 years. She was in the community 
centre for more than 16 years. Then she went to the medical university to implement a 
Total Quality Management (TQM) model. Following that, she went to Hospital M as the 
manager of planning and service development. She was brought to this hospital to 
implement the European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) model, which is a 
performance management tool widely applied in healthcare (Favaretti et al., 2015; Gomez-
Lopez et al., 2015). Shirin is a middle manager, but she considers herself as a member of the 
leadership team not a manager. 
Middle managers background and identity in Iran (Hospital Z) 
Mina is a nursing manager at Hospital Z. She has been in the healthcare system for more 
than 25 years. She has had several managerial roles for more than 12 years. She considers 
herself as a senior manager.  
Similarly, Jasmine said she was a senior manager. Jasmine is the youngest manager and has 
a non-clinical background. She has been the manager of planning and performance for 
about three and half years. She has done her postgraduate in healthcare management. She 
had also worked for social insurance before her current managerial role at Hospital Z. As she 
was a member of the senior management team, she considered herself a senior manager.  
Reza has been a general manager at hospital Z for more than five years. He joined the 
healthcare system 26 years ago as a health assistant and went on to build his career as a 
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manager. He completed his undergraduate and postgraduate degree in healthcare 
management. Reza described himself a middle manager. 
Among others, two of the middle managers used both factors of decision making and 
organisational chart to justify their position within the organisation. The first is Kian, the 
research and education manager. Kian started his work 20 years ago at Hospital Z as an 
operating theatre technician in 1995. After a few years, he took this managerial position. 
Kian positioned himself at the senior management level. 
The second manager, Ashkun, is a treatment manager at Hospital Z. He is a member of 
pathway change team and has a medical background. He has been in his current managerial 
role for about three years. He explained that he was lower than middle management level 
because financial and human resources were not available to him. So he was heavily relying 
on his boss to implement his plans.  
Majid is another middle manager at hospital Z. He was a healthcare scientist when he joined 
Hospital Z twenty years ago and worked his way up through the organisational hierarchies. 
He did his bachelor’s in ‘Occupational Psychology’. He has been in his current managerial 
role for about five years. Majid said he was a middle manager.  
Ahmad is the HR manager at hospital Z with a non-clinical background. He joined Hospital Z 
sixteen years ago in 1998. Ahmad has been in his current role for about four years. Ahmad 
said he was a senior manager. Unlike him, Mustafa the finance manager who has been 
working in the healthcare system for more than 24 years described himself as an 
operational manager. Throughout his career, Mustafa has been a finance manager at the 
both Medical University and hospital levels. Mustafa said he believed that only managers at 
the medical university level were seniors. With this category, he identified himself as an 
operational manager.  
5.2.1.1 Summary 
 
In summary, clinical managers in both Iranian hospitals had differing views on their identity. 
According to Zahra, a nurse by background, she can be considered as both middle and 
senior manager as her senior managers make her a middle manager. Similar is the case with 
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Leila, who also has a nursing background. Mohammad, despite having a nursing 
background, considered himself as an operational manager as he was based in the hospital. 
According to him, those who are based at the medical university are senior managers. 
Clinical managers in Hospital Z too had differing views on their identities.  For instance, Kian, 
the ‘research and education manager’ started his work at Hospital Z as an operating theatre 
technician in 1995. Kian positioned himself at the senior management level.  
Similarly, Mina said she was a senior manager. She is a nursing manager in the healthcare 
system for more than 25 years. She has had several managerial roles for more than 12 
years. On the other hand, Ashkun, a treatment manager at Hospital Z explained that he was 
lower than middle management level due to the lack of financial and human resources. 
Managers with non-clinical backgrounds had a similar trend in their responses to their 
identities. Cyrus, the finance manager at Hospital M, stated that he was just an operational 
manager as he had to implement the deliberate policies of the medical university within the 
hospital. Cyrus has been in the healthcare system for more than 20 years and in his current 
role for about four years. Still, he considered himself as an agent of the medical university.   
Shirin has been in the healthcare system for more than 27 years. She was in the community 
centre for more than 16 years. Shirin mentioned that she was neither a middle manager nor 
a senior manager. She said she believed to be a part of the leadership team, as she could 
contribute to the strategic planning of the hospital. Also, Jasmin, who worked in social 
insurance prior to the current job, considered herself as a senior manager.  
Based on the views of managers in both hospitals in Iran, the backgrounds of the managers 
had little to contribute to their identity as a middle or senior manager as different clinical 
manager and non-clinical managers considered themselves as both senior and middle 
managers. Similar to the English middle managers, it seems that career path and experience 
are important factors affecting the Iranian middle managers’ identity. The determinants of 
the managers' position within the organisation can also be viewed through various other 
factors, discussed further in this chapter. 
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5.2.2. Extra Individual Factors and middle managers’ identity  
 
In this section, the views of middle managers on the organisational factors (such as division 
of hierarchy, division of labour, reporting structure and organisational agents) affecting their 
identity are presented.  
5.2.2.1. Division of hierarchies and middle managers’ identity 
  
Division of hierarchy and middle managers’ identity England (Hospital G) 
Mary, the general manager in hospital G, came to the NHS in 2003 after her graduate 
management training scheme. According to her, the organisational hierarchies and power 
structure had positioned her in the middle stretch of the organisation. The rise in the size of 
the organisation has led to multiple and even contradictory identities for Mary: 
If you're a top manager, you get on, and you get to tell people what to get on with 
below you. If you are a front-line manager or first-line manager, you respond and tell 
your personnel what needs to happen. If you are a middle manager, you have it from 
both directions – you have a team of managers who are telling you what they need 
you to do, and it needs to happen; but you also have your top managers telling you 
what they need you to do and what they need to happen. So, I thought it was quite a 
nice description and also nicely demonstrates the difficulty of being a middle manager 
in a large organisation, because you are not the master of your own destiny. 
This is also the case for Margaret, the general manager of children's community services that 
was taken over by Hospital G in April 2011. Margaret thinks that she can be categorised as a 
senior manager in her directorate. However, within the organisation she can be listed as a 
middle manager. This difference of classification can be attributed to the various hierarchies 
above her. Margaret is a nurse by background and has been in the NHS for more than 30 
years. Having joined the acute services, Margaret talked about the ‘burgeoning bureaucracy' 
and that she ‘was not used to it in the community services’. According to her, she ‘did not 
feel less autonomous, however, she faced a high level of scrutiny and accountability in the 
acute services’. 
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General Managers in Hospital G manage several hundreds of staff, which is almost the same 
size as a typical district general hospital, but they have various hierarchies above them. On 
the other hand, due to the large size of the trust, general managers' decisions might have 
great implications on other directorates. They have to take those decisions to the board. 
This has led to the feeling that there is a burgeoning bureaucracy and that they are ‘not 
masters of their own destiny'. Therefore, it implies that they cannot be the decision makers 
and senior managers. 
Division of hierarchies and middle managers’ identity in England (Hospital H) 
Eric, the divisional director at Hospital H, stated that he was a senior manager as his position 
was only one below the executive board. Eric joined Hospital H about seven weeks before 
the time of the interview. He was a general manager in another Foundation Trust in London.  
Similar to Eric, two other divisional directors (Rose and Douglas) identified themselves as 
senior managers. As they stated, they attended ‘board meetings’ and ‘reported directly to 
the director of operations’. Although they are below the executive level, they are the chief 
executives of their divisions. They confidently stated that they were in the senior 
management position within the organisation. 
Lesley (Operation Manager at Hospital H) and Mary (General Manager at Hospital G) both 
had the same opinion regarding what made them middle managers. According to Lesley, she 
was a middle manager as she had people above her, telling her what to do.  
In Hospital H, HR managers were asked whether they considered divisional directors and 
operation managers as senior managers or middle managers. They explained that according 
to the banding structure, divisional directors and operation managers were band 8A and 
above. Therefore, they were considered as senior managers. 
Some of the middle managers in Hospital G from both clinical and non-clinical background 
considered organisational hierarchies and the power structure as the main determinant of 
their position within the organisation. According to the managers with a non-clinical 
background in Hospital G, the organisational structure plays a key role in managers' 
perception of their position within the organisation. The size of the organisation also is a key 
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to organisational structures and managers’ position within the organisation. For instance, 
Margaret who is a clinical manager stated that she could be considered as a senior manager 
in her directorate; however, she was a middle manager in the organisation. The hierarchies 
above them are what define their position within the organisation.  In Hospital H, there is 
not a large hierarchy above the divisional level and divisional directors report directly to the 
director of operations. These divisional directors considered themselves as senior managers. 
Division of hierarchies and middle managers’ identity in Iran (Hospital Z) 
 
Some of the middle managers identified their position within the organisation according to 
their organisational chart. For instance, Majid, the manager of employee relations and 
communication at Hospital Z made a reference to the responsibility chart and the 
responsibility structures. He considered himself a middle manager. Majid was a healthcare 
assistant when he joined Hospital Z twenty years ago and worked his way up through the 
organisational hierarchies. He has been in his current managerial role for about five years.  
Kian, the research and education manager used both factors of decision making and 
organisational chart to justify his position within the organisation. Kian positioned himself at 
the senior management level. In his interview, he talked about attending senior 
management team meetings and contributing to decisions of the hospital to emphasise his 
seniority: 
According to our organisational chart, I am a middle manager. But I attend senior 
management team meetings, I discuss the issues with them, I challenge them, and 
when it is needed, I criticise them. I am the member of most of the hospital 
committees. So, I think I am a senior manager. (Kian, the research and education 
manager, Hospital Z) 
Ahmad, an HR manager at Hospital Z since 1998 for about 16 years, said that these 
managers were not middle managers but seniors, as they manage several hundred staff 
members. According to Ahmad, these managers have to take lots of responsibility to make 
decisions in their jobs. Ahmad was also critical about the organisational chart and the post 
establishments. He said: 
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I believe that the organisational chart of this hospital [Hospital Z] should be amended. 
These managers are seniors, but their posts are not established as such because it has 
a great financial implication for both the medical university and hospital. It would 
increase their payment, remuneration; it would also affect their retirement and 
everything else. (Ahmad, HR manager at Hospital Z) 
Keeping in view of the managers in Hospital Z, we can assess that managers from both 
clinical and non-clinical background maintain that the hierarchies within the organisation 
are one of the key determinants of their identity.  
 
5.2.2.2. Division of Labour and middle managers’ identity  
 
The division of labour such as attending board meetings also has a visible effect on 
managers' perception of their position within the organisation. All managers with non-
clinical backgrounds who were involved in the key meetings and strategic planning 
considered themselves as senior managers. 
After the hospital restructuring, Jill became the divisional operation manager at Hospital H. 
She considered herself as a senior manager: 
I'm a senior manager of on-call rota, and I think I'm the lowest level of senior 
management in the trust. And I think you don't start getting into service manager at 
the 8A level and below. So there are people that are senior, but they only look after 
one area. Or there'll be more juniors looking after a broader range of areas. And so 
now, I consider myself a senior manager. (Jill, Divisional Operation Manager, Hospital 
H) 
 5.2.2.3. Reporting Structure and identity  
 
As in the case with the division of hierarchies and division of labour, reporting structure also 
contributes to the determination of middle managers' position within the organisation. The 
divisional directors at hospital H in England reported directly to the director of operations, 
and they considered themselves as senior managers. In hospital G, general managers 
reported directly to clinical managers and director of operation. So, managers identified 
their positions based on their reporting structures as well. In Iran, managers identified their 
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positions based on the responsibility chart of the organisation. For instance, as mentioned 
above, although Majid is an experienced manager and has worked his way up through the 
organisational hierarchies, still he considers himself a middle manager.  Similarly, Mustafa 
considers himself a middle manager as he has to report to the finance manager of the 
medical university. Both Mustafa and Majid are managers with non-clinical backgrounds.  
5.2.2.4. Organisational Agents and identity  
 
 England 
It is evident from the middle managers’ accounts that senior managers’ intervention has 
affected middle managers’ views on their identity. For instance, Sue, the GM at hospital G, 
considered herself as a middle manager because she did not have ‘the total authority 
delegated’ to her by senior managers. The impact of the power structure of the organisation 
on her position was evident in her account.  
We sometimes go to meetings and we are told we are the decision makers and 
everything else and we are whatever, but actually, we are not because the board 
makes the decisions; so I guess, yes. I am the middle manager. (Sue, GM, hospital G) 
Simon became general manager of clinical imaging directorate at Hospital G two years ago. 
He also said that he was not empowered enough to be the sole decision maker. He 
explained that there were flaws in the system that created a situation where he was 
empowered at one time and disallowed at the other. 
For Andrew, the GM in hospital G, it was more about the resources available to him. He 
referred to the notion of ‘clinical leadership’ and stated that his clinical director was an 
eminent clinician as well as a good leader. Andrew stated that the leadership skills of his 
clinical director and his involvement in managing and leading the clinical leads of his 
directorate made his job easier. He mentioned that he enjoyed a high degree of 
collaboration with his team and attributed that to his clinical director’s engagement in 
management. According to him, his colleague in another directorate did not benefit from 
such collaboration due to lack of clinicians’ engagement.  
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Iran 
Leila, the manager of research and education, stated that she was a middle manager. Leila 
had a nursing background and joined Hospital M in 2005. Leila considered herself a middle 
manager because she needed to consult with her senior managers especially regarding the 
plans that had a financial implication. Also, for Zahra, an operation manager at Hospital M, 
the intervention of senior managers gives her the sense that she is a middle manager. She 
added that her dependency on the senior managers made her a middle manager. 
 
In comparison, the managers in hospital G with non-clinical backgrounds mentioned the 
impact of senior manager intervention as a determinant of their identity. Sue, Simon and 
Andrew, GMs in hospital G, mentioned that senior managers made them a middle manager 
as they are unable to take a decision without the senior managers’ approval. However, only 
Andrew took this intervention positively as he said that the intervention from his senior 
clinical manager has made his job easier. On the other hand, in Iran, managers with a clinical 
background in hospital M stated that they were middle managers because they had to 
consult their seniors and this dependency made them a middle manager.  
 
5.3. Identity Work 
 
The notion of identity work helps the researcher explain why middle managers adopt a 
particular role or resist it. Through this concept, the responses of middle managers to the 
institutional elements (e.g., rules and resources) can be explained. According to the 
literature review, the managerial responses to multiple internal demands and identity 
claims can be categorised as deletion, compartmentalisation, aggregation, and integration 
(Johansen et al., 2015, p.4). Role claim can also be added to this classification (Creed et al. 
2010). The managers’ responses in England and Iran are reported according to this 
classification. 
5.3.1.  Deletion: 
 
Deletion can be referred to the removal of one or more institutional logics by the manager. 
For example, middle managers in hospital G were not willing to deal with some of the HR 
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issues such as of managing the sickness absence of their employees. In this regard, David, 
who is an HR manager (Head of Workforce Relations) at Hospital G, explained: 
They [MMs] don’t like having difficult conversations with an employee because they 
haven’t got the skill or they don’t feel that they’ve got the time, and what they do is 
just put it off – put it off and the problem continues and continues until something 
happens that makes it uncontrollable anymore. (Line 168) 
David also added that: 
what they don’t understand, and they only just started to realise, is that if you don’t 
manage people being off sick costs money, money spent on sickness absence means 
that money can be spent on clinical services, so at the end of the day, it’s patients’ 
care. (Line 180) 
One explanation might be that clinical managers are emotionally attached to their 
employees and consider them as their colleagues and friend. Hence, they are not willing to 
challenge their employees over sickness absence issues. This also might be related to the 
middle managers’ identification with their professional identity rather than managerial 
identity. Again, this makes them less willing to manage such HR issues.  
 
5.3.2. Compartmentalisation 
 
‘Compartmentalisation’ describes a strategy where the manager utilises different logics in 
different situations or settings, based on the situational requirements. Middle managers 
develop different identities in different situations. As reported by the middle managers at 
hospital M in Iran, they consider themselves as just operational managers while following 
the senior managers. However, when they can contribute to the strategies and policies, they 
consider themselves as senior managers. 
It seems that managers at hospital Z in Iran have fragmented identities. On one hand, they 
stated that they were seniors because they felt they were trusted and their views were 
respected. On the other hand, they stated that they were not empowered by their senior 
managers because they restricted middle managers’ interventional autonomy as well as 
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their managerial autonomy to use the resources. Therefore, they identified themselves as 
middle managers or even lower. Middle managers who stated that they ‘sold’ ideas to 
formulate strategies and policies said their views were valued. This is in line with the 
findings of the previous chapter on autonomy. Middle managers stated that they had policy 
autonomy, but they needed to be supported and to receive the resources to implement 
those policies.  
5.3.3. Aggregation 
 
Aggregation of multiple logics refers to the retaining of all logics ‘while forging links 
between them’. The responses from managers from all four hospitals depict that they linked 
different logics while performing their roles. Most of the middle managers in both hospitals 
in England mentioned that their main focus was on patients while enacting their managerial 
role. John (GM at Hospital G) stated:  
I think corporate businesses, well corporations with their very nature, they are 
driven by profits, and that’s their primary drive because they have shareholders – 
but as our...we don’t have the same driver, but in the financial aspects, we have to 
deliver. But our primary driver is care to patients, and that’s the difference I think we 
see in the focus of NHS managers in their decision making. 
Jane (another GM) also supports this view. According to her:  
Our number one objective is to provide the best patient experience in this city, so we 
are really focusing on that, and as part of that, supporting staff, because we see that 
as a kind of key part to delivering good patient care. And I guess in addition to sort of 
patient experience to waiting times and our external regulator and financial 
performance, there’s also the governance side of things and safety, so making sure 
all services are as safe as possible and also that the quality of the services is really 
good, too. There are lots of different aspects, and we have different people within 
the department; they lead in different areas, but yeah, as I said, it is a bit like 
managing a business. 
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Middle managers in both hospitals in England, especially those with clinical backgrounds, 
stated that their managerial role had made them aware of the business. From their 
accounts, it seems that they were aware of the logic behind the business-like approach in 
the NHS foundation trusts. So, they know what business means and how it works. They all 
used the term business and emphasised the financial targets that they had to meet, but at 
the same time, they underscored the important role of the patients. They argued that they 
had to consider the clinical aspects of the services (‘sight of the patients’) as well as the 
financial ones. Middle managers also noted that their workload was increasing due to an on-
going emphasis on implementing quality standards and meeting quality targets in hospitals. 
They all referred to QIPP targets (quality, innovation, productivity, prevention). 
In Iran, most of the middle managers have multiple identities. On the one hand, they could 
contribute to the strategies and policies of the hospitals by selling their ideas to the senior 
managers. On the other, they were bounded by senior managers at the medical university. 
According to Ali, a GM at hospital, the senior managers at the medical university did not 
have a positive view on middle managers and their competency. It seems that middle 
managers such as Ali are hesitant to develop an empowered identity as they feel there is a 
lack of sources of social validation for these managers. Therefore, he has taken a 
conservative approach.  
Ali said he had the autonomy to delegate some of his responsibilities and invest more time 
on policymaking and improving the processes. However, he has deliberately put checks and 
balances in place especially for the project managers of the hospital to control the finances. 
He tries to avoid senior managers’ intervention as he does not want to be questioned by 
them. Besides that, the financial situation of the hospital has led to the fragmented identity 
of managers such as Ali, who are willing to give autonomy to their staff but, at the same 
time, have to manage their budgets cautiously. This could be an example of aggregating the 
autonomy and accountability logics. 
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5.3.4. Role Claim/role use 
 
Role claim (England) 
 
Influencing and negotiating  
Middle managers in both English hospitals stated that they worked in a clinically-driven 
environment so their main role was negotiating and influencing. Andrew (a GM at Hospital 
G) stated that he was not a general manager of a factory. According to him, ‘there was a lot 
of negotiation, influence and subtle things that he had to do’ (Line 41). Similarly, Simon, 
another general manager at Hospital G who has a military background, mentioned that he 
had to work very hard on his influencing skills because the actual power of the appointed 
leader was not invested in him and that did inevitably restrict the amount of autonomy he 
enjoyed. He added that he had to ‘rely more on influencing and coordinating decisions 
rather than just taking decisions’ (Line 222). 
Simon, the GM, also referred to the lack of engagement of clinicians in management: 
Some of them are quite engaged; some are not; so that's typical of clinicians, you 
know. Some are more engaged in the day-to-day management and day-to-day 
performance than others. You know, I've sat in the meetings with clinical directors 
where they are on their phones answering emails when it is supposed to be important 
meeting about issues of performance, management, finance and all that. [They are] 
not interested at all; so, it's a difficult issue (Line 39). 
Managing HR 
One of the middle managers’ roles is managing the sickness absence of their employees. 
Among all middle managers, only Ann (general manager at Hospital G) made a clear 
reference to this particular responsibility. She added: 
I suppose my role is to see that they all run smoothly operationally, making sure that 
all the HR processes are followed – HR processes like recruitment, retention, 
managing sickness, performance management; anything such as restructuring, 
consultation(Line 80). 
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On the other hand, Betty, another HR manager at Hospital G, had a different view. 
According to her, middle managers were willing to deal with HR issues, but they needed 
more support. Betty said: 
Some of the general managers say we know it’s our responsibility to manage that 
relationship and probably we’ll need some training in how to manage that in a new 
organisational form going forward with the new transactional services and service 
delivery model. I thought that was quite an impressive and mature response, but 
some struggle with some of the HR issues on occasion. But some HR issues are not 
simple, so that’s not in itself a criticism. (Betty, HR manager, Hospital G) 
Managing operation/contributing to the strategies 
Middle managers had different views on the extent to which they were involved in strategy 
formulation. For instance, Kate, the youngest general manager of the smallest directorate of 
Hospital G, said that it was her choice and she could decide how much she wanted to be 
involved in operational and/or strategic issues. According to her, it was optional to be more 
‘hands-on’ or ‘distant’ while focusing on strategic issues. However, for Andrew, the general 
manager of the largest directorate, other factors played an important part, he quoted: 
Exactly what you get involved in – the degree of challenge – would depend on the 
team and how well that service is, what the issues are, and what your clinicians are 
like; and it can be very difficult – I’d just be doing more fire-fighting. (Line 723) 
Fire-fighting  
Similar to Andrew, Kate (the GM at hospital G) made a reference to fire-fighting as her role:  
I'm definitely involved here in fire-fighting. So if there's something going wrong in 
theatre, I will be around the theatre. If there's something wrong in a clinic, if one of 
the other managers is ... I will go down. If somebody's crying in the corridor, or if 
somebody's kicking off, or if something's happened in the ward, I'm right next to it. So 
for me, I'm in. A lot of managers probably aren't as in such an operational role. (Kate, 
Line 629) 
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Kate identified her role as involving fire-fighting, which was coherent with her self-identity, 
whereas for Andrew, organisational factors may have made him imbibe the fire-fighting 
role. This has led to fragmentation in his identity and made him distant from his self as a 
manager who should have time to concentrate more on strategic issues rather than 
operational matters.  
 
Role claim/role use (Iran, hospital M) 
 
Contributing to the policies of the hospital  
 
As mentioned several times by the middle managers in Iran, contribution to policymaking 
was one of their main roles. For example, Cyrus, the finance manager at Hospital M, stated 
that he was just an operational manager as he had to implement the deliberate policies of 
the medical university within the hospital. Although, Cyrus has been in the healthcare 
system for more than 20 years and in his current role for about four years, he considered 
himself an agent of the medical university. He said:  
If I was a middle manager, I’d be able to make decisions and formulate policies, but I 
am not. 
Zahra can be considered as someone having multiple identities. She considers herself as a 
senior manager when her senior managers are not around and she can be the main decision 
maker. 
 
 
Leadership  
Among nine middle managers in Hospital M (in Iran), Shirin mentioned that she was neither 
a middle manager nor a senior manager. According to her, she was a part of the leadership 
team, as she could contribute to the strategic planning of the hospital. She considered the 
finance managers and HR managers as middle managers because they just pursued the 
objectives determined by seniors rather than developing them. She said that the leaders 
formulate policies and give direction. Shirin stated that one of her main responsibilities was 
to develop strategies beforehand and executing plans that can easily adapt the 
environmental changes.  
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Discharging diverse responsibilities  
Middle managers said that they had a wide range of responsibilities, from something very 
ordinary to policymaking and standardising the work processes. However, most of them 
complained about their workload, so they did not have enough time to focus on improving 
the processes.   
I wish I could just do my work based on my job description, but it’s like I am the 
assistant of the hospital CEO. So I am almost responsible for everything. (Ali, GM at 
Hospital M) 
Role claim (Iran, hospital Z) 
 
Decision making  
Mina (the nursing manager at Hospital Z) stated that she was a senior manager because she 
could contribute to decision making at the senior level. According to her, working at this 
position had given her the opportunity to contribute to the senior management team 
meetings. However, she said she was not sure whether her counterparts in other hospitals 
had similar opportunities.  
Service improvement  
‘Team’ and ‘teamwork’ seem to be main organisational discourse at Hospital Z. Mina 
(nursing manager) explained that they worked as a team to improve the processes. 
However, Ahmad, the HR manager at Hospital Z had a different view. He had so much work 
that he did not get time to make changes and improve processes. It should be taken into 
account that those managers like Mina and Ashkun with clinical background emphasised 
their job as improving the processes of service delivery focusing mainly on patients. In that 
sense, that might be true. However, for Ahmad, as an HR manager whose main focus is on 
the hospital human resources, this might not be the case.  
According to Jasmine, the manager of planning and performance, her senior managers were 
strongly supportive. So, she could make suggestions to improve processes. She stated that 
being supported by seniors helped her make a great contribution to the decisions made by 
 
 
 
 
173 
 
managers within the organisation. She added that she lend support and advice to other 
managers in order to improve the processes. According to her, she was in charge of writing 
the protocols and service delivery processes, arranging and holding the hospital committee 
meetings.  
Communicating  
Ashkun also stated that he could create a bridge between personnel and senior managers. 
He noted that due to having a good relationship with personnel, sometimes they talked 
about the issues with him, and he could discuss those issues with senior managers.  
Quality improvement  
Most of the managers mentioned that their responsibilities were continuously increasing. 
Some of them like Jasmine (an operation manager) and Mustafa (the finance manager at 
Hospital Z) made a reference to the quality standards and the new accreditation system of 
the hospitals as the main reasons. Another manager, Zahra, the operation manager at 
Hospital M, directly pointed to the senior managers at the ministry and medical university as 
the main determinants of the growing responsibilities. Some of the middle managers, such 
as Ali (general manager at Hospital M) stated that their responsibilities and authorities were 
not balanced. Ali said that he had put a lot of effort and energy in his job, but he did not 
have any authority and this had an adversarial effect on his personal life.  
 
 Summary  
 
The role of general managers in Hospital G in England can be seen vividly in the views of 
managers with non-clinical backgrounds. Andrew and Simon both come from non-clinical 
backgrounds, and they stated that there was a lot of negotiation and influencing they had to 
do instead of directly taking decisions. According to them, the power of senior leadership 
was not invested in them so, they did not feel autonomous. On the role of managing the 
sickness absence of their employees, the managers with non-clinical backgrounds stated 
that it was their responsibility and they require additional support in terms of training to 
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deal with the problems of HR. Only one clinical manager, Ann, mentioned managing the 
sickness absence of employees as her role.  
General Managers with the non-clinical background in Hospital G had different views on the 
participation in strategic decision making. According to Kate, it was upon her to decide how 
much she wanted to participate in decision making. Whereas Andrew stated that it 
depended on the relationship with the clinicians and the type of issues as well. However, 
both managers mentioned their involvement in fire-fighting as their role. It leads to 
fragmentation of their identities as they have to switch from their strategic role to 
operational ones. 
In Iran, managers with non-clinical backgrounds in Hospital M said that they were 
operational managers and they only implemented predetermined policies of the medical 
university. Two of the managers, Shirin and Ali, reported to be involved in all sorts of tasks 
from something very ordinary to policymaking and standardising the work processes. 
However, most of them complained about their workload and said they did not have much 
time to focus on improving the processes.  Similarly, clinical managers said that their job 
emphasised on improving the processes of service delivery with a particular focus on 
patients. However, non-clinical managers such as Ahmad, stated that they had so much 
work that they were unable to work on improving the process of service delivery. Most of 
the middle managers (both clinical and non-clinical) also mentioned that the standards and 
new accreditation systems have added to their workload. Both groups also pointed to their 
senior managers for the increase in their workload.  
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5.4. Comparison of middle managers’ perceptions of their identity, the factors affecting 
their identity and the roles they claim that they play in the English and Iranian hospitals  
 
In all the four cases middle managers do not have consistent views on their position with 
the same background (i.e., among clinical managers and non-clinical managers). In England, 
at hospital G (the larger hospital) most of the general managers considered themselves as 
middle managers, although some seemed confused about their position in the organisation. 
At hospital H, most of the managers said they were senior managers. Only one female 
operation manager (Lesley) said that she was a middle manager. In Iran at Hospital Z (the 
larger hospital), some managers considered themselves as senior manager; others stated 
that they were middle managers. However, at the smaller hospital (hospital M) no one 
described themselves as senior managers. Some of the middle managers said they were 
middle managers and some other stated themselves as just operational managers. 
In England, middle managers at hospital H (the smaller hospital with the division structure) 
consider themselves as the ultimate power of their divisions. They refer to their closeness to 
the senior managers as an indication of their seniority. However, middle managers at 
hospital G acknowledge that clinical directors are the ultimate power of their directorates. 
Middle managers stated that senior managers made them being middle managers. In Iran, 
middle managers of hospital M (the smaller hospital) acknowledge that managers at the 
medical university are their seniors as they need to implement their decision at the hospital. 
At hospital Z some of them (with both clinical and non-clinical background) consider 
themselves as seniors. They express different views on their seniority. Some of them 
explained they were close to the senior managers and described themselves as seniors and 
some others represented themselves as middle managers. There were not consistent views 
among the middle managers with the clinical and non-clinical background. 
In both English hospitals, the main organisational discourse is patient’s experience while 
considering the financial implications. In Iran, middle managers at the smaller hospital 
emphasise on contributing to the decision making and policy making to meet the needs of 
the patients, while at the larger hospital the main organisational discourse is ‘team’ and 
‘teamwork’.  
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In England, two of the general managers (at hospital G) with commercial background and 
one female divisional operation manager with a clinical background (at hospital H) reject 
that autonomy is in place. However, the majority say that they have autonomy but the level 
of accountability is also increasing. In each Iranian hospital, one clinical general manager 
mentions that they do not have autonomy. However, regarding non-clinical managers, those 
at the larger hospital (hospital Z) report having more autonomy compared to their 
counterpart at the smaller hospital (hospital M).  
Middle managers with clinical background in both English hospitals are not willing to 
manage some HR issues such as managing sickness absence. According to them, HR people 
are responsible to manage such issue. Therefore, managerialism is normalised but not in all 
aspects. In Iran, one of the non-clinical GMs at hospital M refers to the not having a strong 
representative at the senior management level (at the medical university), and another GM 
at hospital Z mentions that the main decision makers are the medical professional elites. 
In England, the majority of middle managers state that they have autonomy and at the same 
time they are accountable. They aggregate the logics of autonomy and accountability. 
However, the majority of middle managers in Iran compartmentalise these logics. They say 
they have autonomy to identify the opportunities to improve the processes and develop 
objectives, but they do not have autonomy to implement them. 
Middle managers in England mention that their roles are mainly influencing and negotiating, 
managing operation, contributing to the strategies, firefighting and leadership. In Iran, the 
roles that middle manager say they play are contributing to the hospital policies, facilitating 
communication between employees and senior managers, service improvement and quality 
improvement. Only one of the female middle managers mentioned leadership as her main 
role.  
The following section tabulates the differences in the middle manager's perception of their 
identity, the factors affecting their identity, and the roles they claim that they play at 
hospitals in Iran and England. 
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Table 5.7 Middle Managers’ Perception of their identity 
 England  Iran 
 
 
Middle 
managers’ 
perception of 
their identity 
Hospital G Hospital H Hospital M Hospital Z 
Most of the general managers 
considered themselves as 
middle managers. Most of 
them displayed self-awareness 
about their positions; however, 
some seemed confused about 
their position in the 
organisation. 
Most of the managers said they 
were senior managers. Only one 
female operation manager 
(Lesley) said that she was a 
middle manager.  
No one described themselves 
as senior managers. Some of 
the middle managers said they 
were middle managers and 
some other said they were just 
operational managers.  
Some managers 
considered 
themselves as senior 
manager; others said 
they were middle 
managers. 
 In all the four cases there are no consistent views among middle managers with the same background (i.e., among clinical 
managers and non-clinical managers). 
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Table 5.8 Factors affecting middle managers’ perception of their identity 
Factors affecting 
middle managers 
identity 
 
England 
 
Iran 
Hospital G Hospital H Hospital M  Hospital Z 
Size of the 
hospital  
Middle managers said G 
is a large hospital with a 
large hierarchy above 
middle managers.  
Middle managers said H is a 
relatively small hospital 
with the flat structure and 
said they were seniors. 
Middle managers said M is a 
small hospital and the senior 
managers are based at the 
medical university. 
For middle managers, the large size 
of the hospital Z is an indication of 
their seniority.  
Authority 
structure  
The ultimate point of 
power at the directorate 
level are clinical directors 
to whom middle 
managers are 
accountable) 
Middle managers in this 
study are the ultimate point 
of power at the division. 
They are accountable to the 
director of the operation.  
Middle managers considered 
the medical university 
managers as the seniors, so 
they described themselves 
middle managers and/or 
operation managers. 
Middle managers directly report to 
the director of operation. 
Therefore, their relationship with 
senior managers is an important 
factor affecting their perception 
towards their seniority. 
Organisational 
discourse 
The main emphasis is on 
patient experience while 
considering the financial 
implications. 
The main emphasis is on 
patient experience while 
considering the financial 
implications. 
Contributing to the decision 
making and policy making to 
meet the needs of the 
patients.  
‘Team’ and ‘teamwork’ is 
considered as the main tool to 
improve the patient’s care. 
Senior managers  Middle managers stated 
that senior managers 
made them being the 
middle.  
Middle managers refer to 
their closeness to the senior 
managers as an indication 
of their seniority. 
The senior managers of the 
medical university made 
them middle managers as 
they need to implement their 
decision at the hospital. 
Middle managers express different 
views on their seniority. Those who 
were close to the senior managers 
and described themselves as 
seniors and some others said they 
were middle managers. There were 
not consistent views among the 
middle managers with the clinical 
and non-clinical background. 
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Table 5.9 Middle managers’ identity work 
 England Iran 
 Hospital G Hospital H Hospital M Hospital Z 
clinical Non-clinical clinical Non-clinical clinical Non-clinical clinical Non-clinical 
Deletion      
Autonomy 
/accountability 
 
- Two of the 
non-clinical 
MMs (from 
commercial 
sector) state 
there is no 
autonomy 
but just 
accountability 
One female 
clinical MM 
states she 
does not 
have 
autonomy. 
- One of the 
clinical MMs 
states when 
seniors are 
around, she 
does not 
have 
autonomy. 
They state 
they are not 
empowered. 
They are just 
the agents of 
the medical 
university 
One clinical 
MM says he 
does not 
have 
autonomy. 
One non- 
clinical MM 
says he does 
not have 
autonomy. 
Managerialism 
/professionalism 
Some clinical 
MMs are not 
willing to 
manage 
some of the 
HR issues 
such as 
managing 
sickness 
absence. 
Two of the 
non- clinical 
MMs (from 
commercial 
sector) state 
the power is 
not invested 
in them. It is 
in the hand of 
clinical 
directors. 
Some of the 
clinical MMs 
consider the 
HR issues as 
the job of HR 
people not 
theirs. 
- - Lack of social 
validation by 
not having a 
strong 
representative 
(senior 
manager) at 
the medical 
university. 
One- clinical 
MM says the 
power is with 
the medical 
professional 
elites. 
- 
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Table 5.10 Middle managers’ identity work 
 England Iran 
Hospital G Hospital H Hospital M Hospital Z 
Compartmentalisation      
Autonomy/accountability - - - - MMs have 
autonomy to 
identify the 
opportunities 
to improve 
the 
processes 
and develop 
objectives, 
but they do 
not have 
autonomy to 
implement 
them.  
MMs have 
autonomy to 
identify the 
opportunities 
to improve 
the 
processes 
and develop 
objectives, 
but they do 
not have 
autonomy to 
implement 
them. 
MMs have 
autonomy to 
identify the 
opportunities 
to improve 
the 
processes 
and develop 
objectives, 
but they do 
not have 
autonomy to 
implement 
them. 
MMs have 
autonomy to 
identify the 
opportunities 
to improve 
the 
processes 
and develop 
objectives, 
but they do 
not have 
autonomy to 
implement 
them. 
Managerialism/professionalism - - - - MMs 
autonomy 
depends on 
senior clinical 
managers. 
MMs 
autonomy 
depends on 
senior clinical 
managers. 
MMs 
autonomy 
depends on 
senior clinical 
managers. 
MMs 
autonomy 
depends on 
senior clinical 
managers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
181 
 
Table 5.11 Middle managers’ identity work  
 England Iran 
Hospital G Hospital H Hospital M Hospital Z 
Aggregation      
Autonomy 
/accountability 
 
MMs states 
autonomy is 
increased so is 
the 
accountability. 
The majority 
states 
autonomy is 
increased so is 
the 
accountability. 
The majority 
states 
autonomy is 
increased so is 
the 
accountability. 
All of the non 
clinical MMs 
state 
autonomy is 
increased so 
is the 
accountabilit
y. 
    
Managerialism/
professionalism 
The majority of 
MMs 
acknowledge 
the importance 
of both clinical 
and managerial 
aspects of 
service delivery. 
The majority 
acknowledge 
both clinical 
and 
managerial 
aspects of 
service 
delivery. 
The majority 
acknowledge 
both clinical 
and 
managerial 
aspects of 
service 
delivery. 
All of the 
MMs 
acknowledge 
both clinical 
and 
managerial 
aspects of 
service 
delivery. 
MMs 
acknowledg
e the 
importance 
of using 
managerial 
techniques 
(e.g., SLR, 
SLM, and 
EFQM) to 
improve 
the 
efficiency 
and quality 
of clinical 
services.  
MMs 
acknowledg
e the 
importance 
of using 
managerial 
techniques 
(e.g., SLR, 
SLM, and 
EFQM) to 
improve 
the 
efficiency 
and quality 
of clinical 
services. 
 
MMs 
acknowledg
e the 
importance 
of using 
managerial 
techniques 
(e.g., SLR, 
SLM, and 
EFQM) to 
improve 
the 
efficiency 
and quality 
of clinical 
services.  
MMs 
acknowledg
e the 
importance 
of using 
managerial 
techniques 
(e.g., SLR, 
SLM, and 
EFQM) to 
improve 
the 
efficiency 
and quality 
of clinical 
services.  
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Table 5.12 Middle managers’ role claim 
 England Iran 
Hospital G Hospital H Hospital M Hospital Z 
clinical Non-clinical clinical Non-clinical clinical Non-clinical clinical Non-clinical 
Role claim     
 Influencing 
and 
negotiating 
Managing 
operation 
Contributing 
to the 
strategies 
Firefighting 
Leadership 
Managing 
operation 
Contributing 
to the 
strategies 
 
Being the 
chief 
executive of 
the thirds of 
the hospital 
Being the 
chief 
executive 
of the 
thirds of 
the hospital 
One non- 
clinical 
female MM 
said 
leadership 
as one of her 
main roles 
Managing 
operation 
Contributing 
to the 
strategies and 
policies 
Contributing to 
the policies of 
hospital 
Facilitating 
communication 
between 
employees and 
senior 
managers 
Services 
improvement 
Quality 
improvement 
 
 
 
 
Decision 
making 
 
Managing 
operation 
Contributing 
to the 
strategies 
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Chapter six:  Discussion  
 
The finding of this study sheds light on middle managers’ experience in exercising autonomy 
in both the developed (England) and developing (Iran) countries. The managers’ perception 
of their autonomy reflects the environmental and structural characteristics of the two 
countries (Caza, 2011).  
According to neo-institutional theory, institutions within the organisations affect the way 
managers think, decide and behave. Scott (2001) categorises the institutions as regulative, 
normative and cultural-cognitive pillars. These institutional pillars including institutional 
actors, logics, and governance in addition to resources affect the managers’ behaviour and 
practices within the organisations (Scott, 2001).  According to Hales (1999), the institutional 
rules (e.g., cognitive and moral rules) and resources affect the managers’ subjective sense of 
their autonomy, identity, and legitimacy.  
Middle managers’ perception of their autonomy also captures the local organisational 
features as well as the agency dimensions of individual middle managers. Middle managers 
depend on their habit, judgment and imagination respond to structural factors (such as 
institutional logic).  They use the institutional rules and resources to establish their identity.  
An analytical framework is developed to identify the impact of institutional pillars on middle 
managers and their responses to these structural factors in the form of identity work. This 
framework is used to discuss the research findings (figure 6.1). 
The extent of autonomy that middle managers can exercise in English and Iranian hospitals 
is discussed using the Verhoest et al.’s (2004) framework of autonomy. The Structural 
factors affectings middle managers in the two countries are explained therafter. Following 
that, the organisational characteristics and individual managers’ agency are discussed. 
Finally, a summary of the discussion chapter is presented.
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Analytical framework  
 
Institutional pillars                 Challenges                    Identity work                            Responses                    Agency                            Role claim/use 
  
                                                                                                                  
                                                                                                                           
  
         
                                                                                                                                             
                                                                                                                                 
  
   
 
 
  
Figure 6.1 Analytical framework
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Autonomy 
Verhoest et al. (2004) define autonomy on the basis of two dimensions. First ‘autonomy as 
the level of decision-making competencies’ and secondly, ‘autonomy as the exemption of 
constraints on the actual use of decision-making competencies’. Accordingly, they (Verhoest 
et al., 2004) develop a conceptual map of autonomy which includes different types of 
autonomy that can be exercised by the agency. These include managerial autonomy, policy 
autonomy, structural autonomy, interventional autonomy, and financial autonomy.  
Verhoest et al. (2004) argue that the formal delegation of autonomy to an agency cannot be 
used as an indicator of its autonomy in practice, and having a different level of autonomy on 
different dimensions may cause tension relating to the decision making competencies of the 
agency. This study supports Verhoest et al. (2004) argument on the various tensions arising 
from unbalanced autonomy. Middle managers’ autonomy in both the two countries is 
limited, although in different ways. In England, middle managers have financial and human 
resources, but government policies and targets limit their autonomy.While in Iran, middle 
managers are less constrained by government policies and targets, but they do not have 
financial and human resources to exercise autonomy. This study supports the Hales’ (1999) 
argument that the contexts within which managers perform their role determine the rules 
and resources available to those managers.  
In the English cases, middle managers are subject to intervention and are restricted by the 
trust senior managers (including the finance team) and the external bodies (e.g., 
commissioners). English middle managers do not have policy autonomy in a sense that they 
are restricted to increase the number of services they deliver. This is in line with the findings 
of Gatenby et al. (2014), who argue that the accountability mechanism and performance 
evaluation have inserted more central control on managerial autonomy. 
Iranian middle managers can, to some extent, contribute to the strategic management of 
financial resources and HR. However, their ability to secure funding for their objectives is 
limited because of the increasing central control over the inputs. Regarding policy 
autonomy, middle managers enjoy dealing with more general principles in some areas as 
supported by Jafari et al. (2010) in another study. Hence, they might be able to affect norms 
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and objectives set by central government. However, in order to exercise policy autonomy, 
middle managers draw on their interdependence of their senior managers. In other words, 
middle managers might exercise policy autonomy, if senior managers support them, 
otherwise they would prefer to play it safe. This supports the idea that autonomy is only 
realisable if each of the ‘input, process and outcome’ properties is controlled by the same 
agent (Exworthy et al., 2010).  
Verhoest et al. (2004, p.111) state that ‘a high level of policy autonomy will affect the 
performance of the involved agency only if a considerable level of managerial autonomy is 
present. In order to execute own policy decisions, one has to control the levers, like human 
and financial resources, necessary for making the organisation work’. As autonomy is a 
multidimensional concept, it is not surprising that different levels of autonomy on different 
dimensions have caused tension and frustration for the middle managers in this study.  
Considering the Exworthy et al.’s (2010) binary division of autonomy as ‘freedom from’ and 
‘freedom to’, it can be argued that middle managers explicitly referred to the former rather 
than the latter. The former refers to the ‘autonomy from the centre and is associated with 
the technical ability to exercise autonomy’ and the latter is related to ‘the horizontal 
autonomy, implying the potential to be responsive and innovative’ (Exworthy et al., 2010, p. 
172). However, there were some examples of entrepreneurial behaviour in the accounts of 
the middle managers in both the countries. This is in line with the findings of Exworthy et al. 
(2011) in the NHS that some managers claimed that they have been acting like 
entrepreneurs.  
 
Middle managers in all the four cases were working in hierarchical and clinically driven 
environments. They did not have autonomy by ‘default’. Rather, they are meant to ‘earn’ 
autonomy that is conditioned on their performance. Therefore, autonomy is not a clear-cut 
property. It is constantly negotiated and contested. Middle managers value the autonomy 
to do their job and are willing to have more control over clinicians. They repeatedly address 
the notion of ‘clinical leadership’ and how working with clinicians who are ‘good leaders’ 
have made their jobs easier. However, this study shows that middle managers are willing to 
have autonomy not to be the sole decision maker; rather they prefer to work in multi-
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professional teams and make shared decisions. Barber et al. (2000) describe this as 
‘consensus autonomy’. This is in line with the findings of Meyer and Hammerschmid’s (2009, 
p. 455) study that ‘decentralised decision-making’ frequently goes hand in hand with a 
higher degree of ‘shared decision-making’.  
 
 
Table 6.1 
Verhoest et al.’s (2004) 
Taxonomy 
England Iran 
Managerial autonomy 
(HR and Financial 
Autonomy) 
In the English cases, middle 
managers have more 
autonomy over inputs such as 
HR and finances.  
Middle managers can contribute 
to the strategic management of 
financial resources and HRs, but 
their ability to secure funding for 
their objectives is limited 
because of the increasing central 
control over inputs. 
Policy Autonomy Middle manager lack 
autonomy over policies and 
procedures.  
Middle managers enjoy dealing 
with general principles in some 
areas.  
Interventional 
autonomy  
Middle managers autonomy is 
restricted by senior hospital 
managers, external bodies 
(e.g., commissioners) and 
central government control. 
Middle managers autonomy is 
restricted by senior hospital 
managers, external bodies (e.g., 
medical university of the 
province) and central 
government control. 
Structural autonomy  In all four cases middle managers are working in a hierarchical 
and clinically driven environment that restricts their structural 
autonomy.  
 
The neo-institutional theory is used to discuss the underlying factors affecting the middle 
managers’ autonomy in the two countries of the study. According to neo-institutional 
theory ‘institutions make a difference’ and it is based on the idea that organisational 
structures and procedures are the reflection of wider environment and affect the way the 
staff of those organisations think, decide and behave (March and Olsen, 1989;Lowndes, 
1996;Ranson et al.,1997). Scott (2001) classifies the institutions as regulative, normative and 
cultural/cognitive pillars. He (Scott, 2001) argues that institutional pillars (including actors, 
logics and governance) and resources affect managers’ practices within the organisations. 
Similarly, Hales (1998) considers the role of the context in managers’ actions and behaviours 
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and argues that the existing rules and resources can restrict managers to take the 
responsibility for their own actions and outcomes. This lack of authority over the 
responsibilities limits the managers’ subjective sense of autonomy. In the next section the 
environmental factors affecting middle managers’ practices are discussed.  
6.1. Environmental factors (resource environment and institutional environment) 
According to Scott et al. (2000), the organisational environment consists of resource 
environment and institutional environment, which are external forces affecting managers’ 
behaviour. Resource environment comprises supply-side factors, such as availability of 
physicians, technologies and external grants, and the demand-side factors such as 
demographics. The institutional environment comprises of institutional logics, institutional 
actors and the governance system (Scott et al., 2000).  
 
Friedland and Alford (1991) contend that Institutional logics are socially shared, deeply held 
assumptions and values that form a framework for reasoning, provide criteria for legitimacy, 
and help organise time and space (Macfarlane et al., 2013, p. 11). Institutional actors, for 
example, purchasers and providers are both ‘carriers and creators of institutional logics’. 
They can be both ‘consumers and suppliers of health services’ (Macfarlane et al., 2013, p. 
11). Scott et al. (2000) argue that institutional actors can affect the resource environment by 
consuming and supplying the health services as well as the institutional environment ‘by 
possessing institutionally-defined identities, capacities, rights and responsibilities, and by 
making meaning from their perceptions and experiences’ (Macfarlane et al., 2013, p. 11). 
Institutional logics, actors, governance and resource environment, on the one hand, affect 
the formulation and implementation of management reforms in different contexts ( 
Noordegraaf, 2009) and, on the other hand, affect the managers’ views and perceptions of 
those reforms.  
 
6.1.1. Resource Environment  
Middle managers in both the countries face the financial limitations. Both the countries 
operate a fixed tariff/price system that shapes local autonomy. The FT status in the English 
NHS has given middle managers a degree of autonomy to have easy access to public and 
private sources of capital and also to retain financial surpluses. However, they are still 
restricted by the central government that exercises public control over funding for the 
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healthcare system. Although the government emphasised financial decentralisation by, for 
example, giving more of the NHS budget to PCTs (CCGs, since April 2013), many of its 
policies have been regarded as, top-down and target-driven, new public management 
(Bevan and Hood, 2004; Blank and Burau, 2013). Most of the middle managers in this study 
experienced the pressure of meeting the ‘centrally dictated efficiency saving targets’ that 
put a tighter boundary around their existing autonomy. Middle managers in foundation 
trusts in England are limited to the ‘predetermined framework’ and ‘financial envelope’.  
 
In Iran, middle managers had initially benefited from the easy access to the public fund as 
they received their budget directly from Ministry of Health and Medical Education 
(MOHME) without the interference of medical university at the early stages of policy 
(hospital autonomy) implementation. However, because of incomplete implementation of 
the policy and lack of financial support, the medical university again started to control the 
finance management of hospitals through the lines of hierarchy and accountability.  
 
Another factor that put financial pressure on middle managers in Iran is that they do not 
receive their incomes completely from insurance organisations according to the tariffs of 
health services for Board of Trustees(BTs) Hospitals. The tariffs of health services for BTs are 
3.6 times higher than the tariffs of other public hospitals or non-Board of Trustees. Recent 
studies also support the lack of cooperation and coordination among insurance 
organisations and the Board of Trustees (Doshmangir et al., 2014, 2015). They argue that 
the structure and capacity of insurance organisations are not well-matched with the 
requirements of implementing hospital autonomy policy (Doshmangir et al., 2015).  
 
6.1.2. Institutional environment  
 
Governance 
 
Different institutional set-ups of the Iranian and English health systems mean that actors 
enjoy different degrees of power (Blank and Burau, 2013). In Iran, in the urban areas where 
hospitals with the board of trustees are located, the government has not developed a strong 
public health centre network. The private sector, as a major provider, is particularly 
influential in setting the priorities of health service delivery. The centralised health system 
bounds middle managers in public hospitals. The central government has inserted strong 
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control over the inputs including financial and human resources; therefore they are not able 
to compete with their counterparts in the private sector. 
 
Middle managers in England described the NHS as a command and control system because 
of its emphasis on national targets. This is in line with the findings of Allen et al. (2011, p.22) 
that targets such as ‘the 18-week patient pathway, A&E waiting time’ and infection control 
targets have very powerful influences on the foundation trusts (Allen et al., 2011, p. 22). 
Middle managers have to align and evaluate the work of their directorates/divisions with 
the government targets to be able to meet the government goals and monitoring 
requirements. This finding is in line with other studies (e.g., Mccann et al., 2015 and 
Gatenby et al., 2015) which emphasise that meeting the targets has restricted managers to 
act innovatively.  
In England, market –type initiatives such as Practice-Based Commissioning gives the middle 
managers the motivation to grow their services and also to market their services to other 
directorates/divisions as semi-autonomous business units. This is in line with Allen et al. 
(2011, p. 120) that, ‘Payment by Results had a strong incentive effect of growing the 
services and increasing income’. However, due to the financial limitations, the 
commissioning bodies put a cap on the services and do not let the middle managers provide 
the services to their full capacity.  
 
Similarly, in Iran, initiatives such as Pay for Performance (P4P) have encouraged the middle 
managers to provide more services. Since 2011, a new accreditation system across all 
hospitals had been implemented. Prior to this new system, medical university of each 
province was in charge of evaluating the performance of public hospitals in that province. 
The quality of these assessments is questionable. Since 2011, the public hospitals of each 
province need to be evaluated by the medical university of other provinces. The new 
accreditation system is a performance-encouraging tool to improve the quality of services 
and have influenced the behaviours of the middle managers. The middle managers are 
motivated to improve the performance for several reasons. First, it gives them financial 
incentives, as higher hospital income leads to higher remuneration (in the form of ‘Karaneh) 
for the staff. Second, with higher income, middle managers are able to invest in service 
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development, and third, they are able to satisfy their sense of success and reputation 
(Aryankhesal et al., 2013). 
 
However, the differences in the economic, geographical and even political position of the 
provinces in Iran, give a complex picture of the local context of hospitals in each province 
and their capacities. The new accreditation system does not have the coherence, so it 
bridges the fairness in the higher authority’s judgement over the performance of the 
hospital and its managers. Hence, it seems that the new performance management 
framework might restrict middle managers to act innovatively.  
 
Middle managers are increasingly responsible for meeting the performance targets and 
public accountability as a result of public management reforms. Some of the important 
aspects of changes under the NPM umbrella have been the implementation of quality 
improvement strategies and the inception of evidence-based medicine, clinical governance 
and the new external regulators (Gatenby et al., 2014).  However, the persistent 
bureaucratic forms of the organisations still exist (Farrell and Morris 2003; Hood et al., 1997; 
Schofield, 2001). This study supports the views of Hales (2002) and Farrell and Morris (2003) 
that ‘the hierarchical control and vertical accountability’ are retained either “through re-
bureaucratization or the creation of neo-bureaucratic structure” (Gatenby et al., 2014, p. 4). 
It can be argued that although middle managers are encouraged to act as entrepreneurial 
leaders, performance evaluation mechanisms, professional elites’ control over the resources 
and the enduring bureaucracy limit their managerial autonomy (Checkland, 2004; 
McFarlane et al., 2011).  
 
Decentralisation, pushing control and responsibility to local organisational units could foster 
a more competitive and innovative service environments (Gatenby et al., 2014). Therefore, 
in line with previous studies (Meyer and Hammerschmid, 2009; Hales 1999; Casa, 2011) this 
study shows that in line with decentralisation and increased local autonomy, the role of 
leadership and managerial skills of managers become more crucial. Exworthy and Frosini 
(2008) draw on the decision space framework of Bossert (1998) and argue that ‘newly 
autonomous local organisations must develop the skills and competencies to exercise new 
decision-making powers’ and denote this as ‘organisational capacity’ (Exworthy et al., 2010, 
 
 
 
 
192 
 
p. 60). Therefore, it is crucial that middle managers, especially those with the clinical 
background, have the leadership and managerial skills. As hospitals are clinically-driven 
work environments, the development of clinical leadership through which clinical elites 
encourage and inspire their team to meet the targets proves useful. However, pushing 
control and responsibility to local organisational units may lead to greater fragmentation of 
services, weaker coordination, lack of cooperation and losing the sight of the patients.  
Logics 
Accountability/autonomy: 
Middle managers in the FTs in England are increasingly under the pressure to meet the 
quality improvement targets of the national institutions such as ‘Care Quality Commission 
(CQC), the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), and the National 
Service Frameworks (NSFs), which were created to address the ‘fair access’ to services 
irrespective of geography (‘postcode lottery)’ (Exworthy et al., 2010, p. 19). According to 
Gatenby et al. (2014), the work of these national bodies means the range of decisions that 
local organisations can make, has been reduced. This means that the autonomy of middle 
managers is more than ever accompanied with the high level of accountability. However, 
drawing on Bossert’s (1998) decision space model, Exworthy and Frosini (2008) explain that 
national policies may have various outcomes at the local level. They argue that the ‘room for 
manoeuvre’ of the local organisations to make decisions is dependent on both ‘vertical and 
horizontal autonomies’ (Exworthy and Frosini 2008 p. 210).  
 
This study shows that middle managers are able to draw on these logics (e.g., 
accountability) to make changes. They build their argument for example, ‘on the basis of 
safety and quality grounds’ and make business cases to secure funding and achieve their 
objectives.  Jones and Exworthy (2015) call this ‘rhetorical strategy’ that is used to convince 
stakeholders of the need for the change. This is in line with Johansen et al.’s (2015, p. 2) 
statement that ‘multiple institutional logics represent not only a challenge but also an 
opportunity for managers to find new and innovative ways to handle them’. 
 
Professionalism/ Managerialism: 
In Iran, the predominant role of the medical professionals as policy makers in setting the 
priorities of the health system has curtailed the room for manoeuvre of managers including 
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middle managers in both public and private sectors (Khayatzadeh-Mahani et al., 2013). 
Middle managers might be able to exercise ‘policy autonomy’ by, for example, determining 
the number of services they wish to deliver. However, they highly rely on professionals’ 
support to be able to push their plans forward.  
 
Although managerialism is a strong logic, professionalism has still remained strong. The co-
existence of managerialism/professionalism is also evident in England. This is in line with 
Dunn and Jones’ (2010) argument that when professionals from different roles come 
together they are dealing with different underlying logics that can also be conflicting. 
However, the rivalry between co-exiting logics can be managed through the development of 
collaborative relationships (Reay and Hinings, 2009). Therefor, one of the main roles of 
middle managers is to negotiate with and influence the clinicians and to build a 
collaborative relationship with them. Through these collaborative efforts institutional 
change can occur if independence and separate identities of collaborators are preserved 
(Reay and Hinings, 2009). 
 
This study also supports the view of Glynn and Lounsbury (2005) that institutional logics 
react sharply to the market forces. The ongoing emphasis on finance management and 
efficiency saving targets indicates the accommodation of managerialism in the healthcare 
organisations, while professionalism is still the main underlying logic.  
 
Actors 
This study shows that the relationship of FTs with other local organisations is a major factor 
affecting the autonomy of managers operating within the FTs. According to Allen et al. 
(2011, p.13), FTs had developed a 'stronger identity' as 'separate entities'.   They competed 
harder against other local hospitals to increase their services and income. However, they 
had still maintained a good relationship with the local organisations. Unlike the findings of 
Allen et al.’s (2011) study, this study shows that hospital G in England has not maintained a 
good relationship with some of the local organisations. The lack of good relationship has led 
to the increased lines of accountability and less autonomy for the trust managers including 
middle managers. There are cases (at the early stages of being a foundation trust) that when 
there was a request from NHS management structure around, hospital G was not inclined to 
respond because it was a foundation trust. This observation is in line with Exworthy and 
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Frosini’s (2008, p. 206) argument that according to the ‘inter-organisational literature’, the 
relationship between local organisations affects the extent of autonomy that one 
organisation can exercise. Therefore, both ‘vertical autonomy from government and 
horizontal autonomy from other local organisations’ (Exworthy and Frosini, 2008, p. 206) 
affect the autonomy of middle managers. It may seem that local, normative and cultural 
constraints are more powerful than regulative pillars here. 
Similar to England, middle managers in hospitals M and Z in Iran could exercise enhanced 
autonomy in semi-autonomous hospitals. The semi-autonomous status of those hospitals 
has enabled middle managers to make decisions faster according to their local needs. 
However, this situation has not lasted long as the medical university of the province 
regained the control of hospitals Z and M because of the lack of budget (Jafari Sirizi et al., 
2010). The persistent role of the medical university in the province, as an intermediary 
between the hospital and the MOHME, considerably restricts the hospital managers 
including middle managers. It seems that the medical university also acts as an institutional 
actor that is willing to maintain the status quo (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006).  
 
6.2. A summary of the environmental factors are presented in the following table.  
Table 6.2 Environmental factors 
Resources   
 England Iran 
 Middle managers in the NHS FTs 
have a degree of autonomy, 
where they have easy access to 
public and private sources of 
capital and also to retain financial 
surpluses. However, they are 
under pressure to meet the saving 
targets which puts tighter 
boundaries on their autonomy. 
Middle managers had easy 
access to public fund at the 
initial stages of policy 
implementation. However, 
the medical universities once 
again started to gain control 
of financial management 
through the lines of 
hierarchy and accountability. 
Also, the insurance 
companies do not reimburse 
the hospitals completely. 
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Table 6.3 Environmental factors  
Governance 
(normative and 
regulative pillar 
 
 England Iran 
Centralisation/ 
decentralisation 
 
Middle managers in England 
described the NHS as a command 
and control system because of its 
emphasis on national targets. 
Middle managers have to align and 
evaluate the work of their 
directorates/divisions with the 
government targets to be able to 
meet the government goals and 
monitoring requirements. 
The centralised health system 
bounds middle managers in 
public hospitals. The central 
government has inserted 
strong control over the inputs 
including financial and human 
resources, therefore, they are 
not able to compete with their 
counterparts in the private 
sector. 
Market/The State  Market –type initiatives such as 
Practice-Based Commissioning 
gives the middle managers the 
motivation to grow their services 
and also to market their services to 
other directorates/divisions as 
semi-autonomous business units. 
However, they are subject to 
intervention by commissioning 
bodies that put a cap on the 
services and do not let the middle 
managers provide services to their 
full capacity 
Market-like initiatives such as 
Pay for Performance (P4P) and 
the implementation of the new 
accreditation system in Iran as 
the performance-encouraging 
tool to improve the quality of 
services has incentivised 
middle managers to improve 
performance. It gives them 
financial incentives as higher 
hospital income leads to higher 
remuneration.  
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Table 6.4 Environmental factors 
Logics    
 England Iran 
Autonomy/ 
accountability 
 
The level of scrutiny and 
accountability has increased. 
Middle managers are under 
pressure from institutions such as 
‘Care Quality Commission (CQC), 
the National Institute for Health 
and Clinical Excellence (NICE), and 
the National Service Frameworks 
(NSFs) to meet the quality 
improvement targets. 
The inception of the new 
accreditations system has 
increased the level of 
accountability of middle 
managers.   
Managerialism/ 
professionalism 
Managerialism is a strong logic but 
professionalism is still very strong. 
The predominant role of the 
medical professionals as policy 
makers in setting the priorities of 
the health system has curtailed 
the decision space of middle 
managers in Iran. 
 
Professionalism is stronger than 
managerialism. 
 
Table 6.5 Environmental factors 
Actors 
  
  
 England Iran 
 
 
 
 
 
Actors  
The relationship between FTs with 
local organizations and authorities 
affects the autonomy of FTs and 
managers (including middle 
managers) operate within those 
FTS. The lack of good relationship 
has led to the increased lines of 
accountability and less autonomy 
for the trust managers including 
middle managers. 
The persistent role of the 
medical university of the 
province as an intermediary 
between the hospital and the 
MOHME considerably restricts 
the hospital managers 
including middle managers. 
 
6.2. Organisational factors: 
In addition to the macro-institutional elements (discussed above), some meso-level factors 
affect middle managers’ autonomy in both countries. One of these factors is the extent of 
autonomy that local organisations, here hospitals, can exercise. According to Bossert’s 
(1998) decision space framework, to examine how much autonomy hospitals can exercise, 
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we need to consider the extent of decision space given to hospitals by higher authorities 
over functions such human resources, finances, service organisations, access and 
governance rules.  
Hospital autonomy 
In England, both hospitals like others are expected to manage their inputs (e.g., financial 
resources) according to the predetermined frameworks by higher authorities. This means 
middle managers have to work with the certain amount of budgets. However, in line with 
Bossert’s (1998) argument regarding the ‘informal decision space’, middle managers in this 
study make use of the lack of enforcement of some of the rules and ‘bend the rules’ to 
achieve their goals. For instance, some of them move the ‘budgets from capital to revenue’ 
to be able to address their immediate needs. Some others use the extra surpluses they have 
made for their long term financial planning, e.g., ‘buying the equipment that they estimate 
to get more expensive in three or four years time’. In Iran, less financial resources are 
available to hospitals from higher authorities compared to England. Iran is a low-middle 
income country and spends 6.3% of GDP on healthcare compared to England where this 
figure is 9% (WHO, 2015). Also, the central government inserts a large amount of control 
over the inputs. Middle managers in Iran face more financial limitations compared to their 
counterparts in England. However, they have more space over the access rules and 
governance rules. 
There are variations in the level of hospital autonomy between the cases in each country, 
which can relate to the institutional capacities and the position of the hospital within the 
field.  In England, hospital G is one of the largest academic sites with thirteen thousand staff 
and supported by a big charity. The strong position of hospital G within the field facilitates 
its access to the field resources. However, this does not necessarily mean that middle 
managers can have more financial autonomy; this is also the case for middle managers in 
Iran.  Hospital Z in Iran was the largest hospital in the province and it delivered specialist 
health care services at the tertiary level. It has a high reputation both nationally and 
regionally and it is an important academic research centre and better placed in comparison 
to hospital M. Some of the middle managers in Hospital Z in Iran identified themselves as 
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senior managers in their organisation. This goes in line with Currie et al.’s (2012) argument 
that the higher status of the organisation position leads to increase in intra-stratification 
within the clinicians.  
According to Currie et al., ‘clinicians working as specialists in tertiary hospitals enjoy higher 
status than their peers’ (Currie et al., 2012, p. 940). Middle managers in hospital Z worked 
with prestigious clinicians. Therefore, some of them drew on the clinicians’ structural and 
normative legitimacy to achieve their objectives. They also worked in alliance to achieve 
common objectives. However, middle managers only relied on those clinicians as long as 
their managerial objectives do not pose a threat to the clinicians’ profession. This is again in 
line with Currie et al.’s (2012) observation. They take the professional hierarchy of clinicians 
into account and argue that if clinicians perceive the managerial objectives as a threat to 
their profession, they act as ‘institutional agents and engage in institutional work in pursuit 
of institutional maintenance to protect their privileged position’ (Currie et al., 2012, p. 941). 
Hence, rather than enabling middle managers to initiate change, they might restrict the 
autonomy of middle managers by maintaining the status quo. This might explain that why 
some of the middle managers are not optimistic about being able to rely on their clinical 
colleagues to achieve their objectives.  
Clinicians’ power  
Clinicians have a strong influence on the middle managers’ autonomy in hospitals. Middle 
managers mainly work with the heads of nursing and clinical directors to run their 
directorates or divisions. One of their main roles is to negotiate with and influence on the 
clinicians. In cases that clinicians decide not to manage the day to day management and 
performance - described as ‘incidental hybrids’ by McGivern et al. (2015) - middle managers 
‘are left to run their directorates’ and at the same time do ‘mundane tasks such as 
managing doctors’ leave’.  Therefore, as Burgess and Currie (2013) argue, middle managers 
play an important role to reconcile the managerial and professional goals.  However, their 
ability to resolve the conflict of managerial and professional interest depends on their 
personal context and professional status (Burgess and Currie, 2013). For instance, this study 
shows that those nurse managers (in England) who have stronger financial skills are able to 
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have more influence on clinicians and managers. They also report they have more 
autonomy compared to their colleagues who lack the financial skills. This is in line with the 
findings of Hoque et al. (2004) that clinician managers in the NHS might not be able to 
exercise managerial autonomy if they lack financial skills.  
The persistent clinical professional dominancy is evident in both the countries. Therefore, 
one of the main roles of middle managers is to build a good relationship with clinicians 
whose supports enable middle managers to achieve their objectives. However, middle 
managers’ in England have a high turnover, which leads to constant re-negotiation of 
autonomy. Halford and Leonard (2006) argue that the large size of the NHS leads managers 
to move from one side to another until they find a place where they can establish a 
coherent sense of identity with their sense of self. However, constant changes in the NHS 
organisations and increase in centrally dictated targets for performance management imply 
that managers are gradually less likely to have variable experience in the NHS organisations 
(Halford and Leonard, 2006).  
It seems that the constant reforms have led to increase in managers’ turnover and decrease 
in managerial tenure. Conversely, in Iran, middle managers do not have high turnover. 
Instead, senior doctor-managers of medical university and following that, senior doctor-
managers of hospitals might be changed after each presidential election every four years. 
According to the Pollitt and Bouckaert’s (2011) classification, the relationship between 
ministers and mandarins in Iran, are integrated and politicised. In public service 
organisations, top-level managers are being replaced in order to satisfy the particular vision 
of policymakers according to the political situation of the country (Ramli, 2009). Changes in 
the government lead to changes in the public executives. Hence, public senior managers’ 
turnover is high and their position is unstable. Yeganeh and Su (2007) argue that public 
management styles and practices need to be in line with the political and social values as 
well as Islamic ideology of the government. The high turnover of senior managers in Iran 
also leads to the constant renegotiation of autonomy for middle managers. 
Senior managers  
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Senior managers also play an important role affecting the middle managers’ perception of 
their autonomy. They use organisational discourses to encourage middle managers to 
achieve the organisations’ objectives. In this study, middle managers in both countries 
identify themselves as part of the management team. This observation supports Checkland 
et al.’s (2011) view that senior managers seek to align middle managers’ identity with those 
desired by the organisation. As Nilson (2009) argues, senior managers use ‘organisational 
talk’ to create and spread the meaning across the organisation.  
Reporting and accountability structure  
This study shows that the reporting and accountability structure of the hospitals within 
which middle managers enact their roles has an impact on the perception of their 
autonomy. In England, middle managers in the smaller hospital (hospital H), emphasise that 
they report directly to the chief operating officer (or director of the operation) as an 
indication of their seniority. This is in line with Hales’ (1998) argument that structural and 
organisational characteristics provide the norms and meanings to those engaging in 
managerial actions. Similarly, in Iran middle managers, of the two hospitals, report directly 
to the director of the operation, whose subject position within the field is a determining 
factor affecting the perception of middle managers on their seniority and autonomy. 
Normative legitimacy and structural legitimacy of the senior managers within the field give 
middle managers the confidence that they can have a better access to the field resources if 
there is no conflict of interests between them and their senior managers. Otherwise, middle 
managers would not be optimistic about their autonomy. 
Hales (1998) also highlights the role of the individual managers’ agency on managerial 
practices. He contends that managers work in a certain way that limits as well as enables 
the future managers to expand their managerial responsibility. According to Hales (1998), 
managers use and reproduce the cognitive rules as interpretive schemes in their managerial 
practices. They also act by drawing on and acting within norms and moral rules. These rules 
provide legitimacy to managerial practices. Managers can alter or reproduce these rules 
which then constrain or facilitate future managerial practices. Hales’ (1998) argument on 
managers’ managerial agency is in line with the concept of institutional work (Lawerence 
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and Suddaby, 2006) which is the ‘purposive action of individuals and organisations aiming at 
creating, maintaining, and disrupting institutions. One of the ways through which middle 
managers get involved in the institutional work is the construction of their identity or 
identity work, which is discussed in the next section. 
6.3. Individual managers’ agency   
 
Identity work 
 
One of the ways through which middle managers get involved in the institutional work is the 
construction of their identity, which is closely intertwined to the institutional logics (Cherim, 
2007; Kellog, 2009; Lock, 2010; Lock and De Rond, 2013). Individuals go through different 
micro-processes including deletion, compartmentalisation, aggregation and integration in 
relation to the logics to construct their identity (Creed, 2013; Pratt and Foreman, 2000 and 
Pache and Santos, 2013b). Depending on their habit, judgment and imagination, they may, 
in response to a new institutional logic, resist some of a new logical identity and action 
implications. However, they may also maintain aspects of both old and new institutional 
logics at the same time (Lock, 2010). In this study, the main two identity works that middle 
managers, in England do are deletion and aggregation, whereas in Iran middle managers do 
deletion and compartmentalisation, although there are a few numbers of middle managers, 
who aggregate the existing logics in the Iranian hospitals (see table 6.3). 
Deletion 
In Iran, some of the middle managers (especially those at the smaller hospital, M) 
internalise the institutional contradiction. They reject that autonomy is in place. They use 
their habitual agency and identify themselves as the medical university agents and the 
operation managers. Similarly, In England, those middle managers with commercial 
background reject that the autonomy is in place. These middle managers have the 
managerial and financial skills but are not inured to the professional bureaucracy of the NHS 
organisations. They use their habitual agency, and as they feel less autonomous, they act 
with more caveats and select the established routines. This is in line with Hales’ (1999) 
argument that when managers face complexity, they embrace the institutional routines to 
avoid uncertainty. These middle managers have fragmented identities as they are 
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accountable for the performance of their directorates/divisions, but they do not feel that 
they are empowered enough. They act as diplomat administrators and change agent, but 
not as leaders, although they are strongly in favour of change.  
This is also the case for the non-clinical young female middle manager at hospital G (in 
England). She has built her career in the NHS; therefore, she knows the work content and 
processes. However, through her identity learning cycle, she views her older clinician male 
colleagues as seniors to her.  She uses her ‘habitual agency’ and acts as an operation 
manager. She tries to maintain her traditional managerial norms; she ‘likes to be close to 
the operation’ and ‘plays safe’.  
Compartmentalisation 
For both clinical and non-clinical middle managers in the Iranian hospitals, one of the main 
determinants of their autonomy is their relationship with senior managers whose support 
deemed to be necessary for middle managers to be able to get access to the resources. 
Some of middle managers in the Iranian hospitals are management graduates from the 
school of management of the medical university. The dean of the management school is one 
of the members of the senior management team of the medical university which holds the 
hospital managers to account for their performance. If the dean has the normative 
legitimacy among other senior managers of the medical university (who are mainly 
clinicians) he can be a good representative of hospital managers at the university level. 
Considering the Pratt et al.’ (2006) framework, it can be argued that for management 
graduates (middle managers), having a good role model at the medical university is a major 
source of social validation affecting their identity construction process. The extent to which 
middle managers in Iran rely on clinicians to be able to influence events and make changes 
indicates that the professionalism is a very strong logic.    
In Iran, middle managers compartmentalise the logics of autonomy and accountability. They 
have autonomy from the senior managers to identify opportunities and develop the ideas 
for service improvements, at the same time they are strictly accountable for managerial 
resources (e.g., HR and finance). They may derive the objectives, but they are not able to 
pursue them. Currie et al. (2008) argue that managers who identify and pursue 
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opportunities can be defined as entrepreneurs. However, middle managers in Iranian 
hospitals rely on their seniors to be able to pursue the opportunities. So, considering the 
typology of Floyd and Wooldridge (1998), their contribution to the strategies is limited to 
‘selling ideas’ to their seniors. Therefore, the majority of middle managers in Iran have 
fragmented identities.  
Having fragmented identities is more evident among the middle managers of the smaller 
hospital (Hospital M) in Iran. The senior managers of hospital M are not as prestigious as 
their counterparts at Hospital Z (the larger hospital). Therefore, middle managers of hospital 
M, who are relying on their senior managers, are less confident about the structural and 
normative legitimacy of their senior managers in the field and their access to the field 
resources. However, variation exists. There is a female middle manager at this hospital (M) 
who has a coherent sense of self and identified herself as a leader. She is a non-clinical 
manager with more than 27 years of experience. She was in charge of implementing quality 
improvement techniques at the medical university of the province prior to her current 
managerial role in the hospital; therefore, she has built a strong network with senior 
managers at the medical university of the province. It seems that experience and career 
path is as important as clinical background and gender for middle managers affecting their 
identity construction process. 
Aggregation  
Drawing on the Pratt et al.’s (2006) framework, it can be argued that middle managers are 
involved in work learning and identity learning cycles. Middle managers try to push the 
boundaries of their work towards the direction that is more aligned with their self-identity. 
They form their identity by reconciling/not reconciling the personal identity and social 
identity. In line with Pache and Santos’ (2013b) argument, the different roles that middle 
managers claim they play depend on their identification with different logics. This study 
shows that the majority of middle managers who have built their career in the NHS and 
know the culture, work content, processes and procedures aggregate the competing logics 
(e.g., managerialism/professionalism and autonomy/accountability) by creating a link 
between these logics. They use their ‘practical evaluative agency’, so their number one 
objective is the patient care while they adhere to the performance management and 
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evaluation rules and standards. They mainly act as change agents. However, there are 
examples of middle managers acting as leaders. Some of the middle managers ‘delegate 
more responsibilities to their subordinates’ to be able to have more focus on strategies.  
Middle managers’ age, gender, financial and managerial ( e.g., negotiating and influencing ) 
skills, career path and experience are identified as influencing factors that can explain the 
differences in the habit, judgment and imagination of the middle managers that 
consequently affect their identity construction processes in the same context. For instance, 
middle managers who have built their career in the NHS, even without clinical background, 
are inured to the NHS culture. They accept the clinical professional dominancy and 
aggregate the managerialism and professionalism. They use their practical evaluative 
agency and draw on the language that resonates with clinicians to pursue their objectives. 
However, their success is, to a large degree, dependent on their financial skills, especially in 
the larger hospital where lack of support services is reported. There are some examples of 
middle managers taking the risk to ‘recruit high profile staff’ without going through the 
formal HR processes or bend the rules to ‘secure funding for buying equipment’. These 
examples are reported by the male, middle-aged middle managers but not by the young 
female middle manager who is in the same category of middle managers, in terms of their 
background.  
Those middle managers who act as leaders, though, seem to be more reactive rather than 
proactive. Considering the typology of Currie et al. (2012), they may act as more ‘political’ 
and ‘stakeholder’ agents rather than ‘entrepreneurial agents’. On the other hand, middle 
managers with managerial and financial skills who came to the NHS after their management 
trainings and have been in the NHS for almost 10 years or more, seem to be more likely to 
use their ‘projective interpretive agency’ and disrupt the status quo, if they have the skills to 
influence and negotiate with clinicians. These managers may be more likely to act as 
entrepreneurial leaders.  
However, there is a female middle manager in this study who has not built her career in the 
NHS, but she has a coherent sense of self. She aggregates the autonomy/accountability and 
managerialism/professionalism logics and identifies herself as an autonomous senior 
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manager. Her experience of working in various public sectors makes her confident to enact 
her managerial role. She uses her ‘practical evaluative agency’; therefore, the autonomy she 
reports is mainly in the form of autonomy from the senior managers’ control, not the 
autonomy to act as an entrepreneurial leader.  
According to Gioia et al. (2012), organisational world is socially constructed, and the people 
constructing their organisational realities are ‘knowledgeable agents’. The people in 
organisations know what they are trying to do and can explain their thoughts, intentions, 
and actions (Gioia et al., 2012. P. 17). Studying organisations through construct elaboration 
helps to gain a deeper knowledge of organisational dynamics. It helps to understand the 
essence of the organisational experience. Studying social construction processes implies 
that we focus more on the means by which organisation members go about constructing 
and understanding their experience and less on the number or frequency of measureable 
occurrences. This, according to Gioia et al. (2012), requires an approach that captures 
concepts relevant to the human organisational experience in terms that are adequate at the 
level of meaning of the people living that experience and adequate at the level of scientific 
theorising about that experience. In line with Gioia et al.’s (2012) argument, the following 
table shows a few examples of how the researcher has moved from the respondents’ views 
to the theoretical concept. 
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Table 6.3  English Middle managers’ views on their identity 
 Middle 
managers 
Quote Code 
(MMs’ responses 
to the logics) 
Concept 
(identity work) 
role 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
England  
 
 
Clinical  
‘I was happy being a nurse and I 
am happy to be a manager too. 
It gives me visibility and 
credibility’ (Ann, GM, hospital G) 
MM adopts 
multiple 
identities 
Aggregation of 
institutional logic 
(professionalism and 
managerial-ism) 
MM with good financial 
and managerial skill use 
projective interpretive 
agency and disrupt the 
status quo and act as a 
leader 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Non-clinical  
From the NHS: 
 
‘Our kind of number one 
objective is to provide the best 
patient experience in this city.... 
And I guess in addition to sort of 
patient experience to waiting 
times and our external regulator 
and financial performance, 
there’s also the governance side 
of things’( Jane, GM, hospital G) 
MM adheres to 
both logics 
Aggregation of 
institutional logic 
(professionalism and 
managerial-ism 
MM uses practical 
agency to pursue 
objectives and act as the 
change agent  
 
MM with good 
negotiating and 
influencing skills use 
projective interpretive 
agency and act as 
leaders  
From commercial sector : 
 
We are told we are the decision 
makers, but actually, we are not 
because the board makes the 
decisions (Sue, GM, hospital G) 
 
MM does not 
adopt an 
empowered 
identity  
Deletion ( of autonomy)  
 
MM uses habitual 
agency and play the 
change agent role  
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Table 6.3  Iranian Middle managers’ views on their identity 
 Middle 
managers 
Quote Code 
(MMs’ responses 
to the logics) 
Concept 
(identity work) 
role 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Iran  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clinical  
 
‘I think I have autonomy when 
senior managers are not around 
because I can take decisions, but 
when they are around I have to 
follow them.’ (Zahra, MM, 
hospital M). 
MM adopts an 
empowered identity 
at one time but does 
not adopt this 
identity at another 
time 
Compartmentalisation  MM uses her projective 
interpretive agency and act 
as a leader when she is the 
only decision maker but 
uses her practical 
evaluation  and act as 
change agent when obeys 
the senior managers 
Experienced clinical MM: 
‘I attend senior management 
team meetings, I discuss the 
issues with them, I challenge 
them’(Kian, MM, hospital Z) 
 
MM adopts an 
empowered identity  
 
 
Aggregation of institutional 
logic (professionalism and 
managerial-ism 
 
MM with good relationship 
with seniors and good 
managerial skills use 
projective interpretive 
agency and act as a leader 
 
 
 
 
Non-clinical  
More experienced MM: 
 
‘I have put a lot of effort and 
energy to my work, but I feel that 
I don’t have the authority’(Ali, 
MM, hospital M) 
MM does not adopt 
an empowered 
identity 
Deletion ( of autonomy)  
 
Use practical evaluation  
and act as change agent 
Less experienced with good 
relationship with senior 
managers: 
‘He [the director of operation] is 
a supportive boss. I feel I am 
supported, trusted, and 
valued’(Jasmine, MM, hospital Z) 
 
MM adopts 
empowered identity 
 
Aggregation of institutional 
logic (professionalism and 
managerial-ism 
 
use practical evaluation 
and draw on senior 
managers support to 
pursue their objectives  
and act as leaders 
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Summary  
Comparing the middle managers' autonomy in the two countries of this study (England 
and Iran), it is vital to look at the underlying factors affecting middle managers 
autonomy at different levels (i.e., macro, meso and micro level). First, in line with 
Hales’ (1999) framework, which emphasises the role of resources on managers' 
autonomy and identity, it can be argued that at the national level there are fewer 
funds allocated to the healthcare services in Iran compared to England. The health 
expenditure in England is 9.4% of GDP (Gross Domestic products) while this figure is 
6% in Iran. Also, there are less human resources available in Iran, for instance for one 
thousand people there are 1.4 nurses and midwives while this figure is 8.8 in England. 
In addition, the centralised structure of the government and its emphasis on the inputs 
has even limited managers more in Iran compared to England where the emphasis is 
more on the output and meeting the targets.  
Considering the macro-level institutional factors (e.g., Logics, actors and governance), 
it seems that professionalism is still stronger than managerialism in Iran compared to 
England. The role of the medical professionals to get access to the field resources is 
evident. Therefore, building good relationships with senior medical managers is vital to 
be able to secure funding. In England professionalism and managerialism are two 
strong competing logics and having professionals from different backgrounds in multi-
professional teams requires a lot of negotiating and influencing skills especially on the 
side of the managers.  
In Iran, medical university of the province is a strong institutional actor affecting the 
extent of autonomy hospital managers can exercise. The medical university is the 
ultimate power before the ministry of health and is in charge of distributing the 
financial and human resources to the public hospital (Davari et al., 2012).   The medical 
professionals are also strong actors; they increase the patients' demand for private 
sector services in the urban areas in Iran that has led to the flow of financial and 
human resources to the private sector. This has left the public sector managers 
including the middle managers with fewer resources compared to their private 
counterparts. In England, the arms-length regulatory bodies and commissioning bodies 
affect the public hospital managers’ autonomy to a great extent. This means that the 
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autonomy of middle managers is more than ever accompanied with a high level of 
accountability. 
At the meso-level, the organisational characteristics affect the middle managers' 
autonomy and identity. In this study, middle managers in the larger hospital in Iran 
report a higher degree of autonomy. This reflects the strength of the professionalism 
in Iran and also the participative style of management at this hospital. Working with 
medical professional elites with a high level of structural and normative legitimacy in 
the larger hospital, middle managers developed a more empowered identity. They 
identify themselves with the organisational goals. Their autonomy is in the form of 
autonomy to act as entrepreneurial leader; however, their proactive and strategic 
contribution is limited to selling ideas (i.e., channelling the information upwards). This 
has left middle managers with fragmented identities. They report that they have 
autonomy to identify opportunities, but due to lack of financial and human resources, 
they do not have autonomy to peruse their objectives.  
Middle managers in the smaller hospital in Iran who do not work with senior managers 
with a high level of structural and normative legitimacy identify themselves as 
operation managers. The behaviour of middle managers is also affected by ‘horizontal 
autonomy’ (Exworthy and Frossini, 2008) which can be the result of the contextual 
factors such as the financial position of the hospitals, the relationship of hospitals with 
other organisations and organisational capacity.  
In England, middle managers are bounded by central policies and targets, but they 
have more managerial autonomy. However, unlike the middle managers in Iran, in 
England middle managers in the larger hospital report they have less autonomy 
compared to their counterpart in the smaller hospital. In England, managerialism is as 
strong as the professionalism. Although in the larger hospital in England there are 
eminent clinical managers but as middle managers have a larger hierarchy above them 
and that their decisions have a greater implication for the rest of the organisation, they 
feel more restricted compared to the middle managers at the smaller hospital.  
 Middle managers do not respond to the organisational and institutional context 
identically. Middle managers age, gender, career path, experience, and skills shape 
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their individual agency dimensions (i.e., habit, judgment, imagination).They perform 
extensive identity work. In both countries, clinical middle managers who have good 
managerial, financial and influencing and negotiating skills use their projective 
interpretive agency to derive and pursue their objectives. This is in line with the 
findings of Proctor et al. ‘(1999) study in the NHS that middle managers take 
advantage of empowerment rhetoric to improve their position and develop the extent 
of their roles.   
In Iran, clinical managers, who do not have influencing and negotiating skills, and do 
not build good relationship with senior managers (who are mainly medical 
professionals), use their practical evaluation and act as change agent. Using the 
concept of internal stratification introduced by Friedson (2001), it can be argued that 
medical elites have maintained their professional dominancy and protect themselves 
from the managerial bureaucracy. 
Non-clinical managers in both countries can use their projective interpretive agency if 
they can build a good relationship with clinicians and as long as their interests are not 
in conflict with medical professionals. As Currie et al. (2012) argue if clinicians have 
conflicting interests with managers, they act as institutional agent and maintain the 
institutional routines to protect their privileged position. This study shows that 
experienced non-clinical middle managers in Iran are not optimistic about their access 
to the resources through their senior medical managers.  
Autonomy is not a clear cut property; it is constantly contested and negotiated. 
Autonomy affects the identity construction processes and the types of identity 
adopted by middle managers. In England, middle managers perform within the 
financial framework, dealing with central policies and standard procedures and they 
need to meet central targets. They experience role dissonance as they are responsible 
for the smooth day-to-day running of the organisational functions and on the other 
hand, they have to innovate and meet the performance targets. However, they have a 
more coherent sense of self as they aggregate the accountability and autonomy logics 
compared to the Iranian middle managers. Hospital middle managers in Iran deal with 
more general policies and principles, and they can grow their services more freely 
compared to their counterparts in England. However, their managerial autonomy over 
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the resources is very limited.   This has led to cognitive dissonance for middle 
managers, which means they are morally confused about reconciling their professional 
values with their professional obligations. They have fragmented identities as they 
develop an empowered identity in one area but a disempowered identity in another.  
In line with Hales’ (1999) argument, only granting autonomy to managers cannot 
change their behaviour. However, it is a necessary element for those managers who 
are willing to act as entrepreneurial leaders as it helps them develop an identity which 
is aligned with their sense of self.  This is in line with Parker’s (2014) argument that 
non-autonomous and bureaucratic environments reduce the internalisation that is the 
process through which an employee develops an identity in line with the self.  
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Chapter Seven: Conclusions, Implications and 
Recommendations 
 
This chapter comprises of three main sections. Section 7.1 provides a summary of the 
overall aims of the study and the methodology used to meet those aims. Section 7.2 
emphasises the study’s original contribution to the overall knowledge. Section 7.3 
reflects on the implications of the study, while Section 7.4 outlines the limitations of 
the study and recommendations for future research. 
7.1 Summary of the study 
Middle managers form a significant occupational category in organisations. They 
perform a vital role as they sit between the operational and strategic personnel (Floyd 
and Wooldridge, 1997; Currie and Procter, 2001; Balogun, 2003; Hyde et al., 2011; 
Currie et al., 2014). The roles of middle managers vary a lot depending upon the type 
and the structure of the organisation, where middle managers responsibilities increase 
with the expansion of the flat organisations (Dopson and Stewart 1990, Hales 2006, 
Buchanan 2013). 
 
Middle managers perform a wide variety of tasks, which include both managerial and 
professional tasks. They are in the middle of the organisational hierarchy so, they 
communicate within the organisation in different directions (i.e., upward, downward 
and lateral). They span the boundaries and behave as representatives of their 
organisations. Middle managers work is characterised by considerable workload and 
pressure (Hales, 2006). 
In some of the management literature, middle managers have been criticised for being 
a block between operational and strategic levels of the organisations. They are seen as 
being costly, unable to act as entrepreneurs, political instead of problem solver and 
inefficient to link the top-level to the front-line managers (Scarborough and Burrell, 
1996; Balogun, 2003). Middle managers have been the agent as well as the target of 
the change. Therefore, it is not surprising that they sometimes resist the organisational 
change (Balogun, 2003). Despite the environmental pressures in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, the middle managers still play an important role in organisations (McGurk, 
2011, p. 15). Middle managers have to play several roles with regard to the varying 
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conditions. These roles, however, have been changed recently. Some of the scholars 
have emphasised the role of the middle managers in strategic change (Currie and 
Procter, 2001, 2005), where they help their employees to adapt to the organisational 
change. Middle managers who paid attention to the emotions of their employees 
while implementing the organisational change made a great contribution to the 
organisational change as well as its continuity. 
Other than balancing the organisational change and stability, middle managers need to 
balance their managerial and leadership roles. The managerial role refers to the formal 
control processes that coordinate the activities, while the leadership role is the 
informal process of influencing and inspiring the members of a group to achieve the 
objectives, that of both the group and/or organisation (Shackleton, 1995).  
In healthcare organisations, middle managers acted as administrators until the mid-
1980s. Before that, the healthcare organisations were professional bureaucracies 
dominated by the doctors. All the important decisions regarding service delivery were 
made by the doctors (Mintzberg, 1995). The doctors were in control of designing the 
service delivery and monitoring its performance. They rejected any reforms that 
challenged their authority (Ferlie et al., 1996; Ackroyd, 1996; Dopson, 1996; Thomas 
and Hewitt, 2011). During that time, the middle managers were only negotiating the 
professional needs and demands of the hospitals (Harrison and Pollitt, 1994). 
In the NHS, middle managers came into power as a result of the inception of the 
internal market and general management policies introduced under the NPM 
paradigm during the 1980s. However, the central government control, doctors’ power, 
and the political context of health care organisations limited their ability to operate 
fully as managers. These managers were expected to enact strategic roles, but they 
were the targets of redundancy at the same time (Currie, 2006). More recently, in the 
debates of middle managers, there is an emphasis on entrepreneurialism and enacting 
a more ‘proactive strategic role’ (Currie, 2006). 
In Iran, during the 1980s and 1990s, the role of middle managers in the health care 
organisations was limited to enact operational roles, as the power and authority 
stayed at the top (Amirshahi, 1997). Middle managers were selected and recruited on 
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the basis of their loyalty to the Islamic ideology rather than competence and skills. 
They were not given decision-making power from senior managers because they 
lacked the required skills. Furthermore, the decision making power was not delegated 
to the middle managers from the senior managers as the senior managers themselves 
lacked legal autonomy. Therefore, the middle managers served mostly as 
administrators (Abeddi et al., 2008). During the last decade in line with the 
development of HRM (Namazie and Frame, 2007; Yeganeh and Su, 2008; Soltani, 2010) 
there is more emphasis on their contribution, in a sense that the middle managers now 
can make decisions towards the strategic objectives of the healthcare organisations 
(Khachian et al., 2012). 
 
It is assumed that granting autonomy to the local organisations and the inception of 
semi-autonomous hospitals (FTs in England and BTs in Iran) would give managers 
(including MMs) more autonomy to act proactively and innovatively. The middle 
managers’ subjective sense of their autonomy reflects the institutional rules and 
resources of the context within which they perform their managerial roles. Structural 
and environmental characteristics provide middle managers with different levels of 
autonomy. Also, all managers do not respond identically to a given environment.  
This research aimed to: 
 Explore the extent of autonomy hospital middle managers exercise in both 
developed (England) and developing (Iran) countries  
 Explain the impact of public management reforms on middle managers’ 
autonomy in the two countries 
 Identify the similarities and differences of middle managers’ responses to 
management reforms. 
In order to address the main research objectives the following specific research 
questions were posed: 
Research question 1: To what extent do hospital middle managers in England and Iran 
have autonomy? 
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Research question 2: How do public management reforms affect middle managers’ 
autonomy? 
Research question 3: How do middle managers of the two countries respond to these 
reforms?  
In order to address the research questions, an interpretive paradigm, corresponding to 
social constructivism, was adopted to explore the middle managers’ perceptions and 
responses to their autonomy. The theoretical perspective and research approach were 
justified according to the research aim and specific questions. In this sense, the 
researcher was influenced by the desire to understand how middle managers 
described and understood their autonomy.  
Data were collected from interviews with forty-five middle managers, observational 
fieldwork and documentary analysis across four teaching university hospitals in 
England and Iran. These hospitals were the first wave applicants of FT and BT (semi-
autonomous) status in England and Iran. Data from interview transcripts were 
analysed thematically using Ritchie and Spencer’s framework (1994). Accordingly, the 
themes were identified from the data. They were charted, and an outline of the 
analytical framework was developed.  This framework was revised and refined as more 
data was gathered.  Also, Gioia et al.’s framework (2012) is used to explain how the 
researcher has moved from the data to the theoretical concept.  
 
This study shows that middle managers’ autonomy is constrained in the two countries 
in different ways. In England, middle managers have financial and human resources 
but government’s policies and targets constrain their autonomy. In Iran, middle 
managers are less constrained by government policy and targets but they do not have 
financial and human resources to exercise autonomy.  Unbalanced autonomy causes 
tension and frustration for middle managers in both countries.  
According to Hales’ (1999) framework, it can be argued that the existing rules and 
resources limit middle managers’ autonomy in the two countries. In England, middle 
managers face competing logics as a result of management reforms (mainly in the 
form of hospital autonomy here). They are expected to exercise autonomy, while the 
accountability regimes and central targets are being increased. Although the regulative 
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aspects of managerialism have been strong during the past decades (e.g., through 
performance measurements targets), professionalism still strongly endures that affects 
the behaviours of the middle managers. 
In Iran, middle managers are expected to drive entrepreneurial objectives, but they are 
relying on senior medical managers to be able to pursue those objectives. Although 
some management reforms such as decentralising of the healthcare system and 
granting hospital autonomy have been implemented, professionalism is still the main 
logic affecting the behaviour of middle managers. In addition, central government 
controls on resources have limited the managerial autonomy of hospital middle 
managers.  Considering the decision space framework of Bossert (1998) which 
addresses the vertical local autonomy of hospitals, it can be argued that, in Iran, 
middle managers’ autonomy over resources and their choices for the insurance plan is 
low. The behaviour of middle managers is also affected by ‘horizontal autonomy’ 
(Exworthy and Frossini, 2008) which can be the result of the contextual factors such as 
the financial position of the hospitals, the relationship of hospitals with other 
organisations and organisational capacity.  
Finally, middle managers do not respond to the organisational and institutional context 
identically. Middle managers age, gender, background, experience, and skills shape 
their individual agency dimensions (i.e., habit, judgment, imagination). In both 
countries, clinical middle managers who have good managerial, financial and 
influencing and negotiating skills use their projective interpretive agency to derive and 
pursue their objectives. This is in line with the findings of Proctor et al.’s (1999) study 
in the NHS that middle managers take the advantage of empowerment rhetoric to 
improve their position and develop the extent of their roles.   
In Iran, clinical managers who do not have influencing and negotiating skills, and do 
not build good relationship with senior managers (who are mainly medical 
professionals), use their practical evaluation and act as change agent. Using the 
concept of internal stratification introduced by Friedson (2001), it can be argued that 
medical elites have maintained their professional dominancy and protect themselves 
from the managerial bureaucracy. 
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Non-clinical managers in both countries can use their projective interpretive agency if 
they can build a good relationship with clinicians and as long as their interests are not 
in conflict with medical professionals. This is in line with Currie et al.’s (2012) argument 
that if clinicians have conflicting interests with managers, they act as institutional 
agent and maintain the institutional routines to protect their privileged position. This 
study shows that experienced non-clinical middle managers in Iran are not optimistic 
about their access to the resources through their senior medical managers.  
Middle managers in both countries are increasingly encouraged to identify and pursue 
opportunities and to adopt entrepreneurial identity; as well as ensuring the smooth 
running of the hospital. Middle managers do extensive identity work as a result of 
facing these competing logics. Clinical middle managers with good managerial skills as 
well as non-clinical middle managers with good negotiating and influencing skills 
aggregate the multiple logics while forging links between them. These middle 
managers in both countries have multiple identities. In their managerial practices, they 
reconcile the financial and clinical aspects of service delivery. Middle managers play 
the different roles as diplomat, change agent and entrepreneurial leader. However, 
the extent to which middle managers within the same hospital identify themselves as 
manager and/or leader/entrepreneur depends on the institutional and organisational 
elements as well as the middle managers’ agency. Individual middle managers depend 
on their ‘habit, judgment, and imagination’ (Emirbayer and Mische 1998) push the 
boundaries of their work towards the direction which is more aligned with their self-
identity. This multi-level dimensions of agency help to explain the difference in 
managerial practices of individual middle managers.  
7.2. Original contribution to knowledge 
 
This study contributes to the literature which emphasises the role of context on the 
managerial practices and behaviour, firstly. It compares the middle managers’ 
autonomy in two different country contexts and shows that middle managers’ 
autonomy, in England, is constrained by government policy and targets, while, in Iran, 
middle managers’ autonomy is constrained by central control over the financial and 
human resources. According to the neo-institutional theory, institutional elements 
including regulative, normative and cultural –cognitive pillars (Scott, 2000) affect the 
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subjective sense of middle managers of their autonomy and identity (Hales, 1999) and 
how they behave within the organisations.  
The autonomy that middle managers in England report is more about the autonomy 
from the senior managers' control. As they have the standardised work processes and 
certain targets to meet, they can exercise autonomy as long as they adhere to the 
criteria and stay within the deliberate frameworks (e.g., financial envelope). Middle 
managers receive similar messages about the limitations they face in different areas 
(e.g., input, process and outcome). They deal with less cognitive dissonance compared 
to their counterparts in Iran. Middle managers in England, aggregate different logics 
(e.g., financial and clinical aspects of service delivery) and develop a more coherent 
sense of self.  They mainly act as change agents.  
However, in Iran, the autonomy that middle managers report is more about the 
‘autonomy to’ act as entrepreneurial leaders. They have limited resources, so they are 
encouraged to come up with the ideas to improve the service delivery processes, and 
outcomes without drawing financial implications. However, middle managers in Iran 
do not necessarily act as entrepreneurial leaders as they face uncertainty and 
ambiguity. They received contradictory messages, as they are encouraged to develop 
entrepreneurial objectives but they have no control over pursuing these objectives.  
The argument is the autonomy that middle managers exercise in Iran is more 
unbalanced compared to middle managers autonomy in England. Therefore, middle 
managers in England have a more coherent sense of self, compared to middle 
managers in Iran who have more fragmented identities. In Iran, middle managers 
mostly act as change agents rather than entrepreneurial leaders.  
Considering the Scott’s (2000) institutional pillars framework (consists of institutional 
logics, actors and governance), it can be argued that in England, middle managers face 
managerialism and professionalism as two strong competing logics, while in Iran, 
professionalism is still stronger. It seems that managerialism is not implemented 
completely, in Iran, as the government still manages the resources of public sector 
centrally which limits the resources available to the managers. In addition, the medical 
professionals are strong actors who encourage the patients to receive their treatment 
from the private hospitals, which leads to the flow of the resources from the public to 
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the private sector. This also adds to the lack of available resources to middle managers 
in public hospitals. These institutional factors affect the extent of autonomy middle 
managers can exercise in the two countries, which consequently affect the identity 
that these middle managers develop.   
Secondly, this study contributes to the public management reforms literature which 
discusses the similarities and differences of public sector reforms across different 
countries. This study supports Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011)’s argument that challenges 
the notion of convergence that is on the basis of the idea that management reforms 
reduce the extent of national differences. It shows that with regards to the 
implementation of NPM, there are elements of path dependency in the two countries. 
The emphasis on the result rather than the inputs is one of the goals of NPM reforms, 
such as decentralisation and managerialism. This is more evident in the English cases 
while in the Iranian cases it can be argued that there is still a strong central control of 
the inputs. According to the neo-institutionalism, the institutional elements have 
limited the implementation of decentralisation ideas in practice.  The administration 
culture, in Iran, is based on the lines of hierarchy and authority which is rooted in the 
Weber’s rational bureaucracy. However, the dominant administrative culture, in 
England, is ‘public interest’. The normative and cultural-cognitive elements of the 
societies with public administration tradition make the implementation of managerial 
changes more acceptable.  
Another contribution is towards the literature on HRM regarding the role of the agency 
on managerial behaviours and practices. The notion of embedded agency helps explain 
that individual middle managers within the same hospital may have a different 
perception and understanding of the institutional and environmental elements by their 
habits, judgments and imaginations. The differences in their perception affect their 
identity construction process and the type of identity they develop or establish. This 
study shows that career path, experience and skills are important factors that 
influence the identity development process or adopting a certain identity. This 
supports that although organisations are strong environments, middle managers do 
not respond to the environmental factors identically. Therefore, it is important to 
acknowledge the individual differences.  
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The inter-relation between institutions and agency have been analysed at both 
national and local level.  The ‘institutional pillars’ and ‘institutional work’ frameworks 
help to capture the relative importance of institutional pillars at different levels and 
different cases. At the national level rules and regulations can explain some similarities 
and differences of managers’ perception and their practices in the two countries, while 
at the organisational level, local culture and norms are more effective. This study also 
shows that how institutional logics (here, autonomy/accountability and 
managerialism/professionalism) are understood at the individual level (e.g., middle 
managers) and how they may respond to those logics. This study adopts the notion of 
identity work following McGivern et al.’s (2015) study.   Identity work is considered as 
an institutional work to add the different dimensions of agency (habit, judgment and 
imagination) to the institutional pillars framework. Therefore, the individuals’ intention 
and purposive action which in turn affect the institutions have been captured.  
 
In addition, this study contributes to the empirical value of neo-institutional theory by 
undertaking multi-level analysis in the two different countries. In this study, the macro-
level elements (institutional pillars), meso-level (organisational features) as well as the 
micro level factors (meaning that individual middle managers give to these elements) 
have been taken into account. Combining the two frameworks (institutional pillars and 
institutional work) helps capture both top-down and bottom-up effects on managers’ 
behaviour. It helps make a link between managers’ perception and their practices.  
Macfarlane et al. (2013, p.11) give examples of the ‘traditional studies in the NHS 
(Currie&Guah, 2007; Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006; Hughes & Vincent-Jones, 2008; 
McNulty & Ferlie, 2004)’ that applied neo-institutional theory to capture the changes 
in the organisational environment as a result of changes in the institutional pillars. 
They (Macfarlane et al., 2013, p.11) also refer to the later studies of ‘Checkland et al. 
(2012) on commissioning in the UK NHS’, and of Macfarlane et al. (2011) on NHS senior 
managers.  They argue that in these two studies neo-institutionalism applied to 
address the organisational life at the meso-level and micro-level, respectively. This 
study contributes to this strand of the literature that, drawing on neo-institutional-ism, 
emphasises the role of the individuals in reproducing the organisational environment.  
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Finally, it can be argued that in most of the cross-country comparative research the 
focus is on national cultures. In much of these studies, it is assumed that the national 
culture and norms are the primary determinants of managerial perception and their 
practices, while it is difficult to see a clear link between the norms and values, and 
managers’ identities and practices (Almond and Gonzalez Menendez, 2014). This study 
challenges the idea that cultural values are the primary explanatory variable of 
managerial approaches and practices.  
 
7.3. Implications 
Implementations of similar management reforms may lead to formulations and 
implementation of different policies across different contexts and within the same 
context. Each stage of policy development (from the idea and talk to decision and 
implementation), can be affected by the macro-level institutional factors (politico-
administrative, economic and cultural aspects) of a particular context. These macro-
level institutional elements incorporate the environments and structures within which 
organisations operate, and can affect the way organisations and their members think, 
decide and behave. On the other hand, organisations and their members act as 
institutional actors that can define, interpret, and disrupt those institutions. How 
organisations and members perceive their position, identity and autonomy affect their 
purposive actions and their influence on the institutions. Therefore, in each context 
both institutional and intentional factors need to be considered when setting up a 
policy. 
 
Furthermore, autonomy is a multi-dimensional concept. Granting autonomy in one 
area and lack of autonomy in another area can cause tension and frustration for 
managers in healthcare organisations. Hence, health systems which are seeking to 
devolve autonomy to middle managers must appreciate the multidimensional nature 
of the autonomy, as well as the wider environment that organisations are embedded 
in if they are about to improve the performance of middle managers and their 
organisations. In order to compare the outcome of the decentralising the healthcare 
systems and granting more autonomy to public hospitals in Iran and England, it is 
important to consider both institutional and intentional factors that influence the 
outcome of policy implementation.   
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Middle managers do not respond to the structural and environmental changes 
identically. Therefore, merely granting autonomy to middle managers cannot change 
their behaviour. Middle managers’ experience and career path affect their skills and 
motivation, and how they use their autonomy. Middle managers may not benefit from 
increased autonomy, and use their autonomy effectively if they do not have enough 
experience. Also, those who do not have the understanding of the healthcare 
organisations’ culture and cannot build a good relationship with medical professional 
elites might not be able to exercise autonomy.  
 
Middle managers who come to the healthcare organisations from commercial sectors 
need to develop their understanding of the professional bureaucracy and the role of 
the professional elites within the healthcare organisations. They require developing 
extensive influencing and negotiating skills to have effective communication with 
clinicians.  On the other hand, clinician managers need to develop their financial skills. 
Lack of financial skills could restrict the contribution of the middle managers to and 
their influences on the organisations’ strategies and long-term planning especially in 
large organisations within which middle managers have to share the support services 
with the managers of other directorates and/or divisions.  
 
Therefore, learning and skills development is crucial for middle managers. It is vital to 
provide middle managers with coaching and mentoring that enable them to develop 
their skills and knowledge to improve their performance. More experienced managers 
can play an important role as the coach or mentor if they are willing to do so. They can 
give middle managers guidance on what they need to learn and also feedback on their 
performance. However, effective coaching and mentoring require rapport, trust, 
effective communication skills and motivation.  
 
This study supports the previous evidence (Bossert, 1998; Hales, 1999; Meyer and 
Hammershmid, 2009; Exworthy et al., 2010; Caza, 2011) that decentralising of decision 
making and increased autonomy need to go hand in hand with developing the 
leadership and managerial skills of managers within those organisations. Specifically, 
considering the clinical professional dominancy within the hospitals, it is important to 
develop the clinical leadership. Clinical leaders, who are engaged in clinical as well as 
 
 
 
 
223 
 
managerial aspects of service delivery, can inspire and influence the clinicians to meet 
the managerial targets. This helps middle managers to achieve their objectives. 
 
In addition, decentralisation and granting autonomy could add to the uncertainty and 
ambiguity for middle managers. As Hales (1999) argues, with the rise of uncertainty 
and ambiguity, managers try to stick to the institutional routines to avoid uncertainty. 
Therefore, there is a need to develop an environment within which middle managers 
can have easy access to and open communication with senior managers so that middle 
managers can propose what they think is right to do and get feedback from 
experienced senior managers. Open communications help middle managers voice their 
concern, and encourage their ideas and suggestions. Armstrong and Taylor (2014) 
suggest that the objectives, strategies, policies and the organisation performance need 
to be communicated two ways (i.e., upward and downward). For middle managers, it 
is important to have face-to-face communication with their senior managers. This is a 
common approach which increases commitment and trust (Armstrong and Taylor, 
2014). However, its success is to a large extent depends on the skills of the managers.   
 
Communication enables senior managers to inform the middle managers on matters 
that concern them. It also helps middle managers have their voice, which refers to 
providing an opportunity for middle managers to contribute to the decision making. 
Therefore, it is important that senior managers review the existing forms of voice and 
discuss their effectiveness and evaluate whether there is a need for improving the 
current arrangements. The challenge is planning for voice requires briefing and 
training those who are involved (Armstrong and Taylor, 2014). 
 
Middle managers with different backgrounds have different skills, and they give 
different responses to the environment. Having them in multi-professional teams 
could bring diverse insights and perspectives. Multi-professional teams ensure that 
various skills and talents are present (Cross and Carbery, 2016).  This will lead to 
improving the quality of health services. However, it may get difficult to reach an 
agreement and make a consensus decision in these teams. To reduce the conflict 
among the team members, middle managers with a clinical background need to 
develop their managerial and financial skills. On the other hand, non-clinical middle 
managers need to develop their influencing and negotiating skills. They need to be 
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able to make business cases and communicate the cost and benefit of their proposed 
plan. In England, one of the challenges for middle managers is that they need to get 
the essential support (from IT, HR, and finance departments) to be able to make the 
realistic projection of the added value or return on investment. In Iran, middle 
managers need to get the required resources to manage with when they provide a 
convincing business case. In line with the structural theory of power (Kanter, 1997), it 
is important to provide middle managers with access to information, appropriate 
resources and support to perform their task at a high level of achievement.  
Senior managers are influential on the process of identity construction of middle 
managers. Whether senior managers delegate/not delegate the middle managers 
authority and autonomy is an important driver for middle managers to develop an 
empowered identity. If senior managers are to encourage the middle managers to 
adopt an entrepreneurial identity, they need to develop a supportive work 
environment within the hospitals. When middle managers can exercise autonomy and 
make decisions, they feel more confident and motivated to perform effectively and 
efficiently. Empowered employees are more likely to take the initiative, use their 
projective agency and identify and pursue opportunities to improve the performance 
of their organisations (Cross and Carbery, 2016). However, individual middle managers 
dependent on their habit, judgment and imagination adopt a certain identity. 
Therefore, organisational and individual drivers need to be aligned to improve the 
entrepreneurial behaviour of middle managers.  
Policy makers and senior managers may need to take into account that the pressures 
of both input and output control could lead MMs to go over the rigid policies and bend 
the rules to be able to achieve their objectives. This is in line with the findings of a 
recent study on front-line and middle managers in the NHS by Mccann et al. (2015). 
They state: ‘in response to the organisational tensions the behaviour of many frontline 
and mid-management staffs ultimately reflects a form of street-level bureaucracy’ 
(Mccann et al., 2015, p.1). It is important for organisations to appreciate that if they 
place too much pressure on middle managers it can cause tension and stress, and the 
result can be counterproductive.  
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7.4. Limitations and recommendations for future research  
Limitations  
This study like any other studies has its limitations. First of all, the main method used 
in this study is the semi-structured interview, which is a subjective technique and can 
be susceptible to researcher bias. The responses of middle managers in this study 
could be a reflection of the social encounter between the researcher and the 
managers rather than their personal beliefs. In addition, the middle managers in this 
study may not have expressed their actual perception during the interview; rather they 
may have told stories to show that they are heroic managers. To reduce the 
respondent bias, triangulation was applied by eliciting the views of other key managers 
such as HR and finance managers and also senior managers.  
 
This research has been conducted in two cases (hospitals) in Iran and two cases in 
England to highlight the impact of context on managerial practices and behaviour. 
However, it has limitations regarding representativeness and generalisability. It may 
increase the possibility of generalisability and be more illuminating to study more 
cases in different countries, but it would also yield a more complex result.  
Another limitation is this study has looked at the middle managers’ autonomy in semi-
autonomous hospitals in England (FTs) and Iran (BTs). In order to explore the effect of 
organisational characteristics on middle managers’ autonomy, it would be more 
informative to elicit middle managers’ views in both semi-autonomous and non-
autonomous hospitals in the two countries. However, it was beyond the scope of this 
study and, again, would add more complexity to the research findings.  
This research has looked at the background of middle managers. Clinical and non-
clinical background affects the middle managers’ views on the structural and 
environmental elements, affecting their autonomy and practices in the health care 
organisations. It is important to conduct a deeper analysis between these two groups 
of middle managers’ autonomy especially in the context of Iranian healthcare where 
less resource in this area is available. However, as this research was a comparative 
study of the two countries, it would take a lot of time and resources which were 
limited. 
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 Recommendation for future studies  
Middle managers’ perception of their autonomy reflects the environmental and 
structural characteristics of the context within which they enact their managerial role. 
Comparing middle managers’ autonomy in semi-autonomous and non-autonomous 
hospitals in each country could capture more details about the impact of public 
management reforms on hospitals.   
Future studies can capture more details of middle managers by considering their 
credentials and how these credentials are relevant to the career of middle managers. 
This would reveal to what extent middle managers value autonomy and the degree to 
which they are able and willing to exercise autonomy. It is also important to explore 
whether middle managers exercise autonomy in the same way in the same 
organisation. This study may explain the impact of individual middle managers’ agency 
on their behaviour and practices. 
It is also worth to conduct a deep analysis to capture the perception of hybrid and non-
hybrid middle managers’ on their autonomy in each country. This could be an 
indication of the strength of different institutional logics. It may also help to explain 
how clinical background helps a nurse manager who has done clinical practice in one 
area, but he/she is a general manager in another area. 
It would be interesting to look at the career path of the middle managers. If they were 
to be promoted to a senior management level, how would they treat their middle 
managers? How their experience of being a middle manager affects their relationship 
with their middle managers? Moreover, if they are still middle managers, has their 
level of autonomy increased as they become more experienced? 
Also, middle managers of the Iranian hospitals in this study did not report any thoughts 
regarding the impacts of gender on their identity. It would be interesting to look at the 
career path of female managers in more depth and see how gender can affect their 
role and identity within hospitals.  
Finally, possessing leadership skills is an important issue for middle managers with the 
rise of emphasis on the notion of distributed leadership in the healthcare 
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organisations. It is important to look at this concept from the middle managers 
perspectives and different levels of staff who work in close collaboration with middle 
managers.  
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documents must be submitted to the relevant NHS organisations. 
 
Title: 
 
 
Start Date: End Date: 
NHS organisation(s): Dept(s): Proposed 
research 
activities: 
Manager in 
NHS 
organisation: 
    
    
    
 
Amendments to the Research Passport  
 
Please state what these are, e.g. they might be a change in name or employment details, 
or a change in research activities.  
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Please check with the NHS organisation where you are undertaking your research if you 
are unsure whether you will need to submit new evidence of pre-engagement checks on 
a new Research Passport form, which will need to be validated by the NHS 
organisation(s) hosting your research. 
 
Date Old Details New Details 
Office use only 
NHS R&D 
contact details 
and signature 
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
To add more projects please copy this page or download further blank pages. Each 
appendix page should be numbered. 
 
For office use only:  
A photocopy of the appendix should be retained whenever any amendments or additions 
to the appendix are made. 
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Appendix 2. Interview schedule  
 
The purpose of this interview is to elicit your views and experience about the extent of 
autonomy you have in your job. This interview approximately takes one hour. Your 
participation is voluntary and you may withdraw from this study at any time without 
justifying your decision. You can stop the interviewer at any point if you have any questions 
or if you need more clarifications. Interviews are being recorded and the transcription of the 
record will only be seen by the researcher. 
 
1. Background  
a. What is your job title? 
b. What is your background? ( clinical/non-clinical) 
c. How long have you been in this post? 
d. Which responsibilities/roles are parts of your position within the trust? 
e. How long have you been working in the NHS? 
f. Do you consider yourself as a middle manager? What do you understand by 
term middle /senior manager? What roles do you think these titles encompass? 
 
2. Job 
a. What responsibilities do you have? 
b. Is your work based on routines? 
c. How are you being held accountable? 
d. Do you negotiate with other managers to make decisions? 
e. What will happen if something goes wrong? 
f. Do you delegate responsibilities? In what areas/how far? 
g. How would you describe the relationship between general managers and 
clinicians? 
h. How would you describe the relationship between general managers and 
executive team? 
i. How would you describe the relationship between general managers and HR and 
finance managers? 
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j. How would it be different, if you were managers in another directorate/division 
or even another hospital? 
k. Are the required training schemes / programmes in place for managers? 
3. Autonomy  
a. How far do you have independence and room for manoeuvre to make decisions? 
In what areas? Example? 
b. In what areas there is lack of autonomy? Examples? 
c. To what extent do you think you have the required financial and human 
resources to do your job? 
d. Are you able to hire new staff without permission? 
e. Are you able to retain savings made in your department? How have you spent 
this money? How much are you able to spend without permission? 
f. Are you able to formulate strategies for your directorate/division?  
g. Do you have autonomy to be innovative in terms of using financial or human 
resources?  
h. What do you think are the key factors affecting your autonomy? 
i. Do you value the autonomy you have? Does it make your job more fulfilling?  
j. Do you feel the boundaries of your work are clear or they are blurred? 
k. What are the negative consequences of autonomy? 
 
4. Changes  
l. As far as you recall, what changes have been made to your responsibilities since 
you have been in this post in the NHS?  
m. When did these changes occur? 
n. What have these changes been related to? (E.g. government policy, local 
strategic decisions?) 
o. Does being an FT have any effects on your responsibilities and the extent of your 
autonomy over those responsibilities? 
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Appendix 3. Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
 
 
Maryam Zahmatkesh 
T: 0785 9293 462 
E: m.zahmatkesh.2010@live.rhul.ac.uk 
 
 
Dear ………..,  
 
RE: Research on the role of middle managers in Foundation Trusts 
 
I am studying for a PhD in the School of Management at Royal Holloway-University of 
London. My supervisors are Mark Exworthy, Professor of Health Policy and Management, 
and Dr. Chris Rees, Senior Lecturer in Employment Relations. I am examining the general 
managers’ autonomy in Foundation Trusts in England. 
 
 
The aim of my research is to evaluate how far general managers have autonomy, and how 
they use their autonomy. I would like to find out whether granting autonomy to the 
hospitals and the inception of Foundation Trusts has had any effects on decision making and 
management practices within hospitals. My research aim is to find out whether managerial 
autonomy (managers’ control over finance and human resources, and their discretion to 
make decisions) has changed as a result of hospital restructuring. 
 
 
 
Benefits to Participation 
 
This case-study approach could be of benefit to your Trust in terms of its organisational 
development, reflective practice and comparative learning. I am willing to make my findings 
anonymous in the thesis as well as presenting my findings to your Trust. 
 
 
 
Methodology 
 
This study has three parts. First, in -depth one to one interview with general managers, HR 
and Finance managers would help to identify the roles, responsibilities, decision making 
process, and management practices within the Foundation Trusts. Second, observation of 
board meetings and shadowing middle managers will give the opportunity to find the 
contributing factors affecting the extent to that these managers can exercise autonomy in 
practice, and the issues they have to deal with in order to perform their role. Finally, the 
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analysis of hospital documents such as annual reports, strategy plans, and board meeting 
minutes will be a useful tool to have a better understanding of the context within which 
managers operate. 
 
 
 
What your contribution would involve 
 
I was hoping that you or your colleagues would be interested in participating in my research. 
You may choose to collaborate in interviews or to be observed as a participant. I welcome 
any additional suggestions you may have about how you would like to contribute. If you 
have any questions about my research or if you would like any additional information, 
please feel free to contact me and I will help in any way I can. I am open to and welcome 
your suggestions and recommendations about how to proceed. 
 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Maryam Zahmatkesh 
 
PhD Researcher 
School of Management, Royal Holloway-University of London 
http://pure.rhul.ac.uk/portal/en/persons/maryam-zahmatkesh%284f51fa7e-4179-49c2-
9961-2dd4242aeff3%29.html 
 
 
 
Supervisors:  
 
Prof. Mark Exworthy, Professor of Health Policy and Management 
m.exworthy@rhul.ac.uk 
http://pure.rhul.ac.uk/portal/en/persons/mark-exworthy%28d1524c09-3e80-4de0-a6b2-
d030fee3d342%29.html 
 
 
Dr. Chris Rees, Senior Lecturer in Employment Relations 
Chris.Rees@rhul.ac.uk 
http://pure.rhul.ac.uk/portal/en/persons/chris-rees%287cf3649f-eb2f-46e2-90d5-
dae40cf22f11%29.html 
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Appendix 4. Consent form  
 
 
Consent form 
 
Managers’ autonomy in Foundation Trusts 
 
Research Participant Consent Form 
Please read this form in conjunction with the Research Participant Information Sheet. 
                    Please Initial  
                                                                                                                                                                       Box 
 
1. I have read and understood the Participant Information Sheet dated            , and I have had the 
opportunity to discuss details with the researcher, and to ask any questions. The nature and purpose 
of this study have been explained to me, and I understand what will be required if I take part in this 
study. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary, and that I may withdraw from this study at any time 
without justifying my decision and without affecting my normal working. 
 
 
3. I consent to the interviews being recorded, and I understand that the transcript of the record will only 
be seen by the researcher. 
 
4. I agree to take part in this study as described in the Participant Information Sheet. 
 
 
 
Signature of participant 
________________________________________ 
 
 
Name in BLOCK LETTERS 
 
____________________________________________________ 
 
 
Date ____/_____/_____ 
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I confirm that I have explained the nature of the study as detailed in the Participant 
Information Sheet, in terms which in my judgment are suited to the understanding of the 
participant. 
 
 
 
Signature of research team member 
_______________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Name in BLOCK LETTERS 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Date ____/_____/_____ 
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Appendix 5. Approval letter  
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Appendix 6. Agenda for change and pay for managers 
Most jobs in the NHS are covered by the Agenda for Change (AfC) pay scales. This pay 
system covers all staff except doctors, dentists and the most senior managers. For 
information about pay for these professions see the pay information section in the medical 
or dental sections. 
 
In AfC, the NHS job evaluation system determines a point score which is used to match jobs 
to one of the nine pay bands and determine levels of basic salary.  
 
Each of the nine pay band has a number of pay points. Staff will normally progress to the 
next pay point annually until they reach the top of the pay band. In addition to basic pay, 
there is also extra pay for staff who work in high cost areas such as around London. 
Pay for managers 
The career in NHS management would typically start at Agenda for Change Band 6 or 7, with 
some positions at Band 5, and the most senior roles rising to Band 9 for, for example, a 
professional manager for a clinical or technical service. Examples of management roles 
include:  a business / administrative manager or practice manager (small practice) (Band 5), 
a project manager (Band 6), a practice manager (Group Practice) (Band 6), a finance 
department manager or HR team manager (Band 7) or a professional manager (clinical, 
clinical technical service), general managers, Bands range from 8a-9 depending on the role. 
In the following table there are examples of managerial positions which give an indication of 
which Agenda for Change pay bands certain job titles fit into and are based on the nationally 
produced job profiles. It can be used as a guide to the levels of pay, but these jobs may carry 
different job titles in different organizations across the NHS.  
 
Band  Examples of managerial positions  
Band 3 Porter Team Leader 
Band 4 General Office Manager/ Admin Team Leader 
Band 5  Business/Administrative Manager 
 Finance Team Manager 
 Project Support Manager 
 
Band 6  Business/Administrative Manager  
 Practice Manager 
 
Band 7  Finance Department Manager 
 Improvement and Development Manager 
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 Information Analyst Advanced Team Manager 
 Project Team Manager 
 
Band 8 – band 9   Head of Procurement and Supply (Band 8a-b) 
 HR Manager Principal  (Assistant Director) (Band 8a-c) 
 Principal Finance Manager (Band 8a) 
 General managers ( 8a-c) 
 Divisional operation managers  
 
Adapted and modified from: http://www.nhscareers.nhs.uk/explore-by-
career/management/pay-for-managers/  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
